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This dissertation is oriented around two moral ideals. The first is equality and the second 
perfection or excellence. In the chapter 2 I review some of the literature on the seemingly 
devastating ‘Levelling Down Objection’ to equality. I am in agreement with Larry Temkin 
that the Levelling Down Objection is true only if we believe that ‘person-affecting’ value, 
more specifically, welfare, is the only thing that matters in the moral universe. Hence, the 
Levelling down objeciton is premised on the truth of an undefended, highly contentious 
monism about value The purpose for introducing the Levelling Down Objection in chapter 1 
is made clear in chapter 3, where I suggest a new problem for egalitarians. Equality is a 
comparative relation holding between people. Relations are not properties, and, since it is 
widely assumed that value supervenes exclusively on properties, we need to show how a 
relation could be of value. It is crucial to be able say how this could be the case. However, 
this issue has, to the best of my knowledge, not been addressed in the literature on equality. If 
we cannot answer this quesiton then the value of the equality relation must reduce to the 
value of its relata. I try to offer a framework which at least goes as far as demonstrating that 
this need not be true. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with the value of perfection. I offer a careful 
reading of the work of an important defender and an important critic of this ideal, the former 
being Immanuel Kant and the latter being Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The aim of these two 
chapters is twofold; firstly, I show that the value of perfection consists in the development 
and cultivation of our capacities for rationality. Secondly I show how perfectionism 
illuminates the importance of culture and the arts. In the final chapter I bring the insights of 
this dissertation together in order to address a practical question; whether there are egalitarian 
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This thesis is a contribution to egalitarian moral thought, and an application of some of that 
thought to the domain of culture and the arts. In Chapters 1 and 2 I shall be dealing with some 




offer a framework for thinking about how we might apply egalitarianism to the question of 
culture and the arts. In Chapter 1, I shall review the current literature on an old, yet persistant 
problem for egalitarianism, in Chapter 2 I will attempt to set out, what I suggest is a new 
problem. This new problem, I believe, is an extension of the old one. Thus the crucial 
question of the first two chapters is how equality, understood as a comparative relation 
between people, is valuable. This question demands an answer before we can proceed to the 
applied side of the study. In Chapter 4 we shall show via Kant that perfectionism understood 
in terms of the development of the essential capacities for rationality, gives us strong reasons 
to favour, promote, or, otherwise lend our support to, culture and arts. I shall consider 
whether egalitarians should be opposed to these reasons.  However, while for example, 
Rawlsians have long opposed the promotion of the arts due to Rawls’s original argument that 
support for the arts contributes neither directly or indirectly to the social conditions that 
secure the equal liberties, nor to the advancement, in an appropriate way, of the long-term 
interests of the least advantaged.1 And prioritarians have reasons to oppose support for the 
arts on grounds of failing to promote a higher sum total of priority weighted utility2 to the 
best of my knowledge there are, to date, no applications of egalitarian thought to the question 
of culture and the arts.3 This may be because what it is that egalitarians are concerned to 
equalize people in, is welfare, and perfection or excellence, is, on most accounts, not thought 
to be a welfarist good.4 Secondly this might be because many applied studies of egalitarian 
                                                          
1 John Rawls A Theory of Justice Revised Edition Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999 p.292. 
2 See for example Peter Singer The Most Good You Can Do, New Haven and London Yale University Press 
pp.120-125 
3 The closest exceptions to this statement are Stephen Lecce ‘Should Egalitarians be Perfectionists’? Politics 25, 
no. 3 (2005): pp.127–34 and, despite his endorsement of perfectionism in earlier work (see n.44 below), 
Richard Arneson ‘Opportunity for Welfare, Priority, and Public Policy’ in Steven Cullenberg and Prasanta K. 
Pattanaik, eds., Globalization, Culture, and the Limits of the Market: Essays in  Economics and Philosophy, New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.177-214. 
4 See Hurka 1996 pp.17-18. See also Dale Dorsey ‘Three Arguments for Perfectionism’ Nous 2010, 44:59-79. 
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theory have been conducted in the arguably more pressing domains of healthcare5 and 
education.6 In this study I hold a view about equality as comparative fairness, and so the 
central practical question I seek to answer is whether there are reasons of comparative 
fairness to favour or disfavour support for the arts. And relatedly, in what sense do 
perfectionism and egalitarianism diverge on the matter of culture. Although a contemporary 
application of egalitarian thought to the question of culture has not, to date, been 
forthcoming7, one crucially important forebear of contemporary egalitarianism, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau had much to say on this very topic. In Chapter 4 I shall reconstruct several of 
Rousseau’s arguments against support for culture and the arts. Rousseau is committed to 
version of equality as comparative justice and it is therefore for reasons of justice, he 
contends, that we should object to the support for culture and the arts. Now, one writer who is 
sensitive to the question of culture is Thomas Nagel. As he writes, “a society which supports 
creative achievement and encourages maximum levels of excellence will have to accept and 
exploit stratification and hierarchy.”8 And he gives three reasons in support of his claim that 
the promotion of cultural and artistic excellence would be “strongly anti-egalitarian”.9 Firstly, 
he argues this will be so because talents for creative excellence are unequal, secondly, 
because these abilities also, in part, are the result of cultural education transmitted informally 
through the family, and, finally, because the motivation to pursue great achievements in 
culture and the arts also owes much to family influence.10  Nagel might very well owe a debt 
to Rousseau here, since, as we will see in Chapter 4, Rousseau was the first writer to present 
                                                          
5 See for instance Nir Eyal Samia A. Hurst, Ole F. Norheim, Dan Wikler (eds.), Inequalities in Health: Concepts, 
Measures, and Ethics (Oxford University Press) 2013 
6  See for example, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift ‘Putting Educational Equality in its Place.’ Educational 
Policy and Finance 3, no.4, 2008, pp.444-66 and Harry Brighouse, Kenneth. R. Howe and James Tooley 
Educational Equality, Bloomsbury, 2010.  
7 Note that I am not claiming that it has not been noticed that certain kinds of perfectionism have strongly 
‘elitist’ implications. All the main proponents of perfectionism are aware of this fact.  
8 Nagel, Equality and Partiality, Oxford University Press 1991, p.132. 
9 Nagel 1991,Ibid.  




these very same ideas in a case against support for the arts. In his First Discourse on the Arts 
and Sciences he rails against “The disastrous inequality introduced among men by the 
distinction of talents and the debasement of virtue.”11 Rousseau believes that it is 
objectionable that some should fare better than others on the basis of their possessing superior 
talents and abilities, including artistic or cultural abilities. He believes that such abilities are 
the product of luck. As he puts it; “we are born with our talents, only our virtues belong to 
us.”12  Hence he condemns as unjust, a situation where the less virtuous fare better than the 
more virtuous. Rousseau’s arguments are, I believe, are crucial to our understanding of the 
costs of inequality which must be weighed against reasons in favour of the promotion of 
cultural and artistic excellence.  
1.2 Egalitarianisms 
Let me now say a little about the current literature on egalitarianism. All egalitarians, insofar 
as they are egalitarians defend the view the there is something normatively significant about 
a comparative relation between persons. Yet insofar as they share a common view that is 
about as far as many egalitarians are prepared to go. Due to Elizabeth Anderson13 and David 
Miller14 there are, at least, two important yet quite distinct, strands in contemporary 
egalitarian thought.15 On the one hand, Anderson and Miller, along with Carina Fourie,16 
Martin O’Neill,17 Thomas Scanlon,18 and Samuel Scheffler19 defend a view that has come to 
                                                          
11  Jean-Jacques Rousseau The Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. in The Discourses and Other Early Political 
Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p.23. 
12 Jean-Jacques Rousseau Preface to Narcissus in The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor 
Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p.98. 
13 Elizabeth Anderson ‘What Is the Point of Equality?’ Ethics Vol. 109, No. 2 1999, pp. 287-337 
14 David Miller, ‘Equality and Justice,’ in his Principles of Social Justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1999, and David Miller ‘Complex Equality’ in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds) Pluralism, Justice and 
Equality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 197-225 
15 For a third view see Kok-Chor Tan Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality, 
Oxford University Press 2012. 
16 Carina Fourie ‘What is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal’ Res 
Publica 18 (2):107-126, 2012 
17 Martin O’Neill ‘What Should Egalitarians Believe?’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (2):119-156, 2008. 
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be known as ‘social relations egalitarianism.’20 As Jonathan Wolff explains21 the central idea 
of social relations egalitarianism is that, in order for us to bring about a society of equals we 
have to create the conditions of mutual respect and self-respect, and this task entails reducing 
or eliminating certain oppressive and hierarchical divisions which deny some individuals 
and/or groups the recognition and respect they are owed as full and participating members of 
society. This view has strong affinities with the work of ‘difference’ theorists such as Iris 
Marion Young,22 and with the work of Nancy Fraser23 and Axel Honneth24 on ‘recognition.’25 
These views connect to a much older tradition of thought expressed in the following passage 
by John Milton; “they who are greatest... are not elevated above their brethren; live soberly in 
their families, walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, 
without adoration.”26 I cannot give any kind of detailed analysis of these views here but let 
me simply note that each of the differing social egalitarian views converges on the idea of a 
society of equals in which people stand in certain kinds of relations to one another 
characterized by the absence of hierarchy, oppression, domination, and exploitation.27 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 Thomas Scanlon ‘When Does Equality Matter?’ (Paper presented at a conference on equality at John. F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA, 2004) accessed 1st March 2015, 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Lecture%201%20revised%20October%202014
.pdf 
19 Samuel Scheffler What Is Egalitarianism?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, 5-39, 2003 
20 Kaspar Lippert-Rasmussen Luck Egalitarianism Bloomsbury ,2015, Chpt.7 
21 Jonathan Wolff ‘Equality: The recent history of an idea’, Journal of Moral Philosophy , 4 (1) 2007, pp.125 - 
136. 
22 Iris Marion Young ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ in Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton University 
Press, 1990, pp. 39-65. 
23 Nancy Fraser Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World Columbia University Press 
2010, see ch. 3. Fraser develops a ‘status model’ of recognition in her ‘Rethinking Recognition’ New Left 
Review  3:, 2000, pp.107-120, cf. David Miller 2010, and Carina Fourie, ‘To Praise and to Scorn: The Problem of 
Inequalities of Esteem for Social Egalitarianism’ in Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer 
(eds) Social Equality: On what it Means to be Equals, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp.87-107. 
24 Axel Honneth The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts MIT Press, 1996, see 
especially ch.7-8 
25 See Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth Redistribution Or Recognition?: A Political-philosophical Exchange Verso 
Books, 2003 
26 J ohn Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton, vols 1–8,Yale University Press 1953–82, pp. 424–25 




O’Neill and Scanlon have made what are perhaps the most important contributions to our 
thinking about some of the differences between social relations and (what used to be known 
as) ‘luck’ egalitarian views. These writers conceive of equality as an important facet of that 
part of morality that is concerned with what we owe to each other.28 Roughly social relations 
egalitarianism says that substantive equality in one or another dimension (i.e., welfare, or, 
resources) is desirable only when and because it is necessary to promote, or secure, other 
important values that are themselves egalitarian. As we have seen, O’Neill and Scanlon argue 
that these other values, are (but not limited to) (i) equality of social status, or, standing and 
(ii) non-domination.29 This view is often contrasted with another view known as ‘luck’30 
egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism was originally pioneered by, among others, Arneson,31 
Dworkin,32 Cohen,33and Temkin.34 This brand of egalitarianism is distinct from the social-
relations view principally because it does not conceive of equality as part of the morality of 
what we owe to each other.35 Rather these egalitarians believe that it is bad because unfair or 
unjust that some fare worse than others through no fault or choice of their own. This type of 
egalitarianism is not motivated, I claim,36 merely out of a narrow concern to mitigate the 
effects of luck on people’s lives, as many of its proponents and detractors have thought, but 
                                                          
28 T.M Scanlon What We Owe To Each Other Cambridge, Mass: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 1998. 
29 O’Neill (2008) 121-22, Scanlon (ibid), see also Phillip Pettit (2012) on the idea of non-domination. 
30 The name was originally coined by Anderson, 1999, and as a pejorative.  
31 Richard Arneson ‘Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,’ Philosophical Studies 56: 77-93, 1989, ‘Luck 
Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism’ Ethics, 110, No. 2, 2000, ‘Luck and Equality’, Proceedings of Aristotelian 
Society, 75: 73–90, 2001, ‘Luck Egalitarianism: An Interpretation and Defense’ Philosophical Topics, 32: 1–20, 
2006. 
32 Ronald Dworkin Sovereign Virtue Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
33 G.A Cohen ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’, Ethics 99, pp. 906–944 1989, ‘Where the action is: On the 
site of distributive justice’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26, No.1, 1997, pp. 3-30. If You're an Egalitarian, 
How Come You're So Rich?, Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press 2000, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 
Cambridge and London, Harvard University Press. 2008 
34 Larry Temkin Inequality Oxford University Press, 1993. 
35 Though see Peter Vallentyne ‘Justice, Interpersonal Morality, and Luck Egalitarianism’ in  Alexander Kaufman 
(Ed.) Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage: G. A. Cohen’s Egalitarianism, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015, pp. 40-49 for a view about how luck egalitarianism might be conjoined with 
interpersonal morality.  
36 See also Cohen 2008 and Temkin 1993, and Larry Temkin ‘Justice, Equality, Fairness, Desert, Rights, Free 
Will, Responsibility, and Luck,’ in Carl Knight and Zofia Stemplowska (Eds) Distributive Justice and 
Responsibility, pp. 51-76, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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rather, it is a part of a morality concerned with how people fare in comparison to others, and 
it is centrally concerned with a comparative notions of fairness and justice. These egalitarians 
believe for example, that it is in itself bad that some are people are born blind while others 
are not, or, that a child in Chad is born with much worse life prospects than her European 
counterparts.37  As I have mentioned, both of these views constitute genuine egalitarian 
positions insofar as both views are concerned with a comparative relation between people. 
But when it is asked why equality matters the two views diverge. Thus more specifically, the 
two views diverge in terms of the reasons they each hold with respect to why inequality is 
disvaluable. Comparative fairness egalitarians believe that it is in itself bad because unfair or 
unjust that some people fare worse than others due to bad luck. Social relations egalitarians 
deny this claim. They believe that how people fare relative to one another only matters if and 
because it undermines other values. Comparative fairness egalitarianism is often described as 
a telic egalitarianism - this is correct. However it would be incorrect to assume that social 
relations egalitarianism is a species of deontic egalitarianism. This taxonomy was originally 
suggested by Derek Parfit.38 However, I agree with Martin O’Neill39 that Parfit’s taxonomy is 
unhelpful because mistaken in capturing the distinction between these two positions. 
According to Parfit40, deontic egalitarians believe that natural inequalities are not morally 
significant; and hence these inequalities do not call for rectification. Secondly deontic 
egalitarians are committed to the view that inequalities are bad only when and because they 
                                                          
37 Temkin 2015. 
38 Derek Parfit ‘Equality or Priority’in The Ideal of Equality, ed. Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. 81–125. 
39 O’Neill 2008 
40 Parfit 2000, for views about ‘deontic’ egalitarianism that are distinct from Parfit’s, see Kaspar Lippert-
Rasmussen, ‘The Insignificance of the Distinction between Telic and Deontic Egalitarianism’ in Nils Holtug & 
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon 
Press 2006, pp101-125, see also Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve ‘Why It Matters That Some Are Worse 
Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority View’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 37: 171–199, 2009 Bertil 
Tungodden and Peter Vallentyne ‘Person-Affecting Paretian Egalitarianism with Variable Population Size’, in 
John Roemer and Kotaro Suzumura (Eds) Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability, Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 




are wrong, such as, for example, when one person gains advantage over another at that 
persons expense, for example, by harming or exploiting him. Hence on this construal, deontic 
egalitarians are not concerned with the badness or disvalue of inequality per se, but with 
inequalities that result from wrongdoing. Thus the deontic view can be reduced to a concern 
with wrongdoing. Since its concern for inequality is entirely captured by a concern with 
wrongdoing, it is doubtful therefore whether deontic egalitarianism really is an egalitarian 
view. According to Parfit, telic egalitarians, on the other hand, believe that inequality is bad 
whatever its cause.  However, this is patently incorrect, no telic egalitarian believes that all 
inequalities are bad, for that would commit her to the view that inequalities, say, between 
‘freckled’ and the ‘unfreckled’ people, or between insects and mammals, are bad. Both social 
relations egalitarians and luck egalitarians reject the view that all inequalities are bad. Rather, 
both of these views are committed to the thought that only inequalities of some normatively 
significant kind are bad, and thus ought to be reduced or eliminated. So in this sense, both 
views qualify as ‘telic’. However it is then suggested that social relations egalitarians differ 
from their luck egalitarian counterparts because they want to add the claim that it is bad for 
other reasons that, for example, some are born blind and others sighted, or that some are born 
with greater capacities and talents and others with less. But this does not get us very far. 
Properly understood, comparative fairness egalitarians do not hold that luck is bad, per se,41 
neither do they hold that luck explains why inequality is bad, rather they hold that inequalities 
that are the result of luck are bad only when and because luck disrupts comparative fairness 
between people. Thus alongside Cohen and Temkin, I claim that it is a concern with fairness 
or justice that explains why inequalities that result from luck are bad. Egalitarians of my 
stripe will therefore be opposed to luck only when it results in comparative unfairness or 
                                                          
41 At least not on the view of two of its most important defenders. For example, G.A Cohen 2000, pp.158-159 
holds that inequalities are bad only when and because they are unjust. While Temkin 2015 (and I) hold that 
inequalities that are the result of luck are bad only when and because they are unfair.  
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injustice. Social relations egalitarians also hold that luck is not in itself bad, but rather that 
inequalities that are the result of luck are bad only when and because they lead to diminished 
social status or to relations of political and economic domination between persons. This view 
holds that, while it is not in itself bad that some born blind or disabled and others are not, it is 
bad for a blind or disabled person to be treated as a ‘second class’ citizen in the sense in 
which they suffer disrespect on the part of their fellows, or, that they enjoy less of the basic 
economic and political rights, freedoms and opportunities than other citizens.42 Thus the two 
views diverge in the following sense. The social relations view is a rejection of the view 
which says that what is disvaluable about inequality can be explained on the basis of ‘faring 
better or worse than others’. As O’Neill writes “the [luck egalitarian] ideal of equality can 
seem unduly obscure and abstract: as a merely arithmetic goal, the value of which is 
impossible to grasp. It is difficult to understand the great badness of inequality, and the moral 
urgency of its eradication.”43 Hence the clue to the divergence between the two views lies in 
the name. What the social relations view rejects is the idea that inequality could be 
impersonally bad. For example, suppose that you and I are washed up on two separate desert 
islands and we are completely unaware of each other’s respective situations. Suppose that, on 
my island, I am at (50) units of welfare, and you, on your island are at (100), both of us fare 
quite well, though neither of us lives in paradise. Further suppose that you fare better than I, 
simply due to your having better talents for catching fish than I do. Since I do not suffer the 
harm of disrespect, or, diminished social status in relation to you; we are, as mentioned, 
totally unaware of each other’s existence, and since you do not use your greater talents and 
abilities to exploit or dominate me, the social relations view would have to say that there is 
nothing bad about this situation, precisely because there is no social relation between us that 
is impared by my faring worse off than you. The comparative fairness egalitarian on the other 
                                                          
42 See John Rawls Justice as Fairness a Restatement Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, p.44 




hand would say that this situation is bad, despite not being bad for anyone. But now suppose, 
some event occurs - perhaps perchance we respectively discover telescopes on our islands -
where we became aware of one another’s existence. Suppose you send me mocking 
messages-in-a-bottle, regaling me with stories about your superior fish stocks, and that 
consequently, I feel a deep sense of shame at my inferior fishing ability. The social relations 
view would now say that because this is a case of unequal respect or standing, and because 
this is a personal bad, the inequality has become objectionable. I find this view implausible 
for two reasons. Firstly, as I shall show in Chapter 1, I disagree with the idea that the only 
inequalities that could matter are those that are personally bad for individuals. This claim 
could be embraced by non, and anti-egalitarians alike.  Secondly, whilst the social relations 
view does give a plausible account of the personal bad of inequality, and equally plausibility 
inequality is sometimes a personal bad, the social relations view says that we ought to 
disfavour inequalities only when and because they do result in something personally bad, in 
the sense of diminished status, disrespect, domination, or exploitation, and I think this view 
runs the risk of reducing to the badness of one of some conjunction of the above. That is, I 
agree that it is plausible that inequality is often the cause of the above list of bads, but I do 
not think that the badness of inequality should be explained in terms of these bads. Finally, 
because the social relations view is only weakly concerned for how people fare relative to 
one another, it leads to the rather odd position that Elizabeth Anderson44 has argued for, 
namely that the social relations view need not be in the business of recommending equalizing 
people in anything at all. If the goal of social relations egalitarianism is equal enjoyment of 
social status and respect, and of the various political rights and liberties, then this might be 
achieved merely by ensuring that each person has a ‘sufficient’45 amount of resources or 
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welfare required so that she is able to function as a social equal amongst equals. When 
sufficiency for all is achieved we need not worry that some people’s lives go vastly better 
than others just so long as no one suffers from disrespect or diminished status. So while by no 
means a conclusive argument for either one of these two egalitarian views, for at least the 
above reasons, the view I defend in this dissertation is a view about equality as comparative 
fairness.  
1.3.  Defending egalitarianism and a new insight. 
I argue in Chapter 2, the normative import of this view has not yet been fully explored. In 
particular neither of its main proponents G.A. Cohen or Larry Temkin have offered an answer 
as to how a relation could be valuable in itself.  Unless we can show how a relation between 
persons could be valuable, there is a danger that the comparative fairness egalitarian is open 
to the objection that the value of equality reduces to the value of something else. This is a 
question I turn to in Chapter 2. In Chapter 1 however, I have to confront the so-called 
“levelling down” objection to egalitarianism. This has to be confronted because it has been 
thought to be utterly devastating to egalitarianism, so before we can continue to make claims 
on behalf of egalitarianism it must be shown that the levelling-down objection is not so 
devastating at all. Egalitarians hold that, an outcome is made, in one respect better if 
inequality is reduced or eliminated, even if this does not involve making the worse off better 
off, but only involves bringing the better off down to the level of worse off. Non-egalitarians 
argue that in no respect is an outcome normatively improved by levelling down some and in 
no respect is an outcome worsened merely by raising up some, Since levelling down would 
undeniably decrease inequality, yet it would render no one better off, while raising up would 
undeniably increase inequality yet it would make some better off, equality cannot improve an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    





outcome in any respect so egalitarianism must be rejected. As Larry Temkin46 has 
demonstrated objections to levelling down must depend on an appeal to a person-affecting 
restriction on the moral value of outcomes, which he dubs the Slogan. The Slogan says that a 
situation or outcome cannot be worse (or better) than another in any respect if there is no one 
for whom it is worse (or better) in any respect. Now after showing how the Slogan has to be 
adapted in order that it is not totally implausible, I then suggest that if true, this adapted or 
Revised Slogan (RS) is strong enough to rule out equality as being in any respect valuable. I 
then canvass some egalitarian responses to levelling down and find them unsatisfactory. One 
important view argues that to avoid levelling-down objections, we should reconceive 
equality, not as a value as such, but rather as a factor which adjusts another, intrinsic value, 
up or down. This view is compatible with RS since it takes wellbeing to that intrinsic value, 
and moreover, the only moral value in the universe, and it then says that an equal distribution 
of welfare can be better than an unequal one, but a distribution with a lower sum total of 
welfare can never be better in any respect, than an alternate distribution with a higher sum 
total of welfare. I show that while this view avoids the levelling down objection, it does so by 
eviscerating the value of the equality relation. I conclude by showing that there is a simple 
inductive argument for why the RS does not work and the levelling down objection must fail.  
I believe that it is a misunderstanding of the value of equality to conceive of egalitarianism as 
a welfarist view. This misunderstanding rests on the assumption that, since egalitarianism 
takes welfare to be the good it wants to equalize people in, the value of equality must reduce 
in part at least to the value of welfare. Since, how could it be that a relation between people is 
valuable in itself? Surely, we value inequality because we want the worse-off to be as well 
off as all those better off than they? Just as we value the freedom relation because we value 
                                                          
46 Temkin 1996, and Temkin ‘Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads’ in R.G Frey and Christopher Morris (Eds) Value, 
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and St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 126-161, 
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the ability to do X. This view says that inequality only matters in a certain respect, and 
moreover that we should only be concerned with eliminating inequality in a certain way i.e. 
by benefiting the worse off.  However, due to the levelling down objection, it was shown that 
egalitarians must in fact believe that equality could matter even in the absence of any increase 
in the welfare of the worse-off. I agree. They must therefore believe that there is something 
good about a comparatively fair relation between people even if this was the result of 
‘levelling down’ the better off to the level of the worst-off. I also agree. Egalitarians should 
believe this. There is some value in this state of affairs then. But in any case, no single value 
can plausibly account for all that matters. We might have a reason to favour a levelled 
outcome over an unlevelled one, but this is quite compatible with such reasons being 
outweighed by other important considerations one of which might be the sum total welfare. 
As Ross teaches us, when one reason is outweighed by another, this does not mean that that 
reason is thereby nullified or obliterated.47 The levelling down objection was supposed to 
prove conclusively that egalitarianism should be rejected. Not only do I show that it has 
failed to do so, but moreover, (and despite the fact that many egalitarians have felt the force 
of the levelling down objection and have been led to question whether they really were 
egalitarians rather than, say, Rawlsians or prioritarians who want to ensure the worst-off were 
as well off as possible),48 the levelling down objection can actually help clarify the basic 
normative concern of egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is, I claim, not any sort of welfarist view. 
Rather it is one aspect of that part of morality that is concerned with how people fare relative 
to one another. And the reasons that explain why we should care about how people fare 
relative to one another are reasons of fairness and justice.49 In Chapter 2, I show that a new 
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objection which is independent of, but closely related to, levelling down can be lobbed 
towards egalitarianism. This is the objection from the metaethical assumption that that value 
of some thing, X supervenes exclusively on the intrinsic properties of that X.50 Since equality 
is a comparative relation, and relations are not properties, it is unclear what could be valuable 
about a relation. The value of equality must then reduce to its relata. Since one of the relata of 
the equality relation is welfare, the value of equality reduces to the value of welfare. And thus 
equality cannot be valuable in itself. I show in this chapter that this need not be the case. 
1.4. Perfectionism 
The second central idea of this dissertation concerns perfectionism. Why do I introduce this 
new idea? In what sense do I introduce it? And what is the purpose of my doing so?  Firstly 
this is a dissertation about equality, and my aim is to explore perfectionism from the 
perspective of equality, more specifically, and I aim to show how the two views sometimes, 
and in important senses, diverge. Even more specifically, my aim is to show that 
perfectionism and egalitarianism disagree over the practical question of support for artists.  
Secondly, it should be pointed out that, while I spend some time in chapters 3 and 5, speaking 
of perfectionism as an important moral ideal in its own right, and some more time trying to 
say in what, exactly, perfectionism consists, my aim is to consider first of all, how and why, 
the arts, the humanities and the sciences, or otherwise; ‘culture and the arts’, are themselves 
an important source of perfectionist value. I suggest that this latter task will be dependent on 
the former. That is, we must be able to grasp why perfectionism is valuable, before we can 
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say how and why particular perfectionist goods are valuable. Secondly, if equality is the main 
focus of the thesis, however, as I clearly state in Chapter 1, equality is not the only value that 
matters in the moral universe. One other value that matters in addition to equality, and 
welfare, is I believe perfectionism. On any plausible value theory each of these values must 
be assigned some weight in assessing states of affairs. Thus in order to arrive at a judgment 
about which outcome would be all things considered best, we must offer some plausible 
weighting scheme which takes all the relevant values into account and is able to consistently 
and coherently arrive at plausible all things considered judgments. It is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to offer anything even resembling a suggestion as to how this could be done, 
since, as Larry Temkin has recently shown,51 arriving at a plausible view about what all 
things considered value might look like is certainly among the most difficult and pressing 
problems in all of practical philosophy. So suffice it to say that when I speak about the value 
of an outcome ‘from the perspective of’ equality or perfection, this should be taken to imply 
the value a state of affairs or outcome has on the basis of the value of a single moral ideal. 
Thus, it does not simply an all things considered judgement.   
I believe that the most important reasons for why culture and the arts matter are perfectionist 
reasons.52 Perfectionism is a doctrine which says that what is intrinsically valuable is the 
development of the powers and capacities which make us the kinds of beings we essentially 
are. And the capacity which it identifies as being essential to the human species is the 
capacity for rationality.53 Secondly as indicated by its name, perfectionism is a maximizing 
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doctrine. Thomas Hurka, the leading contemporary proponent of the doctrine suggests the 
connection between perfection and maximization54 is, if not analytic, at least a constitutive 
one, as denoted by the term perfection-ism. In order to see this, consider a view which, 
simply for the purposes of drawing a distinction, I shall call ‘Satisficing Developmentalism’. 
This view like perfectionism, enjoins the development of the capacities but up to some 
‘satisfactory’ or ‘sufficient’ level. Let us suppose, (idealistically) that 5 represents a 
satisfactory level of perfection, or, excellence. Now consider a person with a talent for 
trumpet playing. Suppose she has the option to either join an amateur brass band which 
would to move her from 2 to 5, or to join a professional orchestra which would move her 
from 2 to 10. On the satisficing55 view because in both outcomes she would move to the 
threshold, both outcomes must therefore be equally good. So it would be permissible, all else 
equal, for her to choose the former and move to the threshold, even if the alternative, in 
which she would develop her abilities to an even greater degree, was available. 
Perfectionism, on the other hand, argues that the best outcome is the one with the highest sum 
total of perfection, and so, it would argue that it would be wrong for to choose the amateur 
brass band option if the orchestra option were available since this would be a waste of her 
finest talents.56 As Hurka writes: “The terms ‘perfection’ and ‘excellence’ hardly connote 
contentment with the moderately good…. The recruiting slogan of the U.S armed forces is 
not, ‘Be at least two-thirds of all that you can be’, nor is the motto of the Olympics 
‘Reasonably fast, reasonably high, reasonably strong.’”57 Perfectionism is therefore 
intrinsically concerned with the maximal development of talents and abilities.  Many 
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perfectionists58 assume that there is a strong connection between the development of the 
capacities and reasons to support or promote culture and the arts, but it is rather unclear what 
this connection might consist in. Since it is unclear why, specifically culture and the arts are 
an important source of perfectionist value. Kant is one important perfectionist writer who has 
a fully worked out account of the normative import of culture and the arts in terms of the 
development of the capacity for practical reason generally, and specifically, the development 
of moral reason.  In Chapter 3, we will look at the argument Kant gives for his belief that 
there exists a strong connection between culture and the arts and the development of practical 
reason, and for believing that there is a weaker, yet still to some degree important, connection 
between culture and the arts and moral reason.  Kant understands ‘perfectionism’ to consist in 
the development of the rational capacities, and secondly, he identifies this development with 
what he calls ‘culture’. This is perfectly consistent with the view of the most important 
contemporary proponent of perfectionism, Thomas Hurka. Kant and Hurka agree that it is the 
capacity to set ends which makes us rational. That is, “[humans] are rational because they can 
form and act on sophisticated beliefs and intentions, ones whose contents stretch across 
persons and times and that are arranged in complex hierarchies. These last features 
distinguish human rationality from that of lower animals.”59 Hurka for example suggests that 
perfectionism offers “justifications [which] come together in a policy of government support 
for the arts”.60 While I believe this to be intuitively correct, he gives us no indication of how 
these “valuable activities”61 connect to the central perfectionist idea of the development of 
the rational capacities. To address this explanatory deficit, I turn to Kant’s thesis on the arts 
and culture from the Critique of Teleological Judgement.62  Now, Kant thinks we need an 
explanation of why culture is a significant source of perfectionist value. And he tells us that 
                                                          
58 For example, every writer listed in n1, above. 
59 Hurka 1993, ibid 
60 Hurka 1993, 39 
61 Hurka 1993, ibid 




the importance of culture lies the development of the rational capacities which is, in some 
way, connected with a development towards morality. My Chapter 4 is an attempt to 
understand this connection. I show that Kant’s thesis on the normative significance of culture 
and the arts can be considered to consist in two interconnected ideas. Firstly, that culture and 
the arts consist in the use of practical reason in complex ways, which distinguishes us from 
mere natural organisms. Thus he claims that culture is the vehicle through which we develop 
an aptitude for practical reason in general.  Secondly, culture and the arts are significant in 
terms of assisting us in some sense towards the realization of the capacity for morality. What 
does this entail? Kant believes that the normative significance of the arts and culture lies 
firstly in its developing the rational capacities, and secondly, in its further aiding the 
development of these capacities in light of a moral capacity, of which is itself a rational 
capacity. In this sense he often speaks about culture as an aid to moral freedom where moral 
freedom consists in a capacity for action and deliberation, guided by reason alone, or, 
otherwise virtue. Now, as I point out in Chapter 6, some writers63 have argued for support for 
the arts and culture, pace Kant, on grounds that the development of a cultured or aesthetic 
sensibility is a necessary and possibly also sufficient condition for the development of a 
moral personality. However, I show that it hugely debatable whether Kant himself wants to 
make this sort of strong claim. I show that he does claim that culture encompasses both the 
conditions of moral agency and the conditions of moral progress and so it appears to be the 
case that he wants to connect culture and morality. Thus, what I refer to after Robert 
Louden64 in Chapter 4 as the ‘strong thesis’ involves the claim that exposure to culture is a 
preparatory step in order for an individual be able to make moral choices at all. That is, 
unless we are exposed to such ‘aids’ we will be unable to formulate moral maxims. Therefore 
culture and the arts must be established prior to morality as its necessary and sufficient 
                                                          
63 See n1 above.  
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condition. However, I show that Kant cannot be making this claim. For this would involve a 
contradiction in his basic thesis that duty is itself motivationally independent from various 
empirical supports. What Louden and I call the ‘weaker thesis’ implies that culture and the 
arts are necessary yet not sufficient conditions for the development of moral character. This 
would still argue strongly for the idea that individuals should have access to culture and the 
arts in order to prepare them for morality, but would not make this into a requirement in order 
that one be moral and so it would avoid the idea that morality depends on culture. Finally, I 
asses the ‘weakest thesis’, where, on this view, Kant wants to establish not that culture and 
the arts are either a necessary or sufficient condition for moral agency, but rather they are a 
necessary condition for moral improvement or progress. Thus they are not some kind of 
preparatory aid to morality at all. Therefore, we can understand Kant as making still weaker 
argument for the relation of culture to morality which includes only a claim about the 
development of practical rationality. I end Chapter 4, by arguing that Kant’s considered view 
was somewhere between the “weaker” and the ‘weakest’ thesis.  That is, culture and the arts 
help to develop the conditions for the use of reason generally, and which Kant believes must 
include moral reason, and this is enough to establish the basic perfectionist insight. Thus, 
according to Kant there are two interconnected reasons to favour, promote or otherwise lend 
our support to the arts, firstly, they are crucial to development of practical reason and 
secondly because they are an important aid to moral progress. 
Now social relations egalitarians often claim Rousseau as a forebear of their view. This is 
only partly correct. The Rousseau of the Social Contract may well give credence to their 
view. The Rousseau of the first two Discourses and of Emile, gives some credence to my 
comparative fairness egalitarian view. As I mentioned above, Rousseau believes that it is 
unfair or unjust that some should fare better than others due to their having greater natural 




desert, where those who are equally deserving should fare equally well.  He holds that virtue 
is the proper desert-base and he holds a common good conception of virtue. Rousseau’s 
objection in First Discourse on the Arts and Sciences, is that it is unjust that those who are 
morally less deserving than others fare better than those who are morally more deserving. His 
claim is that those who have chosen not to contribute to the common good, those who have 
instead chosen a life of contemplation and leisure, namely artists and the philosophes, should 
not be permitted to fare better than those who have chosen a life of virtue. Extending from 
this argument, in Chapter 4, I show that Rousseau wants to develop further an account of 
consequences of comparative injustice which he connects to the idea of ‘corruption’. The 
basis insight is that there are further bads, on top of, or, in addition to comparative injustice 
This he argues is the ‘craving for distinction’ associated with his idea of amour propre; the 
desire to be richer and more esteemed than others. Put simply, instead of being motivated to 
act from virtue, when talents are widely esteemed and venerated, individuals are motivated to 
expend greater amounts of time and money investing in their development. And as we will 
see Rousseau argues that the effect of this the corruption of a natural tendency or inclination 
towards the good. Hence, in direct contrast to Kant, Rousseau claims that the development of 
the arts encourages one to neglect one’s duty. And, instead of being ‘aids’ to moral 
development Rousseau argues that culture and the arts encourages vice.  
1.5 A practical quesiton. 
In Chapter 6, I attempt to provide an answer to the central practical question of this study, 
whether there are egalitarian reasons support the arts. Here I draw on some recent empirical 
studies of artists’ incomes and earing functions. Thought these findings provide us with a 
partial picture of income inequality in the arts, they should however be useful in guiding us in 
our assessment of when and in what respect equality as comparative fairness has implications 
on policy decisions for the arts. The data I refer to establishes the following things; firstly, 
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that income inequality has increased in the arts over the period 1949–1999. During this 
period, artists had a consistently lower mean and median incomes compared to workers with 
similar levels of professional training and education. Secondly that the average income of a 
full-time artist in the US is around 30% lower than that of all other full-time managerial and 
professional employees, a group broadly which is taken by the econometrics literature to be 
comparable with artists in term of abilities, experience and educational attainment. Third, it 
shows that while artists enjoy a comparable level of education to that of professional and 
technical workers, returns to education are lower for artists than for workers in these other 
sectors. Which implies that, unlike in other sectors, investment in education does not 
significantly increase artists’ incomes. The data has also shown that despite these issues there 
has nevertheless been a huge increase in numbers of people pursuing careers in the arts since 
at least the late 1970s. Finally, three separate surveys have shown that there is a tendency for 
a majority of artists to be drawn from comparatively better off backgrounds though the 
majority of these will end up significantly worse off in comparison to their parents. In the 
chapter I use this data to create four hypothetical ‘case studies’ through which our intuitions 
about comparative fairness can be tested. I find that in most cases there is no egalitarian 
objection to artists being worse off than others. This is brought into relief when we compare 
artists who are badly off in income terms, with those who are equally badly off in terms of 
income, but who lack the occupational choice set of an artist. Our egalitarian intuitions would 
support aiding the latter person and not the former, despite the fact that they are equally badly 
off.  Things get more complicated when we compare intra artistic inequalities. For example 
when an artist, as Rousseau would have it, is driven by amour propre to pursue fame and 
fortune in the knowledge of the risk involved and where another artist chooses to use her 




artists fares better than the other there might well be an objection from comparative justice to 
the latter faring worse than the former.   
I conclude this introduction with the following thoughts. I believe that both equality and 
perfection matter, and I believe, moreover, alongside Kant and Hurka, that culture and the 
arts matter because perfection matters. It is good that we develop our capacities for 
rationality, and it is good that inequality is reduced or eliminated. Perfection and equality are 
two important values in the moral universe which must be carefully weighed together with 
other important values if we are to arrive at an all things considered judgement about the best 
outcome. However as we shall, see both perfection and equality are non welfarist values, and 
there are some, in particular those who Fred Feldman65 describes as fanatical welfarists who 
would wish that talk of perfection and equality be expunged. These people hold an 
implausible monism about value.  Their views are not defensible. I write this thesis from the 
assumption that some form of pluralism about value66 is true. I shall say a little more about 
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Levelling Down, Equality, Fairness and Welfare 
2.1 
The master value of this dissertation is equality. In this chapter I will consider the so-called, 
‘levelling down objection’ against it, and I shall examine two responses to the objection. In 
the section 1, I consider the response to the levelling down objection due originally to Larry 
Temkin.67 In section 2, I review a second, alternative response to the levelling down 
objection which has been proposed by a number of writers, including; John Broome,68Iwao 
Hirose,69 Karsten Klint Jensen,70 and Ingmar Persson.71 This response is premised on a 
modified version of egalitarianism which completely avoids levelling down, and, for that 
reason, the above writers claim, enjoys a crucial advantage over Temkin’s framwork. I shall 
find this response unsatisfactory and defend Temkin’s framework as the most plausible 
egalitarian response to the levelling down objection. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. 
Fristly I review some of the key literature in the field and introduce the ‘impersonal 
egalitarian’ framework which I shall be working with across this thesis, secondly, I shall 
show that whilst the current discussion of levelling down typically turns on the normative 
status of impersonal values, a second problem to which egalitarians must answer is the one 
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regarding the normative status of an impersonal relation. And it is this problem which will be 
addressed in chapter 3. 
2.2 Setting out levelling down: Person-affecting principles. 
Egalitarians hold at least the following:  
Egalitarian Principle: it is bad because unfair that some people are worse off than others 
through no fault or choice of their own.72 
According to egalitarianism, an outcome is made, in one respect better if inequality is 
reduced or eliminated, even if this does not involve making the worse off better off, but only 
involves bringing the better off down to the level of worse off. Non-egalitarians argue that in 
no respect is an outcome normatively improved by levelling down some and in no respect 
does merely raising up some worsen an outcome.73 Since levelling down would undeniably 
decrease inequality, yet render no one better off, while raising up would undeniably increase 
inequality yet would make some better off, equality cannot improve an outcome in any 
respect so egalitarianism must be rejected.74 As Larry Temkin has demonstrated75 objections 
to levelling down depend on an appeal to a ‘person-affecting’ restriction on the moral value 
of outcomes, which he has dubbed the Slogan. 
The Slogan: One situation cannot be worse (or better) than another in any respect if there is 
no one for whom it is worse (or better).76 
 
 
                                                          
72 Temkin 1993, 13, 200 
73 See for example Parfit 2000, Temkin, 1993, ch. 9, and Holtug 2010 ch.7 
74 Temkin 2003b 773 
75 See Temkin 1993, pp.248-281, 2000 p.132, 2003b, pp.776-782, 










A    B 
The Slogan is obviously strong enough to support the objection to levelling down. Consider 
the diagram above where the width of each block represents the numbers of people in each 
outcome and the height represents the levels well-being. Egalitarians claim that B is, in one 
respect, better than A, i.e. that it is better with respect to equality. But moving from A to B is 
worse for some and better for no one, and because it is better for no one, so the Slogan 
claims, it cannot be better in any respect. Therefore equality cannot be a value that renders an 
outcome in even one respect better than another, so egalitarianism should be rejected.77  
The Slogan expresses a Narrow Person-Affecting view78 of outcome value,79 where the 
goodness of outcomes is dependent solely on how particular people, or, particular groups of 
people, are affected for better or worse, in those outcomes. The aim of narrow person-
affecting viewss is, for each person who does exist, or has existed, or will exist, that those 
                                                          
77 Nils Holtug Persons, Interests and Justice Oxford University Press 2010, 185. 
78  The distinction between narrow and wide person-affecting principles originates in Derek Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons Oxford: Clarendon, 1984, pp. 393–95. 
79 Certain welfarist writers claim that Person-Affecting Views do not simply account for the whole of outcome 
value but the whole of morality. See for example, L.W Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics Oxford 




persons should fare as well as possible.80 Narrow Person-Affecting views are therefore to be 
contrasted with Impersonal Total and Average views and with Wide Person-Affecting views. 
Impersonal Total and Average Views imply that regardless of whether or not they have the 
same people or the same number of people, one outcome will be better than (equal to) 
another if and only if the one outcome has a higher (the same) total or average amount of 
utility or well-being, respectively.81Person-Affecting approaches are indeed important. They 
enable us capture what is attractive about our views regarding well-being in a way that is 
arguably rendered distinctly unattractive by Classical Utilitarianism. As Jan Narveson puts it: 
Morality has to do with how we treat whatever people there are.... [We] do not ...think that 
happiness is impersonally good. We are in favor of making people happy, but neutral about 
making happy people.82  
In contrast, for impersonal views, benefits are simply good therefore, it is good that benefited 
people exist.83 Hence, these views treat people as ‘mere recepticals’84 of value whih can be 
added to (or in the case of average views, subtracted from) an outcome to make that outcome 
better from the perspective of total (or average) utility. Broome,85Parfit,86 and Temkin87 have 
each shown that Narrow Person-Affecting views return judgments that are implausible in a 
wide range of cases. One particular range of cases in which these approaches have been 
                                                          
80 Sumner 1996 pp.191-2 
81 For discussion of the different implications of holding total and averaging views about welfare see Thomas 
Hurka, ‘Value and Population Size’ Ethics 496,1983. Parfit 1984 ch.9, see also Temkin’s discussion in his 2012, 
especially ch. 12. For the distinction of impersonal aggregative views about welfare, see the classic article by 
Jan Narveson, ‘Moral Problems of Population’ The Monist 57 1973,pp. 62–86. See also Sumner’s discussion in 
his 1996, ch.2-4, Holtug 2010, ch. 6, Gustaf Arrhenius andWlodek Rabinowicz‘The Value of Existence’ in I. 
Hirose and J. Olson, Oxford Handbook of Value Theory, Oxford University Press, 2015, 
82 Narveson 1973, 80. 
83 Holtug, 2010, 157. 
84 See Tom Regan The Case for Animal Rights, London: Routledge, 1984, 205  
85 John Broome, Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995, ch.10 
86 Parfit, 1984, ch.16 
87 Temkin 1993, 2000. I consider Temkin’s response to person-affecting princinples below. In contrast with 
Broome and Parfit who think that Narrow Person-Affecting views should be rejected. Temkin argues that such 
views should not be rejected, but rather amended, and limited in their scope so as to require pluralism. We 
will shortly see how the Narrow-Person Affecting view can be amended, and we shall be arguing later for its 
scope to be limited.  
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shown to be deeply implausible are cases involving people whose existence is contingent on 
our choices, that is, cases involving the Non-Identity Problem.88 
Fig 2. 
 
   
 
       
      p   p              q   p     r 
     A          B                      C 
Assume that the above three outcomes contain different (but the same numbers of) people. 
Following Temkin’s discussion, let us suppose that the people p in outcome A are 
contemplating two policies which would transform A into either B or C. Let us call Policy 1 
‘live for today’. If p adopt Policy 1 they have children immediately and deplete natural 
resources for current uses. Outcome B would result. Each of p would be better off, but their 
children, q would fare less well than they. Alternatively, they could adopt Policy 2 which we 
will call ‘take care of tomorrow’, they would postpone having children for a few years and 
conserve resources. In this case C would result; each of p would fare slightly less well than 
they do now, but their children call them r would fare just as well as they.  Most believe the 
                                                          
88 Parfit in his 1984 ibid, was the first to point out that the Slogan, or Narrow-Person Affecting principle runs 
afoul of the slogan.  For Temkin’s analysis of this same problem see his 1993, cb. 9. For some different 
attempts to rework the Slogan resolve its incompatibility with non-identity, (more on which below) see for 
example Roger Crisp Equality, Priority, and Compassion Ethics 113 2003, pp.745–763, see especially p.747, Nils 
Holtug Nils Holtug, ‘Good for Whom?’ Theoria LXIX, Part 1–2, 2003 pp.4–20 and Holtug 2010 p.160. For a 
collection of papers on person-affectingness generally and problems of non-identity problem see Melinda A. 
Roberts and David T. Wasserman, (eds) Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. 




‘take care of tomorrow policy would be morally preferable to the alternative ‘live for today’ 
policy, and thus they would judge C as better than B. However, as Temkin has shown, given 
two plausible assumptions, this belief is incompatible with a Narrow Person-Affecting view. 
The first assumption is that the choice of policy will affect the identities of those who exist in 
the future, such that the children born in B will not be the same people as those born in C. As 
Temkin puts it, “being conceived several years later, they would come from different sperm 
and ova”,89 and this, many people accept, is sufficient for their being different people. The 
second assumption is that one cannot harm or act against the interests of someone who will 
never exist, and neither can one harm someone by failing to conceive her.  Temkin illustrates 
this with the following example. Consider that an average ejaculation contains between 120 
and 750 million sperm cells. If one thinks of all of the partners a woman might have sex with 
during the time each month when she is fertile, and if one thinks that each sperm would 
combine with her ovum to create a unique individual, the number of possible people she 
might conceive each month is astronomical. It is surely implausible to think that she acts 
against the interests of each possible person she might conceive, if she refrains from sex. 
Moreover, while it might be true that if she had had sex with Tom she might have conceived 
a particular individual, Tom Jr., it seems implausible to claim that she acted against Tom Jr’s 
interest when she had sex with her husband Barry, and conceived Barry Jr. instead.90 
From these two assumptions together with the Slogan it follows that B cannot be worse than 
C for p since each of p fares better in B than in C. Neither is B worse for q, because q each 
have lives that are worth living in B, and would not exist in C if the ‘take care of tomorrow’ 
policy were adopted. And B cannot be worse than C for r, because r would not exist if the 
                                                          
89 Temkin 1993 p.255  
90 See Temkin 1993, ibid and 2012 For the Tom Jr.and Barry Jr. case, see his 'Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads', in 
R. G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (eds), Value, Welfare, and Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1993, n13 p319.Cf. Jeff McMahan ‘Causing people to exist and saving people’s lives’. Journal of Ethics 17: 
5–35, Parfit 1984, and David Velleman, ‘Persons in Prospect,’ Philosophy & Public Affairs 36, 2008,pp.221-288.  
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‘live for today’ policy was adopted so would not be made worse off. Finally, if the “take care 
of tomorrow” policy was adopted and C was brought about, then, as the Slogan implies, there 
is someone for whom C is worse, namely it is worse for p. Even though C is clearly better 
than B, despite being better for no one, the Slogan returns the judgment that B must be better 
than C, since it is better for p, and is not worse for either of q or r. Thus the Slogan would 
recommend that we adopt the ‘live for today’ policy over ‘take care of tomorrow’, thus 
generating the Non-Identity problem. Because of the counterintuitivieness of Narrow Person-
Affecting views when applied to Non-Identity cases, most writers reject the Slogan and thus 
its role in motivating objections to levelling down. They appeal instead to a Wide Person-
Affecting restriction,91 intended to answer both to the Non-Identity problem and motivate the 
objection to levelling down.  
One example of such a view is given by Nils Holtug  
Wide Person-Affecting Principle An outcome, O1, cannot in any respect be better (worse) 
than another outcome, O2 , if there is no one for whom, were O1 to obtain, O1 would be in 
any respect better (worse) than O2 and no one for whom, were O2 to obtain,  O2 would be in 
any respect worse (better) than O1. 92 
The Wide Person-Affecting restriction is able to avoid the non-identity problem since, in 
contrast to the Slogan, it is not limited to a concern with how particular people fare for better 
or worse in one outcome relative to how the same people might fare in any alternative 
outcomes. Rather Wide Person-Affectingness is concerned with how people fare for better or 
worse in different outcomes, whether or not they are the same (or same numbers of) people, 
and where the aim is to make it the case that whichever people will exist those people are as 
                                                          
91 Writers who endorse this principle include, Holtug, 2003 & 2010, Brett Doran, ‘Reconsidering the Levelling 
Down Objection Against Egalitarianism’, Utilitas, 13 2001, pp. 65-85, Crisp, 2003, Marc Ramsay, ‘Teleological 
Egalitarianism vs. the Slogan’, Utilitas 17 2005, pp. 93-116 p. 94. Campbell Brown ‘Levelling Down Sans Slogan’. 
Unpublished ms. 2003 




well off as possible. We will simply assume that a principle along the lines of Holtug’s is 
successful in answering the Non-Identity problem, and so the egalitarian cannot use such 
cases to put pressure on Wide Person-Affecting views. The Wide Person-Affecting restriction 
is also strong enough to motivate the objection to levelling down. In returning to Fig.1 it 
implies that there is no respect in which B can be better than A, since, were B to obtain, there 
would be no one for whom, in any respect, B would be better than A and, were A to obtain, 
there would be no one for whom, in any respect, A would be worse than B. We should note 
that, the Wide Person-Affecting restriction is a revision of Slogan (for the sake of brevity I 
shall simply refer to the Wide Person-Affecting restriction as revised Slogan (RS)), which 
preserves the thought that that moral value of outcomes should be assessed exclusively in 
terms of individuals and by way of their capacity to be affected for better or worse in those 
outcomes. In cases where the same number and same people are involved it will simply 
converge with the original Slogan. On the other hand, it widens its scope of the Slogan, such 
that, the persons for whom outcomes can be better or worse for are non-contingent as well as 
contingent persons.93  Hence, according to Roger Crisp: “[…] what is worrying about 
egalitarianism is independent of person-affectingness in [the narrow] sense. Rather the worry 
arises from the idea that what matters could be something that was independent of the well-
being of individuals.”94  So if we accept RS, it follows that: “the features that speak in favor 
of outcomes must be grounded, even if in an indirect way, on benefits to individuals.”95 
Similarly, according to Hotlug:  “Outcome values…crucially depend on how individuals are 
                                                          
93 See Ingmar Persson’s discussion in his ‘Person Affecting Principles and Beyond’ in N. Fotion, J.C. Heller (eds) 
Contingent Future Persons: On the Ethics of Deciding Who Will Live, Or Not in the Future, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1997, pp. 27-41. 
94 Roger Crisp Reasons and the Good Oxford Clarendon Press 2006, pp.148-149 
95 Crisp 2003, p.748. See also L.W Sumner 1996 pp.91-92. One other writer of note who endorses a wide 
person-affecting view of value is Joseph Raz who writes in his The Morality of Freedom, Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1988, p. 194, “the explanation and justification of the goodness or badness of anything derives 
ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life and its quality.” 
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affected for better or worse. And the problem with egalitarianism is that the link between 
equality and benefits is purely contingent.”96 
In the next section we will see how some writers have argued that the levelling down 
objection could be avoided by reducing ‘equality’ to the welfare of the worse off. Insodoing 
they reject the egalitarian principle and with it the idea that equality is any kind of value as 
such.97 
2.3. The Case of the Disappearing Value. 
As we have seen egalitarians are committed to, at least the principle of equality, according to 
which it is in itself bad that among equally deserving people, it is bad because unfair that 
some are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. So among equally 
deserving people unfair inequalities are bad. We have also seen that all egalitarians are value 
pluralists. As pluralists, they must weigh the objective of reducing or eliminating inequality 
alongside other moral ideals, including welfare. This implies that in certain contexts, the 
value of reducing or eliminating inequality may be outweighed by other values. In cases of 
levelling down, it is because the egalitarian is committed to the value of wellbeing that she 
need not claim that an equal, levelled outcome is better all things considered, than an unequal 
unlevelled outcome. Indeed she might hold that if the losses in welfare to the better off are 
very great and given no attendant gains for the worst-off, this may outweigh gains to equality, 
so, all things considered, she may judge the levelled outcome as worse. But this is perfectly 
compatible with holding that levelled outcome would nevertheless be an improvement in one 
respect.  Egalitarians therefore are committed to the view that the relation ‘better than, with 
respect to equality’ implies incompleteness. Incompleteness is not, to be sure, itself any sort 
                                                          
96 Nils Holtug ‘Prioritarianism’ in Nils Holtug and Kaspar Lippert-Rasmussen (eds) Egalitarianism: New Essays on 
the Nature and Value of Equality  Oxford Clarendon Press, 2007,p. 140. 




of fatal failing, given that it would be fanciful to think that any ‘single principle’ distributive 
view could capture the full truth about the ethics of distribution.98 
As we been claiming, objections to levelling down flow from the idea captured by RS which 
says, at least in terms of the moral assessment of outcomes, all respects or moral factors in 
which one state of affairs can be better or worse than another must be person-affecting. RS 
cancels out the ‘in-one-respect-better’ claim, since according to RS there are no non-person-
affecting moral ideals.99 And since egalitarians cleave to the idea that equality is a good-
making feature of outcomes, over and above welfarist value, then, if the revised Slogan were 
true, egalitarianism would be false. In this section we shall consider a sophisticated response 
to the levelling down objection developed in recent years by Broome, Persson, Hirose and 
Jensen, inter alia.100 The thought behind their proposal can be put as follows. The impersonal 
egalitarian view says that (a) equality makes an outcome in one respect better even when it 
does not benefit anyone. From (a) it follows that (b) levelling down must be, in one respect 
better. This triggers the objection which if true cancels out the statement of value in (a). We 
should therefore modify (a) so as to avoid implying (b). As we will see, in modifying (a), 
these writers reject the conception of equality as an impersonal, or, non-welfarist, good. Their 
proposal instead attempts to ground the value of equality in the wellbeing of the worse-off. 
Hence at the core of their argument is a revision of the central egalitarian principle. It 
proposes to shift out the normative concern from that of a comparative relation between 
persons, where, at least as far as egalitarians of my stripe are concerned, people ought to 
relate to one another in the absence of comparative unfairness, to a concern for comparative 
                                                          
98 Martin O’Neill ‘Priority Preference and Value’, Utilitas, 24, 2012, p. 344. 
99 More precisely it rules out the idea that non-person affecting ideals (that is, non-welfarist ideas) contribute 
to the value of an outcome, though, as some writers note, non-person-affecting ideals might still feature as 
side-constraints. On this point see Nils Holtug Egalitarianism and the Levelling Down Objection Analysis 
Vol. 58, No. 2,1998, pp. 166-174 see p.168 
100 Broome 2002, Hirose 2009 & 2014, Jensen 2003  See also Matthew AdlerWell-Being and Fair Distribution: 
Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis p Oxford University Press, 2012, pp.72-78 and Martin Petersen The Dimensions of 
Consequentialism: Ethics, Equality and Risk Cambridge University Press 2013, p.144 
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wellbeing where the aim is to ensure those who are worse off than others fare as well off as 
possible.  
Their argument is an attack on the claim that levelling down can make an outcome in one-
respect-better via an attack on the ‘not better-all-things-considered’ claim. It argues that if we 
have reasons to believe that levelling down cannot make an outcome all things considered 
better, we must modify the egalitarian principle to such that this possibility is avoided. The 
effect of this modification then gives us reason to doubt that it can make an outcome better in 
a respect.  
As we have noted egalitarians do not believe that equality is the only thing that matters in the 
assessment of outcomes. So they attach weight to other moral ideals, including that of 
wellbeing. However, as above writers claim, the impersonal egalitarian cannot however 
consistently hold a commitment to the value of equality alongside a commitment to the value 
of welfare.  Suppose that, qua pluralist, in addition to the egalitarian principle, the impersonal 
egalitarian also holds the: 
Weak Principle of Utility: It is in one respect better (worse) that people are better (worse) off  
In response to the levelling down objection, qua pluralist the egalitarian assumes that she can 
choose some weight for the egalitarian principle and the principle of utility, such that 
levelling down does not make an outcome all things considered better. She could, for 
example, assign some weight to the disvalue of inequality such that even if levelling down 
brought about a sufficiently large improvement in inequality this would be outweighed by 
any attendant losses in total welfare. Assuming this weight was constant then levelling down 
could never be all things considered better. However, the egalitarian offers no principled 
restriction on the weight she assigns to the disvalue of inequality. So we must assume the 




count, in one respect, negatively because always increasing inequality, the weight assigned to 
the disvalue of inequality and total welfare should increase as the badness of inequality 
increases.   
As Hirose101 puts it;  
Those who favor the intrinsic [egalitarian] view might accept that the value of the better off 
person’s well-being counts less, but claim that the principle of utility is not violated. They 
could argue that an increase in the better off person’s wellbeing increases the value of 
people’s well-being generally, but that this increase is outweighed by the overwhelming 
disvalue of inequality. Therefore, the principle of utility is not violated. But a response along 
these lines is not satisfactory. The response is simply deceptive in the sense that it would 
have us ignore the stone-solid fact that the well-being of the better off person counts 
negatively in estimating the overall goodness of a state of affairs.102 
Therefore, there must be some scenarios where the badness of inequality is sufficiently great 
such that the weight assigned to the disvalue of inequality will be sufficiently large to 
outweigh welfare losses to the better off, which implies that levelling down would make an 
outcome better, all things considered, thus violating the principle of utility. It is claimed that 
this would be deeply implausible.  
We must therefore believe that levelling down of the better off always make an outcome, all 
things considered, worse. And so the egalitarian ought to restrict the weight assigned to the 
disvalue of inequality to avoid this implication. Which implies that the egalitarian principle 
must be modified so as to ensure that it never violates the principle of utility. One of the ways 
                                                          
101 A similar point is also put by John Broome in his ‘Fairness, Goodness and Levelling Down’ in Christopher J.L 
Murray, Joshua A. Salomon, Colin D. Mathers, and Alen D. Lopez Summary Measures of Population Health: 
Concepts, Ethics, Measurement and Applications World Health Organization, 2002, pp.135-137 
102 Hirose 2014 p.79 
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it has been suggested103 that the egalitarian can hold her favoured principle consistently with 
the principle of utility is, if she were to endorse: 
Principle of Personal Good: One outcome O1 is better, all things considered, than another 
outcome O2, only if it is better for some, all things considered, and worse for no one, all 
things considered. 
If the egalitarian principle is suitably combined with the Principle of Personal Good104 (PPG) 
we arrive at a version of egalitarianism that is referred to as ‘moderate’.105 This view says 
that levelling down is always all things considered, strictly worse, since it always worse for 
some and never better for anyone, which is equivalent to the claim that raising up is always, 
all things considered, strictly better. That is, benefiting the better off, while keeping other 
people's well-being constant always makes an outcome, all things considered, strictly better. 
So, it is argued if the principle of egalitarianism is combined in such way with utility that it 
satisfies PPG, we arrive at a combined principle which orders outcome all things considered.  
Now, as we have argued, RS, implies that impersonal moral ideals fail to count as respects in 
which an outcome can be better or worse. PPG includes no such strong restriction. An 
egalitarian therefore may endorse PPG without giving up her commitment to the impersonal 
value of equality. However RS and PPG, in distinct ways, express a central and overriding 
concern for the person-affecting nature of value. Both imply that if one outcome is all things 
considered better than another this must be because it is better for some and worse for no one. 
And, if two outcomes are equally good this must be because there is no welfare difference 
                                                          
103 See Ingmar Persson’s discussion in his 2009 
104 The Principle of Personal Good is a version of the Pareto principle but differs from standard versions of the 
Pareto since those versions are formulated in terms of preferences rather than welfare. It corresponds to John 
Broome's principle of personal good in his 1995 pp. 152&165.  
105 Parfit coined the term ‘moderate’ in his 2000. For moderate views see Bertil Tungodden ‘The Value of 




between the two outcomes106. However, RS arrives at this judgment because there can be no 
value other than person-affecting value. PPG arrives at this judgment despite permitting the 
normative significance of impersonal values, though entailing their irrelevance all things 
considered. PPG thus operates in a similar way to RS at the level of all things considered 
judgements. Impersonal ideals do not, just by themselves make an outcome better. 
Impersonal moral ideals may make an outcome better only in cases where they ride 
piggyback on improvements in person-affecting value, or in certain restricted cases where 
they are invoked to break a tie between two equally good outcomes. Thus holding the 
combined principle, the egalitarian is in effect committed to a restriction on the moral 
importance of the disvalue of inequality and total welfare. But we can respond that, if 
equality, on its own, never makes a difference to the value of an outcome all things 
considered, then there might be reason to doubt whether it is plausible to continue to hold 
onto the ‘in a respect better’ claim. The next step in the argument is to show that moderate 
egalitarianism can be reformulated so as to be compatible with a view which does not include 
an ‘in a respect better’ claim, thus avoiding levelling down entirely. Which will mean the 
view that falls out will be perfectly compatible with RS. Iwao Hirose107 has offered a clear, 
formal presentation of this argument which I will reconstruct as follows.   
We have been arguing above that the egalitarian qua pluralist holds two separate moral 
principles which when combined can be represented in the following formula.  
G=W - I. 
                                                          
106 For example,Matthew Adler in his 2012 p.53, writes that Pareto indifference is the essence of welfarism. 
107 Hirose 2014 pp. 70-79. Hirose’s formula is the ‘generalized Gini’ or Gini social welfare function, see Charles 
Blackorby and David Donaldson ‘A Theoretical Treatment of Indices of Absolute Equality’, International 
Economics Review 21/1, 1980, pp.107–36, Amartya Sen On Economic Inequality (enlarged edition with a 
substantial annexe, 'On Economic Inequality after a Quarter Century', by James Foster and Amartya Sen). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997. John Weymark ‘Generalized Gini Inequality Indices’ Mathematical Social 
Sciences 1, 1981, pp. 409–430.See also the discussion in Mark Fleurbaey, Bertil Tungodden, and Peter 




Where G is the goodness of a state of affairs which is calculated as a combined function of 
the value of welfare and the disvalue of inequality.  
Consider a two person case, Let W be measured by the average of the welfare of the two 
individuals.  
1/2 (W1 + W2)  
Let I be measured by the absolute difference between the welfare levels of the two 
individuals and let  represent a weight assigned to I. 
|W1 – W2| 
We can then combine these two respects so as to give the value of G.  
(1) G= 1/2(W1 + W2) - |W1 – W2| 
We calculate the value of G through a simple procedure of subtracting the disvalue of 
inequality from the value of average welfare. The inclusion of inequality as an independent 
impersonal moral factor in which an outcome can be better or worse invites the levelling 
down objection. When the weight of α-is unfixed, i.e when it is greater than 0, then the 
welfare of the better off counts negatively, so, by levelling down, we decrease both the value 
of inequality and the value of average wellbeing. However, while the decrease in average 
welfare decreases G in one respect, decreasing inequality increases G in another, thus 
levelling down must make an outcome better in one respect.  
Hirose proposes108 to rearrange (1) and entirely avoid the levelling down objection.  
(2) G = 1/2 W1 + 3/4 W2 (if W1 > W2) 
     G= 3/4 W1 + 1/2 W2 (if W2 > W1) 
                                                          




In (2), the only moral factors, or respects, in which the outcome could be better or worse, are 
the welfare of person1 (W1) and the welfare of person2 (W2). Where has the value of 
equality gone? ‘Equality’ in has been reduced to the weight, or, moral importance of each 
person’s welfare in the distribution. Where these weights are determined by the rank order 
position of individual welfare when all welfare levels are arranged in a descending order. 
Weights increase as one moves down the order, with the greatest weight assigned to the worst 
off. Finally, the principle tells us that overall goodness is a function of the weighted sum of 
(rank-ordered) wellbeing.  
Now, (2) avoids levelling down and is extensionally equivalent to moderate egalitarianism. If 
we are moderates, recall, we will believe that α should be restricted by PPG. Since (2) 
satisfies PPG, it will arrive at exactly the same ranking of outcomes as the moderate view and 
so it will be extensionally equivalent. Next, (2) avoids levelling down while (1) does not. It is 
quite simple to observe why this is the case. As Ingmar Persson an advocate of this view puts 
it, “inequality [is] something that operates upon the ‘host’ value of well-being rather than as a 
separate value alongside it.”109In (2) equality simply does not appear as any kind of separate 
moral factor, or, respect which an outcome can be better or worse. Levelling down cannot be 
in any respect better, because there is no respect in which it can be better. Suppose W1 > W2, 
by levelling down, all we would achieve is a reduction of W1, we do not increase the value of 
W2. Because there is no increase in either of the terms in the argument so there is no respect 
in which levelling down is better.   
                                                          
109 Persson 2008 p.297 
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Because I shall argue that this proposal does not represent a plausible version of 
egalitarianism rather than a plausible version of prioritarianism, I shall refer to this view, 
(after Perssson110) as: 
Relative Prioritarianism (Broad Scope): Benefiting people is the only thing that matters. 
Benefiting people matters more the worse off those people are compared to others.  
According to the relative priority view expressed by (2), the moral value of outcomes is to be 
assessed solely in terms of benefits and harms to individuals. The weight or the moral 
importance attached to benefits is determined by rank-order position in an overall ranking by 
wellbeing level, with weights increasing according to rank-order, with the welfare of the 
lowest ranked individual having the greatest moral weight. In the simple two-person case (2), 
if person 1 is comparatively better off than person 2, this decreases the weight or moral 
importance of that person’s well-being in the overall goodness of a distribution, and increases 
the weight, or importance, of the well-being of person 2, in the overall goodness of a 
distribution. We therefore do more good by giving a benefit of a certain size to a lower 
ranked individual in the distribution, than by giving the same benefit to a higher ranked 
individual. Depending on the weighting profile the relative priority view would be straight 
maximin/leximin given an infinite relative weight to the welfare of the lowest ranked 
individuals, and straight utilitarianism if it assigned equal weight to all individuals. However, 
like the absolute priority view,111 the relative view does not assign absolute priority to the 
worst-off. It rather seeks a weighting profile somewhere between maximin and utilitarianism. 
Many believe correctly, that it is implausible for an ethical principle to focus solely on 
improving the condition of one group at the total expense of other, even slightly less badly 
off people. As an additive aggregative view relative prioritarianism must satisfy continuity, 
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such that, it must be able to trade-off gains and losses between better and worse off. So, other 
things equal, it claims that, any finite amount of benefits falling a lower position can always 
be outweighed by a sufficiently large amount of benefits falling at any other position. Thus, 
unlike Rawls’s maximin principle, it assigns strictly positive weight to the welfare of all 
individuals, and a strictly greater but not infinitely greater, weight to those with strictly lower 
welfare.  
We can give a complete expression of the view as follows: 
Relative Prioritarianism (Narrow Scope): One distribution O1, will be better than another 
distribution O2, if O1 has a greater sum total of rank-order-weighted benefits than O2.  
Now, while I agree that this view is consistent with a person-affecting morality such that it 
avoids levelling down, despite the intentions of its proponents however, I believe that is has 
little to recommend itself as an egalitarian view. As was expressed in (2), the relative priority 
view claims that is in no respect bad that some are better off than others. It is incapable of 
registering the fact that lowering the best-off group to the level of the next best-off would 
unequivocally improve an outcome’s equality. If we believe that it is bad that some are better 
off than others, this must be because we believe that something of value other than the 
welfare of individuals has normative significance.  The relative priority view argues instead 
that the only relevant information we require in order to make moral evaluations of states of 
affairs, has to do with people’s levels of welfare. Reducing the welfare of the better off with 
no increase in welfare anywhere else in the distribution simply reduces welfare, there is no 
way that it could make outcome in any respect better.. Hence the view avoids levelling down 
and is compatible with RS, but at the cost of eliminating equality as any kind of value.   
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Now, it is of course true that the view differs from absolute prioritarianism insofar as it 
concerned with the idea that welfare is an essentially comparative concept. Indeed, Hirose112 
criticises absolute prioritarians for cleaving to the belief that there is an absolute scale of 
value which could exist independently of distributions of people’s well- being113, and which 
tells us how much each person’s wellbeing contributes to the value of an outcome. Rather he 
argues that until an absolute scale has been proved to exist, it has a presumption against it. 
The most plausible way of understanding ‘giving priority to the worse off’ is therefore, in 
comparing everyone’s level in the distribution. Which means we must understand the ‘the 
worse off’ in terms of those individuals who are worse off than others. Hence it is concerned 
with comparisons just in case there is no absolute scale of welfare. Otherwise it would be 
absolute prioritarianism. Since it denies that there is an absolute scale it rejects absolute 
prioritarianism.114  Therefore the aim is that the worse off should fare well, and that this just 
means that they should fare comparatively better. However, rejecting an absolute scale of 
welfare does not an egalitarian make. Indeed not only do I believe that if Hirose is correct, 
the relative priority view is a more plausible version of prioritarianism but moreover, if he is 
correct, I believe, though in many way distinct, this view, should be understood as a more 
plausible version of Rawlsianism. Recall that Rawls’s argues:  
[T]he [difference] principle holds that …society must give more attention to those with fewer 
native assets and to those born into the less favorable social positions. Now the difference 
principle is not of course the principle of redress. . . But the difference principle would 
allocate resources…so as to improve the long-term expectation of the least favored. … Thus 
we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the social system so that no one 
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gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution …without giving or receiving 
compensating advantages in return.115 
Similarly to Rawls’s view116 the relative priority view is committed to making those who are 
worse-off than others, better off. And, and unlike egalitarianism, this view is perfectly 
compatible with the idea that we should seek inequalities if the worse-off benefit from them, 
since that would make an outcome better. That is, we should seek inequalities if a relatively 
worse off individual is made better off than she would have been without the inequality.117  
And so along with Rawls’s view, the relative priority view I believe stretches the sense of the 
concept, should it refer to itself as a version of egalitarianism.  Let us now consider the 
objection that comparative fairness egalitarians cleave to some ghostly value, over and above 
individual welfare. Suppose that we use the weighting schedule recommended by Adler118 
and Fleurbaey,Tungodden and Vallentyne in their paper.119 The weights then are, 1 for the 
benefits of the best off position, 2 for the benefits of the second best off position, 4 for the 
third best off position… and 2n-1 for the benefits of the worst off position (where there are n 
people). Suppose we have a three person case as follows; (5, 6, 9) =41 (9x1+6x2+5x4). The 
relative priority view says that the lower welfare of each of the 2nd and 3rd ranked individuals 
contribute more value to overall value of the outcome than the higher welfare of the first 
individual. This is a controversial claim which I believe requires much more argument, but 
furthermore it would at least lead us to doubt the assertion that the relative view should be 
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preferred to the impersonal egalitarian view on the basis that the latter is committed to a value 
over and above the value of individual wellbeing. We might ask whether the relative 
prioritarian is not himself committed to such a value. Secondly and relatedly, the view 
requires that if there are two or more individuals at a given welfare level, rank order positions 
should be allocated arbitrarily amongst them120. Then suppose, (5,5,5)=35 (5x1+5x2+5x4), 
we might want to ask how it is plausible that the welfare of the equally well off 3rd placed 
individual counts for four times as much as the very same amount enjoyed by the 1st placed 
person simply because she occupies that particular position in the distribution.  
Next, egalitarians argue121 that if a gap of n between two or more people is bad, then a gap of 
2n is more than twice as bad, and a gap of 3n more than three times as bad…, and so on, as 
the gap of n. This is one way that that egalitarians argue that the size of inequalities are to be 
distinguished from their badness. They also argue that size and badness can be distinguished 
in a second way. While, at any given level, a gap of 2n for someone at that level is more than 
twice as bad as a gap of n, they deny that a gap of 2n at a relatively higher level is more than 
twice as bad as a gap of n at a relatively much lower level. This view holds, roughly, that a 
gap of n units matters more at low levels than high levels.122And they hold, at least these two 
views, regarding relative inequality, consistently with the claim that among unequally 
deserving people, gaps of whatever size, at whatever level, need not be bad at all. In contrast 
the relative priority is entirely neutral on this ideal. This is because it is insensitive to equi-
propotional changes in welfare that do not alter rank-order positions. For example, consider 
another three person case and two outcomes, x (100, 50, 20)=280, (100x1+50x2, +20x4), and 
y (1000, 500, 200)=2800, (1000x1 +500x2+200x4). The relative priority view would judge y 
to be better than x, since y has a higher sum of weighted welfare, and the worse off person 
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fares better in x compared to y. The view cannot capture the idea that the worse off person is 
now worse off in y than she was in x. The proportional increase in y does not alter rank order 
position, the worse off person is still ranked third in the distribution, and the relative weights 
to each person’s wellbeing remain exactly the same in y as in x. So it is incapable of judging 
that a gap of 800 units between better and worse off might be worse than a gap of 80 units 
between better and worse off. And this is because it does not pay any attention whatsoever to 
the size or magnitude of the gaps or distances between persons. It can only register the idea 
that 200 is less than 500, and 20 is less than 50, but 200 is more than 20. This also means 
that, it is incapable of registering the thought that it is worse to be worse off at a lower level 
than it is to be worse off at a higher level.   
I reject the relational prioritarian view. I also reject ‘moderate’ egalitarianism. Therefore I 
also reject the idea that the relative priority view is extensionally equivalent to egalitarianism. 
Recall that, as its advocates claim, extensional equivalence would give the moderate 
egalitarian a reason to be, at least indifferent in a choice between the two views, and that, 
moreover, because it completely avoids levelling down by giving up the ‘in-one-respect-
better’ claim, relative prioritarians argue that this should tip the balance in favour of their 
view. However, as I believe as Scanlon123 and Temkin124 have convincingly demonstrated, 
there are certain cases which tell powerfully against endorsing ‘moderate’ egalitarianism.  
                                                          
123 Thomas Scanlon ‘Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property', Philosophy & Public Affairs, 5 pp.3–25, see 
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Routledge, 2005 pp.177 
124 Temkin 2003a, 2003a, 61—87 
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Since Phillip Pettit’s125 pathbreaking works on the subject, many people accept the idea that 
freedom consists in a relation between people characterized by the absence of domination. 
The concern about domination is not a concern about what actually happens to you, as in 
freedom as non-interference,126 in which you are unfree just in case you face a hindrance or 
constraint on an option, but is instead is a concern about being subject to the uncontrolled 
power of another to make things happen to you, even if that power is never actually 
exercised. The badness of domination resides in the fact that it entails subjection, and so 
violates equal status and respect owed to all. If we say that the one person dominates another 
only if the domination leaves her worse off than she would have otherwise been, we commit 
ourselves to the claim that benevolent masters don’t dominate their slaves. Which implies 
that slaves would be free if their masters are sufficiently benevolent. But if slavery is 
paradigmatic case of unfreedom this must be implausible. Hence, if you are subject to another 
person’s benevolent will, then while you will have freedom as non-interference, should that 
will turn malevolent towards you, you will suffer interference. But it is absurd to think that 
you can make yourself free by cosying up to or kowtowing to power in order to try to raise 
the probability of that will remaining favourable towards you. Hence it is plausible to assume 
that you can be made unfree just in case you are subject to the arbitrary or uncontrolled 
power of another, even if that power brings you benefits, or is never actually excised. Now, 
suppose there is a democratic society in which everyone fares quite poorly but certainly not 
very poorly. Now suppose, with the intention of making everyone better off, this society is 
the subject of a military coup. Perhaps the military leaders believe that democracy and 
constitutional rights hamper the flourishing of the people. Further suppose that over time the 
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military leaders establish themselves as a benevolent hereditary dictatorship. And that, 
despite their having all the political, economic and social power and influence it is possible to 
have, and there is only a vanishingly small probability of interference in the lives of the 
people, the military dictators are, after all, benevolent. Finally, suppose the leaders achieve 
gains for their society, fulfilling the ambitions of the coup, welfare is higher in the 
dictatorship than it was under the democracy, but the dictators and their coterie do very much 
better than everyone else.  I am in agreement with Scanlon and Temkin that, in cases such as 
the above, it would be better, all things considered, if this society were transformed into a 
wholly egalitarian society where no one suffered from domination, even if this meant that the 
members of the hereditary dictatorship lost all of their political and social power and 
influence and thereby were much worse off as a result.  I think this would be true even if it 
resulted in a tiny increase in the well-being of everyone else. I also agree with them that it 
might be better, all things considered, if the society were transformed into a wholly 
egalitarian society where everyone was treated with equal respect and no one suffered 
domination, even if this meant only that the members of the dictatorship were worse off as a 
result and everyone else’s well-being was left unaffected. 127 Thus, I believe we should reject 
the idea that egalitarian principle should be combined with PPG.   
Because I do not therefore believe that relative prioritarianism does arrive at the same 
evaluations of outcomes as non-moderate egalitarianism, I do not believe that those 
egalitarians who reject the moderate view, have any reason to be indifferent in a choice 
between the two views. And because adopting the former would eviscerate what is significant 
about egalitarianism in the first place, I do not believe egalitarians in fact have any reason to 
adopt this view.  Unless they are caught in the grip of the RS, in which case it is doubtful that 
they would be egalitarians at all.  
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Now, I do not deny that the relative priority view is not a plausible position in its own right. 
And moreover, I agree that because it might indeed be extensionally equivalent to some 
forms of ‘moderate’ egalitarianism its merits may indeed convince moderates, but I leave that 
up to them to judge. However I believe that moderates and non-moderate egalitarians alike 
would want to argue that more importantly that the relative priority view is intensionally 
incompatible with any form of egalitarianism that is grounded in reasons of comparative 
fairness or justice. And this at least would give the moderate a reason to refrain from an 
endorsement. Now, of course none of this solves any of the problems we began with. We are 
simply lead back to the claim that levelling down is not better in any respect.  The deadlock 
with the non-egalitarian has not been broken, and I am begging the question regarding the 
value of equality if RS is true.  
2.4 Welfarism and Justice.  
In this final section I briefly review Temkin’s response to the levelling down objection. I 
believe he has done enough to convince us that the objection is not at all devastating for the 
egalitarian. Temkin offers an inductive argument and so he will not prove that equality is a 
value. Nevertheless, if he is successful (and I believe that he is), his results would strongly 
imply that RS, at least in the form in which it was given in above, ought to be rejected. The 
argument concerns thought that there are non-welfarist values. That is: there are goods whose 
value does not reduce to how they affect sentient creatures, for better or for worse. (There is a 
large list, including, justice, perfection, truth, beauty, virtue, duty, promising, freedom, rights 
and respect). Unless one is, in Fred Feldman’s words, a ‘welfarist fanatic’128, one must 
believe that there is a least one impersonal good with independent non-instrumental 
normative significance. If we are committed to the belief that there is at least one impersonal 
good, we must give up or restrict the scope of RS. Let us consider the case of proportional 
                                                          




justice. Consider two possible worlds. In WI there are a million happy saints and a million 
sad sinners; in W2 there are a million happy sinners and a million sad saints. Those who 
accept RS will have to say that the two worlds are of equal value and that there is no respect 
in which W1 could be better than W2, surely this must be false. Now consider another case. 
Suppose that there are two separate heavens, in H1 Pol Pot is at welfare level (1000) while in 
H2 Stalin is at (10). Further suppose that because both deserve to be at (2), Pol Pot and Stalin 
have more than they deserve. According to proportional justice it would make things, in one 
respect better, if Pol Pot was reduced to (10) and better all things considered if both were 
reduced to (2).  Those wedded to RS would, however, not only claim that H1 is better than 
H2 but there is no respect in which it could be worse. Those who endorse relative priority 
view would say that if a benefit became available it would make things better all things 
considered to give it to the comparatively worse off person, we should give it to Stalin. Those 
who endorse the absolute priority view would say that if a benefit became available it would 
make things better all things if we gave it to the person who is absolutely worse off, again, 
Stalin.  It would not be in any respect good to simply chuck that benefit away. And it would 
not be in any respect good to lower Pol Pot to (10). I believe most people would find their 
credulity strained by these claims. This must be because we believe that something other than 
welfare or, more generally, person-affecting value, has normative significance. And this 
contradicts RS. We must therefore reject RS.  
In the Critique of Judgement, Kant asks us whether we would want to create a world which 
contained only person-affecting value. And what sort of world that world would be like. His 
response is as follows: 
It is easy to decide what sort of value life has for us if it is assessed merely by what one 
enjoys (the natural end of the sum of all inclinations, happiness). Less than zero: for who 
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would start life anew under the same conditions […], which would… still be aimed merely at 
enjoyment?129 
I believe that Kant is correct, at least in his assumption that a world of person-affecting value 
would be a world of sentient creatures but not a world of persons in the robust sense. It might 
indeed be a world of unbounded wellbeing, a land of Cockaigne, but I do not believe that it 
would be a world that anyone could truly call moral.   
In conclusion, we have seen that the levelling down objection relies on a strong claim that all 
value is person-affecting in nature. We have considered and rejected a response that claimed 
we can modify egalitarianism in order to make it compatible with the person-affecting nature 
of value. We rejected this on grounds that it involves giving up the independent value of 
equality. Finally we saw that there are values other than person affecting value. If we are 
committed to at least one of these values we must reject RS. And finally we saw that to 
abandon all of these impersonal values to save RS, would entail a world we could not 
recognize as moral, we must therefore reject RS. This did not prove that equality is valuable. 







                                                          





How Might (In)equality Have (Dis)Value? 
3.1 
In the previous chapter we saw the levelling down objection to egalitarianism was dependent 
on the truth of a strong wide person-affecting restriction on the nature of outcome value, 
which we called the Revised Slogan (RS). Recall that RS said that something cannot be good 
or bad, without its being good or bad for someone (that its presence makes his life go better 
or worse). We argued that RS should be given up since it is incompatible with values the 
goodness of which is independent of the welfare of persons. Many people believe that 
something can be good in the sense of its making the world go better (‘good for the world’ as 
Fred Feldman puts it) without believing that its presence makes someone’s life go better.130 
We saw that, according to justice, it is good that people get what they deserve. If, for 
example, someone is getting more than she deserves, e.g., is at a higher positive level of 
wellbeing than she deserves, despite this being good for her, this must count in one respect 
negatively to the value of the state of affairs. Hence, it would be better, in one respect i.e. 
with respect to justice, if that person was at the level of welfare she deserved, even if this 
were to amount to a loss of welfare for that person.131 According to RS, there is no respect in 
which such an outcome can be good because there is no one for whom it is good, only 
someone for whom it is worse. Another non-person affecting value which we will be looking 
at in later chapters is perfectionism.132 According to perfectionism it is in one respect good 
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that one develops and exercises one’s essential human capacities for rationality.133. Suppose 
Alex has remarkable talent as a theoretical physicist. Suppose further that Alex chooses to 
instead purse her real passion for farming. Finally, suppose she fares well from farming, 
better than she would if she were to choose to pursue theoretical physics. Perfectionism 
claims that it would be in one respect better if Alex were to choose to pursue physics, since 
by pursuing physics she would develop her talents to a far greater degree. An outcome where 
she farms is in one respect worse than an alternative outcome were she practices physics, 
despite the former being better with respect to her level of wellbeing.134 If those who are 
committed to RS, are also committed to at least one value the goodness of which is 
independent of benefits and burdens to individuals then they will be required, at least, to limit 
the strength of this principle. Since a weaker version of RS does not lead to the levelling 
down objection, the non-egalitarian cannot appeal to RS in her objections to egalitarianism. 
Where does this leave us? In arguing against RS, we have of course not offered a positive 
argument for the value of equality. And, furthermore, non-egalitarians may still deny that 
equality is any kind of non-instrumental value on independent grounds, that is, without 
committing themselves to the truth of RS. I believe that those who find it difficult to see how 
equality could be non-instrumentally valuable on the following basis; final value, or the value 
something has as an end supervenes on non-evaluative properties of things. Yet equality, like 
freedom, truth, knowledge forgiveness, mercy, respect and recognition, is a relation and 
relations are not of anything but rather hold between things. In this chapter we will not be 
attempting to provide an axiology but rather more narrowly we shall be concerned to give an 
account of how relations can be of value.  
What I want to try to puzzle in this chapter is whether relations have value over and above the 
value of their relata. The view that they do is what I call the anti-reductionist view about 
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relations. The reductionist view is a denial of this view. Take for example, freedom. If 
freedom is a relation between, an agent, an agent imposed constraint and the doing of 
something X,135 does the value of freedom reduce at least in part to the value of ‘being able to 
do X’? Similarly with desert, desert is understood in terms of a relation between an agent, 
some level of virtue, and an amount of wellbeing.136 Does the value of desert reduce in part to 
value of wellbeing? Stephen Kershnar writes against the idea that desert-satisfaction itself 
could have value that “it is hard to see how a mere abstract relation such as desert, as opposed 
to a mental state, is capable of being intrinsically valuable.”137 For ‘desert’ read any relation 
you like, and for ‘mental state’ read monadic property. The reductionist says that relations are 
all explainable in terms of non-relational facts. So the question becomes, in the case of 
relational goods, do these goods have value only and because of the value of their relata? 
3.2  Distinctions in Value. 
Due to Korsgaard’s paper ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness,’138 it is common to distinguish two 
ways in which things can have value and two ways in which we value things. 
(1) The ways in which things have value: 
(a) Intrinsic Value: X is intrinsically valuable if and only if it is valuable in a way that 
supervenes only on the intrinsic properties of X. 
(b) Extrinsic Value: X is extrinsically valuable if and only if it is valuable in a way that 
supervenes on (at least some of) the extrinsic properties of X. 
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(2) The ways in which we value things: 
(a) Final Value: X is finally valuable if and only if it is valuable as an end, or, for its own 
sake. 
(b) Instrumental Value: X is instrumentally valuable if and only if it is valuable as a means. 
We shall be referring back to some these terms later.  Let us me now consider an important 
passage from Thomas Scanlon in which he writes: 
[F]airness and equality often figure in moral arguments as independently valuable states of 
affairs. So considered, they differ from the ends promoted in standard utilitarian theories in 
that their value does not rest on their being good things for particular individuals: fairness and 
equality do not represent ways in which individuals may be better off. They are, rather, 
special morally desirable features of states of affairs or of social institutions. In admitting 
such moral features into the evaluation of consequences, the theory I am describing departs 
from standard consequentialist theories, which generally resist the introduction of explicitly 
moral considerations into the maximand. It diverges also from recent deontological theories, 
which bring in fairness and equality as specific moral requirements rather than as moral 
goals.139 
We can interpret Scanlon in the above as making a claim about bearers of value, and types of 
value. It is being suggested that what it is that we evaluate, from the perspective of equality 
and fairness are ‘states of affairs’. While, on the other hand, what it is that we evaluate from 
the perspective of welfare are states of persons (‘good things for particular individuals’ for 
example, ‘P’s being happy’ or ‘P’s being benefited’) and lives as collections of such states140 
and only derivatively states of affairs. Hence we have two kinds of things that are of value; 
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equal and fair states of affairs on the one hand, and better or worse lives on the other. 
Secondly, although it is not made explicit, I suggest Scanlon would endorse the idea that 
equality and fairness, or rather, equal and fair states of affairs are valuable as ends; i.e., they 
are the kinds of thing that are valuable for their own sake, rather than for the sake of 
something else.141 On this estimation such states of affairs have final value. As we will see 
shortly this generates a problem, for if equality and fairness are relations between things and 
not properties of things, and if a things final value supervenes on its properties, then we may 
ask how equality and fairness could be either finally or intrinsically valuable.  
In his canonical work on egalitarianism, Larry Temkin142 uses the label ‘impersonal non-
instrumental value’ in order to draw the appropriate contrast with ‘personal non-instrumental 
value’. Scanlon, for his part, does not use this terminology but instead suggests that equality 
and fairness are “moral features” or values of states of affairs where I believe the relevant 
correlate is ‘prudential’ rather than ‘personal’ value. This is a better distinction. I aruge that 
personal value is confusing since it does not distinguish between values independent of the 
welfare of persons, but which are however states, or, properties of persons, such as ‘P’s being 
virtuous’, or, ‘P’s flourishing’ in the perfectionist sense.143 These two kinds of value are non-
welfarist yet they are not impersonal, since they clearly refer to states of persons. In  
Foundations of Ethics Ross includes the latter along with creative activity and welfare 
pleasure in his category of personal goods144 yet clearly distinguishes welfare from what he 
refers to as “moral and intellectual activities”145 by which he means virtue and perfection.  I 
                                                          
141 See Shelly Kagan ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’ in Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman (eds) 
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value  Springer 2005, Korsgaard 1983, Rabinowicz & Ronnow Rasmussen 1999 
142 Larry Temkin ‘Egalitarianism Defended’ Ethics Vol. 113, No. 4 ,2003, pp. 764-782 
143 Gustav Arrhenius has a nice discussion of this some of these themes in his ‘The Person Affecting Restriction, 
Comparativism, and the Moral Status of Potential People’ Ethical Perspectives 10, 3-4, 2003, 185-195 but he 
does not seem to recognize that some personal values such as virtue and desert are non-person affecting 
values. 
144 W.D Ross Foundations of Ethics Oxford Clarendon Press 1939, p.285 
145 Ross 1939, Ibid. 
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think we have reasons to reject Temkin’s terminology and to instead endorse something 
along the lines of Scanlon’s suggestion regarding idea that equality and fairness are moral 
values, though they are indeed also impersonal values in the sense that they do not refer to a 
property of persons. The problem with Temkin’s label of “impersonal value” is that the term 
does not provide any positive characterization of the type of value that is at issue. Temkin 
explains the distinctions in value as follows: 
[A] noninstrumental ideal [is] an ideal that [is] intrinsically valuable in the sense that its 
realization [is] sometimes valuable in itself, over and above the extent to which it promoted 
other ideals. Noninstrumental ideals have independent normative significance, and a 
complete account of the moral realm must allow for their value. Let us define personal 
noninstrumental ideals as ideals whose noninstrumental value lies in the contribution they 
make, when realized, to individual well-being. Such ideals are noninstrumentally valuable 
because of the extent to which their realization is good for people. In contrast, let us define 
impersonal noninstrumental ideals as ideals whose noninstrumental value lies partly, or 
wholly, beyond any contributions they make, when realized, to individual well-being. We 
might say that, qua being impersonal, such ideals are noninstrumentally valuable because of 
the extent to which their realization makes an outcome good, independently of, or beyond, 
the extent to which they are good for people.146 
I am in complete agreement with Temkin that noninstrumental ideals do indeed have 
independent normative significance, and I agree absolutely, that a complete account of the 
moral realm must allow for their value. But the purpose of this chapter is to ask whether 
equality is a “noninstrumental ideal” and to try to answer the question of how it has value. 
And on these two points I find Temkin’s analysis confusing. Firstly, he seemingly reserves 
the use of ‘impersonal’ and ‘personal’ to refer to two distinct bearers of value, and not to two 
                                                          




kinds of value. ‘Impersonal’ is appended the value of states of affairs, or, outcomes, and 
‘personal’ is appended to the value of states of persons, or lives, qua collections of states. I 
think this is fine as it goes but it is somewhat confusing and uninformative. He then uses 
‘non-instrumental’/‘instrumental’ to distinguish between two types of value. This use of the 
impersonal/personal distinction to refer to bearers of value, has certain similarities with Fred 
Feldman’s analysis in which he proposes that the evaluation of worlds and the evaluation of 
lives make use of different considerations.147Zimmerman has pointed with respect the above 
claim that it seemingly suggests that the items evaluated account for the distinction in 
evaluations, rather than the types of value in terms of which the evaluations are made.148Next, 
Temkin seems to be suggesting that if something has ‘non-instrumental’ value this entails its 
having ‘intrinsic’ value, and conversely, if something fails to have ‘intrinsic’ value this must 
entail that it has ‘instrumental’ value. Finally, states of affairs may either have ‘impersonal 
intrinsic’, or ‘impersonal instrumental’ value, while states of persons, and lives, may have 
either ‘personal intrinsic’ or ‘personal instrumental’ value but states of persons and lives 
cannot be ‘impersonally valuable’ in either sense, nor can states of affairs be ‘personally 
valuable’ in either sense. I think this is a mistake, and we should reject Temkin’s analysis. 
Referring back to Korsgaard, the proper correlate of ‘intrinsic’ is not as Temkin assumes, 
‘instrumental’ but ‘extrinsic’. It is false to claim that some things having ‘non-instrumental’ 
value entails it’s having ‘intrinsic’ value, since something might have extrinsic or relational 
value, without its having intrinsic value and yet, extrinsic value is a type of non-instrumental 
value. But the category of extrinsic value does not feature at all in Temkin’s analysis. We 
might also argue that instrumental value does not refer to a way in which something has 
value, but rather refers to a way in which we value things i.e. as a means to something else, 
                                                          
147 Feldman 2004, p.195 
148 Michael Zimmerman ,‘Feldman on the Nature and Value of Pleasure’, Philosophical Studies, 136 (3) 2007 
425-437 p.430, Zimmerman points out however that this is not Feldman’s considered view. 
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rather than as an end.149 If this is true, then modifying Temkin’s analysis accordingly and 
placing it in relation to Korsgaard’s schema above, things would either have intrinsic value 
and would be valued as ends, or they would fail to have value at all, and at best would be 
valued as a means to something else. I don’t think this analysis can be right. Returning to 
Zimmerman’s point above with respect to Feldman, we can interpret his suggestion as 
follows, the thought is: it is not because there are impersonal items or objects of evaluation 
that there is a type of impersonal value, and, conversely, it is not because there are personal 
items or objects of evaluation that there is a type of personal value. Zimmerman’s claim is 
that the personal /impersonal distinction should rather refer to a distinction in types of value. 
His argument is that personal value is a species of extrinsic or relational value; it concerns a 
type of value relativized to the interests of persons.150However Zimmerman would surely not 
want to commit himself to the claim that all extrinsic or relational value is personal, since that 
would imply that relations hold only between objects and the interests or attitudes of persons. 
This would be implausible. I object that impersonal value should be reserved solely for 
intrinsic value as Zimmerman suggests, since I claim there is a species of impersonal 
extrinsic value. For example; a great work of fine art or literature may be valuable because it 
is highly original. Originality is an extrinsic value since it is a value that the work or art has 
only relative to other works of its comparison class. Hence the value of the work is extrinsic 
but bears no relation to the attitudes or interests of persons, thus on my reckoning this makes 
originality a species of impersonal extrinsic value.151 
3.3. Ross: Situational Goods. 
                                                          
149 Thought see Langton 2007 
150 I mean persons with the appropriate universal quantifier applied, so let me not conflate personal and 
subjective value.  
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I propose that we can understand Scanlon’s above statement by looking at W.D Ross’s idea 
of “situational goods”.152 When Ross talks about the value of justice he often claims that it is 
“a separate good” or “a different kind of good”.153 I think the same is true for equality as 
comparative fairness. But what does Ross mean by “different kind of good”? In the Right and 
The Good, Ross maintains that we have reasons of beneficence to promote what he refers to 
as the “generally recognized personal goods, either in the way of good moral or intellectual 
activities or in the way of pleasure.” And in that work he maintained that both the duty of 
justice and the duty of benefice, can be subsumed under the general duty to promote as much 
good as possible.154  However, in Foundations of Ethics, he rejects this view. He there argues 
that a duty of justice should not subsumed under the category of a general duty to promote 
the good because a duty of justice is not a duty to promote the “generally recognized personal 
goods”155 which the general duty to promote the good requires us to promote. He puts this 
thought in the following passage: 
One of the great puzzles of ethical theory lies in the sense we have of obligations to do 
certain thinks which do not seem likely to bring into being the greatest possible amount of 
any of the generally recognized personal goods…we feel an obligation to do justice as 
between different people, even when we do not think that the sum of goods either moral or 
intellectual or hedonistic will be increased thereby.156 
This does not imply that Ross conscripts justice to a theory of the right. However, it can be 
objected that if justice is not itself part of a theory of the right then Ross’s paragraph is absurd 
since it amounts to saying we have a duty to promote a the good which does not increase 
goodness, and second that if justice were part of the good, then the values of states of affairs 
                                                          
152 Ross 1939, p.286 
153 Ross 2002,  p.138 
154 Ross 2002, p27 
155 Ross, 1939, p.285 
156 Ross, 1939, ibid. 
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would be made to turn on normative features (i.e. on absolute and/or comparative justice), 
and no consequentialist theory makes use of normative features in this way.157Finally we mix 
up the right and the good in another more fundamental way, that is deontic conceptions such 
as reasons and obligations, are relational and polyadic while goodness or value is a simple 
monadic property of things hence value and reasons are utterly distinct things, by claiming 
that goodness is relational we collapse this distinction.158 Theories of justice and fairness may 
well be part of the right, but they have no place in value theory.159 But this response seems 
arbitrary and question begging, firstly it presupposes the truth of the argument attributed to 
that Moore that intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties.  Which implies that that the 
only properties that can contribute to intrinsic value are intrinsic properties. However, 
beginning with Korsgaard something can have very well have final value without having 
intrinsic value.  I reject both of these claims. Ross160 believes that a just state of affairs “is a 
good”161 not part of the right. And he thinks this goodness or value consists in its having 
features that make it a worthy object of interest or satisfaction.162 This idea of value is close 
to a ‘buck-passing’163 or, a ‘fitting attitudes’ view.164 But what are the features that are 
possessed by a just state of affairs which makes it a worthy object of interest? Ross answers; 
                                                          
157 Fred Feldman Adjusting Utility for Justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice in his 
Utilitarianism, Hedonism and Desert Cambridge University Pres,1997 p173. 
158 Jonathan Dancy ‘Should we Pass the Buck?’ in Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman (eds) 
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value  Springer 2005, 
159 Frances Kamm for example, argues for this point in her ‘Health and Equity’ in Christopher J.L Murray, 
Joshua A. Salomon, Colin D. Mathers, and Alen D. Lopez Summary Measures of Population Health: Concepts, 
Ethics, Measurement and Applications World Health Organization, 2002 
160 Along with at least, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Rousseau see n41 above, Brentano and Moore also hold that 
desert satisfaction is one aspect of intrinsic value in the world. See Franz Brentano, The Origin of Our 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong  trans. Roderick M. Chisholm and Elizabeth H. Schneewind Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2009 p. 100; G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993/1903, pp. 263–264. 
161 Ross 1939, 289 
162 Ross 1939, 286 
163 Scanlon 1998, Derek Parfit ‘Rationality and reasons’ In Egonsson, D. et. al. (eds.), Exploring practical 
philosophy, essays in honour of Ingmar Persson, Ashgate, 2001, pp. 17-39 
164 See Francesco Orsi  ‘David Ross, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the Intrinsic Value of Acts’ Journal for the History 
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goods] as genuine goods, since they are worthy objects of satisfaction (ibid.), and presumably complex but 
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the distribution of pleasures among others in proportion to their goodness.165 And these same 
features he argues also ground a duty to act justly, that is, to ensure that just outcomes obtain. 
He adds that a just state of affairs is a worthy of satisfaction, one which we ought to promote 
“over and above the good which consists in the meritorious character or its activities, and that 
which consists in…happiness”.166So in response to the above objections, it is true that justice 
cannot be a personal good, because it is not a good that as Ross explains, is “resident in 
individuals”167 qua a monadic property of individuals. But this does not imply that justice is 
not a good. Following Aristotle168  Ross recognizes that justice is instead a value which holds 
in “relations between individuals”.169 Ross is arguing here that a theory of value must 
recognize justice as a ‘different kind of good’, or “good in different senses”170 which, after 
Nicoli Hartmann he calls a “situational good”, or, “state-of-affairs-value”171. Hence the 
lesson from Ross is that when we talk about the value of equality or the disvalue of 
inequality, or more generally, when we talk about how people fare relative to one another we 
are talking about states of affairs in which certain kinds of relations between people obtain. 
Inequality like freedom, desert, knowledge, truth, respect, recognition, is a relation holding 
between persons. All of these goods are ‘situational’ in Ross’s sense. So we need to see how 
they could have value.  Now, there are very tricky metaphysical issues which we need to try 
to grasp before we can offer something in the way of an answer. We need to go through a bit 
of metaphysics because almost all theories of value be they fitting-attitude theories, buck-
passing accounts or Moorean views, they all make reference to supervenience on properties 
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of things.172 For example, Mooreans understand value to supervene only on intrinsic monadic 
properties of things and they argue that all final value is intrinsic. Non-Mooreans argue that 
value supervenes on properties but these need not be intrinsic. The can therefore be relational 
properties. But relational properties depend on relations and properties. So relations are more 
fundamental than relational properties. So what are relations?   
3.4 Relations, properties, and reductionism 
We can firstly distinguish between properties and relations. Intuitively we can say that while 
properties hold of things that possess them, relations are borne by one thing to another, or, 
alternatively, they hold between things.173  When we say that A is square, or A is metal, then 
we are saying that there is a property ‘being square’ or ‘being made from metal’ that A 
possesses. Hence if A possesses the property of ‘being made out of metal’ intrinsically, then 
we say that this property is monadic. All intrinsic properties are monadic. Monadic properties 
are one-place properties, they can be possessed by things individually. But not all monadic 
properties are intrinsic. For example, the property ‘being a man’ is essentially monadic, but 
the property ‘being a father’ seems to be essentially relational. A person x is a father, just in 
case, x is a man, and there is another person y, such that y is the progeny of x. One cannot 
determine whether x is a father just by studying x alone; one has to take into account the 
relations which x has to at least one other person, e.g., y.  But even if the property of ‘being a 
father’ is essentially relational it can be designated by a monadic predicate; ‘is a father’.174 
However relational properties are not fundamental since they are entirely reducible to 
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relations and properties.175When we say that London is to the west of Bristol or that, A is 
more massive than B, then we are saying that there is a certain kind of relation which holds 
between London and Bristol, and between A and B, i.e. the relation ‘being to the east of’ and 
the relation ‘being more massive than’. Now we need to consider the crucial distinction 
between internal and external relations. According to David Armstrong and David Lewis176 
an internal relation such as being ‘taller than’, is one which supervenes on the intrinsic 
properties of the relata. That is, if the relata exist then the relation holds between them 
internally, if and only if the relata have the properties they do intrinsically. As Ingvar 
Johansson notes, most philosophers use the following definition of an internal relation177:  
Internal Relation: a relation is internal iff, necessarily, given the relata a and b, then aRb.  
Take the comparative ‘taller than’ relation of height. Suppose that John is 5’10” and James is 
5’11”, then it is true that ‘James is taller than John’, and that ‘John is shorter than James’.  
Some writers argue that each of these facts are made true just in case John has the height that 
he actually has and James has the height he actually has; hence it is not possible for James 
and John to have the heights they actually do and for James to fail to be taller than John.  
Keith Campbell has a nice example  “if God makes an island A with so much rock, soil, etc. 
as to amount to 20 hectares, and subsequently, an island B of 15 hectares extent, there is 
nothing more needing to be done to make A larger than B.”178Thus, if God brings it about 
that there are purely monadic facts about this amount of rock and other purely monadic facts 
that there is this amount of soil, God has thereby brought it about that A is larger than B. 
                                                          
175 David Armstrong A World of States of Affairs  Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.91-93 
176 David Armstrong Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989, p.43; David 
Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell 1986, 62 
177 Ingvar Johansson ‘All Relations Are Internal – the New Version’ Philosophiques, vol 38, no. 1, Spring 2011. 
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There is no further fact that God must bring about in order to bring it about that A is larger 
than B.179 
Indeed, it is natural to suggest that James’ being taller than John is nothing beyond their 
individual heights. Supposing that things have their heights intrinsically, then the taller than 
relation is internal. And as Armstrong claims, internal relations are “an ontological free 
lunch”.180They are “not something extra”181they “are not an addition to the world’s 
furniture”182they “are not the sort of relations we should be focussing on in 
ontology”.183Internal relations therefore reduce entirely to the monadic properties of the 
relata.  However, due originally to Russell, not all relations are internal. Some relations are 
‘external’. And as Armstrong claims, external relations, unlike internal relations, are an 
addition to the world’s being. One example of an external relation is the one we have already 
referred to above. The spatio-temporal relation ‘being to the west of’. You could know all the 
monadic facts about London and all the monadic facts about Bristol, it and all the monadic 
conjunctive facts about London and Bristol without knowing that London is west of Bristol. 
God could create each city, filling each with the requisite number of persons, cafes, etc. until 
every monadic fact concerning London and Bristol was made true, and he would still not 
have brought it about that London is south of Bristol.184 Now, absolutists are reductionists 
about relations185, when the see a relation they want to try to reduce it to the intrinsic or 
monadic properties of things. Comparativists are anti-reductionists, they hold that relations 
can be made true only by irreducibly relational facts. Bertrand Russell was a famous anti-
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reductionist about relations. Let us see what he can teach us about inequality. Suppose that 
Andy stands in a relation of inequality to Betty. Inequality like the ‘taller than’ is an 
asymmetric186 comparative relation. Suppose that Andy is at (10) and Betty is at (20) units of 
welfare. It would seem that because of the intrinsic nature of the numbers ‘10’ and ‘20’, 
Andy and Betty of necessity, stand in this relation. Recall Armstrong’s definition of internal 
relation stated that a relation will be internal iff, necessarily, given the relata a and b, then 
aRb. So because 20 is necessarily greater than 10, there is no way that 20 could fail to be less 
than 10, thus Andy and Betty stand in the relation of inequality they do, simply because of 
Andy’s having the amount of welfare he does and Betty’s having that amount of welfare she 
does. So we can finally reduce the relational to the non-relational intrinsic properties of Andy 
and Betty. ‘Andy is better off than Betty’ is made true by the intrinsic properties of Andy and 
Betty, and so there is no irreducibly relational state of Andy and Betty. Or, what amounts to 
the same thing, the relation between Andy and Betty is nothing real over and above the 
monadic non-relational properties of Andy and Betty.  Russell187 argues against the 
reducibility of asymmetric transitive relations in general. He points out that in order to argue 
this way, we must posit a relation between the magnitude of Andy’s welfare and the 
magnitude of Betty’s welfare.188 As Russell puts it: “Quantities are not properly greater or 
less, for the relations of greater and less hold between their magnitudes, which are distinct 
from the quantities.”189 Hence, “better off than” can be reduced to the more fundamental 
‘greater than’. In our case, the fact that 20 is 10 units greater than 10, is a further asymmetric 
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transitive relation.190Russell argues that the ‘greater than’ relation between magnitudes 
cannot be treated in the same way as the ‘better off than’ relation between Andy and Betty, 
because there are no intrinsic properties of magnitudes in virtue of which they stand in the 
relations they do. Thus we have an external relation. I think the case for an external relation is 
further strengthened when we consider the other crucial egalitarian relation -apart from 
‘greater than’, ‘less than’, and ‘equal to’ relation- that is the is ‘x units of welfare away from’, 
relation. This is because, as we mentioned above, all spatio-temporal relations are external. 
Now if these arguments go through, we can show that the inequality relation does not reduce 
to its relata. Thus we cannot simply value the equality relation because we value welfare. But 
we have not yet said how a relation can have value, since it remains the case that relations are 
not properties, and whichever view about value we choose, whether we adopt that is, a 
Moorean view which takes value as basic an unanalysable, or, a Non-Moorean view which 
analyses value in terms of reasons, supervenience on properties is common to both views. We 
rejected Dancy’s reading that “Ross held that goodness is an intrinsic property, while 
rightness is a relation… goodness is a property of motives and that is not a relation at all. 
Moral goodness, in particular, is a monadic property.”191 
We saw that Ross indeed did hold that the class of situational goods referred precisely to kind 
of value holding between persons. Many of these goods, in particular, justice, are moral or 
ethical goods. They are distinguished from personal goods generally, on grounds that as 
relations they cannot be monadic properties of persons, such as virtue, or welfare. So Dancy 
is right to quote Ross as holding that one important kind of goodness is indeed a monadic 
property, for example, “acts of will, desires, and emotions, and finally relatively permanent 
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modifications of character even when these are not being exercised”.192But we also saw that 
Ross wanted to us to recognize situational goods as a different kind of good from the kind of 
goodness resident within persons. 
I think there is actually quite a simple argument for the value of relations that would not 
differ too much from Korsgaard’s argument for final value. Firstly, as we have already stated, 
a relation is not a property, yet relational properties can be finally valuable. But relational 
properties supervene on relations and properties. Relational properties are therefore less 
fundamental then relations. However we should not claim that if a relational property has 
value then this entails that the relation will have value. Consider the value of ‘freedom’ and 
of ‘being free’ where the former is a relation and the latter is a relational property. Assume 
that the freedom relation does not reduce to the value of its relata. To be sure, ‘being free’ 
may have final value quite apart from whether or not ‘freedom’ has value. Similarly ‘being 
the father of” may  have final value quite apart from whether or not‘fathering’ has value.193 
The second option is that if inequality is an external relation, then it is constitutive of a state 
of affairs. And many writers believe that states of affairs are among the kinds of things that 
are the bearers of value. So saying that comparative unfairness is disvaluable implies 
objecting to certain states of affairs obtaining. Both of these seem like viable options. I think 
that egalitarians are ultimately concerned with disvalue of a certain type of inequality 
relation. Specifically they want to reduce or eliminate comparative unfairness in relations 
between persons. Egalitarians are not primarily concerned about the value of equality 
relation. Yet I believe they should not deny that the equality relation has (some positive) 
value. I do not believe that the value of comparative unfairness reduces to relational 
properties of persons such as their ‘being worse off’. Rather I think the disvalue belongs to 
the relation itself. And we mis-locate what is disvaluable about comparative unfairness, by 
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attempting this sort of reduction. Indeed I am in full agreement with Temkin on the point that, 
if we believe that comparative unfairness is disvaluable then we must believe that it is bad 
that one is worse off than others through no fault or choice of her own, and we must also 
believe that it is bad that another is better off than others through no fault or choice of her 
own.194  But ultimately what we want to reduce or eliminate is the relation of comparative 
unfairness on which these relational properties themselves depend on. Let me not go any 
further with trying to attach the value of egalitarianism to one or another metaethical view 
about value. Equality is a normative matter, and need to be able to accept or reject 
egalitarianism independently of our metaethics. Let me now simply summarise this section 
and offer a suggestion. We have argued that the inequality relation cannot be reduced to the 
value of its relata. We have also seen that whilst this blocks the view that equality only 
matters because welfare matters, we have also seen that this does not answer how relations 
themselves have value. Only that, whatever value they have will be independent of the terms 
of the relation. I believe that Ross is on the right track; situational goods are, like all goods, 
“objective facts of the situation”195 and those facts are themselves reason giving, in the sense 
that they give us reasons to take an interest in the thing. Moreover they give everyone-or, as 
Ross puts it they give the morally good spectator- reasons to (dis)favour them. This might 
seem to naturally lend itself to a buck passing view; where some thing’s having the higher 
order property of goodness or value is to be explained in terms of other features (properties 
and relations) of the thing that provide reasons to take an attitude towards some thing. Such 
that, when something has these reason-giving features we can call the thing good, but calling 
the thing good, need not imply an additional property of ‘goodness’. Rather, as Parfit puts it, 
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calling or labelling a thing ‘good’ is “merely an abbreviation: a way of implying that it has 
such [other] features”.196  
3.5 Some axiological comments. 
Let me finish this chapter by briefly considering a framework which might point the way to 
an view about axiology. I have said that egalitarians should be concerned primarily with the 
inequality relation. I therefore agree, at least in part, with Ingmar Persson197, who has long 
argued that egalitarianism should primarily be construed negatively, that is, the fundemental 
egalitarian concern should be to reduce or eliminate a certain kind of inequality as a non-
instrumentally bad-making feature of states of affairs. However, he assumes that if we agree 
with him on the claim that egalitarianism ought to be expressed in terms of a concern for the 
badness of inequality then we must be committed to claim that “equality is not anything good 
in itself”, I disagree. Due to Temkin198 and Hurka199 I suggest we could well think of the 
inequality relation in terms of a spectrum of cases bounded on one side by perfect equality 
and unbounded on the other, as inequality becomes greater and greater. Inquality unlike 
equality, after all, admits of degrees. Focusing primarily on eliminating inequality, as Hurka 
suggests, makes equality perfectly achievable, whereas a value such as welfare or virtue is 
not something we can say can be perfectly ‘achieved’. Inequality however, like vice, seems at 
least, to have no lower bound. However I do think we should allow equality to have some 
positive value,200 yet it will nevertheless be the case that we can improve on perfect equality 
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only by adding more equality relations to an already equal state of affairs.201We might have a 
reason to favour this if it did happen but no reasons to act so as to try to bring it about that it 
does happen. In a two person universe where A (10) and B (10) there is nothing more we can 
do by way of improvements to the equality between A and B.  We might have no reasons for 
example to make it the case that (imagining they are male and female) A and B procreate to 
produce a further equalizable C. Though this does not imply that if C did come into existence 
that we would not prefer for C to be equal to A and B. Now, there are a number of 
suggestions here with regard to the positive value of equality. For example Gustav Arrhenius 
suggests that we might have an aggregation function for the negative value of unequal 
relations which would be strictly linear whereas we might specify an alterntaive aggregation 
function for the positive value of equal relations which might be a strictly increasing concave 
function with an upper limit.202 But Arrhenius seems to want to allow for the positive value 
of equality to, at least sometimes, outweigh the negative value of inequality. I find it difficult 
to agree with this. Indeed, I have an obvious and general problem with Arrhenius’s argument 
in that it offers no solution to the reduction or elimination of inequality. If reducing inequality 
is the egalitarian’s fundemental concern which I think is highly plausible, then, for this 
reason, I think the reverse of Arrhenius’ argument might well be true; if equality has positive 
value it should always be less than the disvalue of inequality. Secondly I am unsure how, 
outside situations of perfectly equality, his proposal could avoid making a bad situation worse 
by adding more equal relations to a situation. Placing an upper bound on the goodness of 
equality with diminishing marginal value, and no lower bound on disvalue of inequality, 
would allow that a large enough inequality can be greater in disvalue than any possible value 
of equality. That is, the incremental bad of inequality can be greater than the incremental 
good of equality. As Hurka has noted, this is similar to the suggestion Ewing made with 
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respect to the values of justice and injustice: “When I look at the two, injustice in punishment 
seems to me a very much greater intrinsic evil than justice is a good, especially if the 
injustice consists in punishing somebody for an offence of which he is not guilty or in 
excessive severity.”203 Whatever we decide about the positive value of equality, and as I say I 
agree with the spirit of Arrhenius’s discussion; that equality should not have a merely neutral 
value, I think we should preserve Temkin’s suggestion with regards to inequality204. As he 
suggests, the disvalue of inequality should be the starting point of the egalitarians moral 
concern. He suggest that as the gap between equally deserving people are very large, it can be 
reasonably clear that the inequality is bad, because unfair. As the gaps between equally 
deserving people become smaller and smaller, we can allow that the situation becomes less 
and less unfair, and so less and less bad. Still, as long as there are some undeserved 
inequalities it may seem plausible to think the situation is somewhat bad, because it is still 
somewhat unfair.  He suggests that these cases could be represented with negative numbers, 
with the greater the inequalities the larger the negative numbers. As a situation’s inequality 
gets smaller and smaller the negative number representing it will get smaller and smaller. 
Eventually, as gaps between people become infinitesimally small, so the negative numbers 
representing their badness become smaller and smaller approaching the limit of the bounded 
sequence of negative numbers. And that limit will be zero, which we may plausibly construe 
as the number representing a neutral situation.205 This I think allows to say against Persson 
that the situation with perfect comparative fairness will be a situation in which there is a 
complete absence of badness or disvalue, represented as it would be by a non-negative 
number. However it would not suddenly go from being not bad to being good. I think this is 
an eminently plausible suggestion. However, it remains problematic since it would disallow 
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positive equality from ever being valuable, no matter how many equality relations were 
added to a state of affairs they would never go beyond having neutral value. 
Let me now conclude with a brief summary of this chapter.  We began by arguing that the 
anti-egalitarian should accept a weaker version of RS which would not lead to the levelling 
down objection. We noted that we had not of course not offered any sort of a positive 
argument for the value of equality. And, furthermore, non-egalitarians may still deny that 
equality is any kind of non-instrumental value without committing themselves to the truth of 
RS. We then suggested noting that equality is a comparative relation between people that one 
way this could be done would be to argue that the value of equality reduces to the value of its 
relata. We briefly considered a framework for the value of equality as a Rossian situational 
good. And we saw that using Russell’s analysis equality could not be so reduced to its relata. 
Finally we looked at the bare bones of an axiology which focused on the disvalue of 
inequality, we saw that inequalities could be represented as a series of spectrum cases. In the 
next two chapters, we move from our discussions of egalitarianism to the relation between 
inequality culture and the arts. These chapters look at two of the most important moral and 











Between Nature and Freedom: Kant, Culture and Moral Teleology 
4.1 
During 1780’s,206 Immanuel Kant had been committed to two interconnected ideas; the first 
of which being a theoretical idea207 consisting of a teleological thesis of human nature and 
history, and the second being the moral-practical idea208 of the highest good. However in his 
later work The Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant attempts to bring these two theses 
together, in order to develop a solution to the problem concerning the realization of morality 
in the sensible world, and through the new category of reflective judgement.  In section II of 
the second, or published, introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgement209 Kant 
sketches out the problem concerning the “great gulf” separating two distinct orders of 
legislation; the understanding’s legislation over “concepts of nature” over what is, through its 
explication of causal laws, and reason’s legislation over “the concept of freedom” over what 
ought to be, and of which is not subject to laws of causal necessity. The problem then 
concerns how these two orders, legislating over the same domain of experience, could be, in 
some way, compatible without being reduced one to the other. That is, without collapsing 
into a single order in either direction, since collapsing what ought to be into what is would 
rule out the possibility of freedom and collapsing what is the case into what ought to be 
would run contra to the laws of natural science and would be nonsense. The formulation he 
gives us then is then following:  
                                                          
206 This section is indebted to the work of Henry Allison. I draw, in particular from his ‘The Gulf between Nature 
and Freedom and Nature’s Guarantee of Perpetual Peace’ in Essay’s on Kant Oxford University Press  2012, 
217-229 and his Kant’s Theory of Taste, A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment Cambridge University 
Press, 2001, 197-218 
207 Immanuel Kant, ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ in Hans S. Reiss, (ed) Kant's 
Political Writings, trans H.B Nisbet, Cambridge University Press 2003, pp.41-53 
208 Kant ‘Critique of Practical Reason’1996. 
209 Kant ‘Critique of the Power of Judgement’, 2000, pp59-87 
 77 
 
“ . . .from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no 
transition is possible. . . yet the latter ought to have an influence on the former, namely the 
concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible 
world; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the 
lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of the ends that are to be 
realized in it in accordance with the laws of freedom.” 210 
The problem then comes down to the following. Assuming that the moral law dictates to us 
certain ends which ought to be promoted, or realized, in the sensible world, it follows then 
that we must take nature (specifically human nature with it human history) as a condition of 
possibility under which any such realization of our freedom rests. However, we understand 
nature in terms of mechanistic laws, and thus as being indifferent to the realization of ends 
dictated by the laws of freedom. But since such ends must be taken to be achievable- for it 
would be irrational for an agent to act in the pursuit of an end that is impossible to achieve - 
we must therefore be able to conceive of nature as being compatible with our moral purpose. 
Thus a transition is needed from a manner of thinking in accordance with the concepts of 
nature to a manner of thinking in accordance with the concept of freedom.  
In Section IX of the introduction Kant refines the terms of the problem. He tells us there that 
the “great gulf” is located between the “supersensible in the subject”211 and phenomenal 
appearances.  He will state in this section that although sensible nature cannot determine the 
“supersensible-in-the-subject”, that is, human nature in its empirical-anthropological 
character, cannot determine what morally ought to be, Kant tells us, in stronger terms than 
those of Section II, that the latter should determine the former.  
He writes: 
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But although the determining grounds of causality in accordance with the concept of freedom 
(and the practical rules that it contains) are not found in nature, and the sensible cannot 
determine the supersensible in the subject, nevertheless the converse is possible (not in regard 
to the cognition of nature, of course, but in regard to the consequences of the former on the 
latter) and is already contained in the concept of a causality through freedom, whose effect in 
accordance with its formal laws is to take place in the world.212 
The crucial concept which is being introduced here is that of “causality in accordance with 
the concept of freedom”, or what Kant what amounts to the same thing; “free causality”.  He 
then argues that the effects or consequences of our free-causality, are to be thought of as 
coextensive with a “final end . . . which is to exist (or its manifestation is to appear in the 
sensible world)”.213 We should view this passage as expanding on the sentence in Section II 
which we saw spoke of “ends dictated by the principles of freedom”, insofar as he is now 
referring to the doctrine of the ‘Highest Good’ as the distinctive moral project which we must 
conceive of as being realizable in the sensible world. This will concern the proportion of 
virtue and happiness of absolute justice. And he identifies that it is the nature of the subject 
“as a being of the sensible world, namely as a human being,” that we must now treat as the 
crucial condition of possibility through which this final end or Highest Good is to be realized. 
Therefore it is necessary that we should be able to conceive of human nature’s (and indeed 
human history’s) amenability to the actualization of our moral freedom. 
Finally then, we reach the section in which Kant introduces his proposed solution to the 
transition problem on which the significance of the Critique of Judgment is to rest. He is now 
able state the solution is to be found in a concept of nature’s purposiveness; the supersensible 
substrate which is the ground of both nature and freedom. However, the deduction of this 
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principle cannot be accomplished either by the understanding or by practical reason since as 
we have seen the understanding can only legislate over appearances, it can only provide 
theoretical knowledge of nature’s causal laws, and pure practical reason only legislates over 
supersensible laws of freedom. Thus Kant tasks the reflective power of judgment to introduce 
this concept of nature’s purposiveness, one that is to be added to our concepts of nature and 
to our concept of freedom in such a way that it is able to mediate between them and it is in 
the teleology which, as we will see, the significance of nature’s purposiveness on the nature-
freedom problem must be sought.  
Having established what the nature-freedom problem consists in and its relation to the issue 
of moral ends, we now need to consider some of the arguments from §82 and §83 from the 
Methodology section in the ‘Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgement’ in order to 
understand how Kant’s teleological thesis functions in relation to a transition between nature 
and freedom. I begin with an assessment of how Kant establishes the concept of an ultimate 
end of nature. I shall show that, having made the argument for the validity of the ultimate end 
in relation to a system of nature, Kant then makes the status of the ultimate end conditional 
on the realization of a further, final end of creation, which, he argues must be a moral one. I 
then provide an analysis of this concept of the final end. After we have established how Kant 
argues for these two fundamental concepts, we will then be in a position to return to the 
above arguments in order to focus on how he conceives of a transition between ultimate and 
final end and to see why these teleological concepts are central to his analysis of the concept 
of the arts and culture.  
4.2  The Ultimate End of a System of Nature 
Kant begins the crucial §83 in the Appendix to Critique of the Teleological Power of 




is the ultimate end of nature, by referring back to §82 where it was initially affirmed. He 
writes:   
In the preceding we have shown that we have sufficient cause to judge the human being not 
merely, like any organized being, as a natural end, but also as the ultimate end of nature here 
on earth, in relation to which all other natural things constitute a system of ends in 
accordance with fundamental principles of reason, not, to be sure, for the determining power 
of judgment, yet for the reflecting power of judgment. 214 
Thus before we can consider §83 and so the argument for culture in any depth we shall firstly 
need to assess the argument to which Kant refers in §82 to in order to see how he is entitled 
to conclude that we have “sufficient cause”, though certainly not proof, to judge the human 
being (or humankind) as (a) not merely, like any organized being, as a natural end; and (b) on 
the grounds of this distinction, to claim that humankind qualifies for the status of the ultimate 
end of a system of nature.   
The argument to which Kant is referring marks the culmination of his discussion of the 
category of external purposiveness. 215 This is an idea concerning natural organisms standing 
in relation to one another as means stand in relation to ends, and where the latter may turn out 
to be means to yet further ends216 Kant states the regulative principle or ‘maxim of external 
purposiveness’ as the following:  
everything [every natural end] in the world is good for something, that nothing in it is in vain; 
and by means of the example that nature gives in its organic products, one is justified, indeed 
called upon to expect nothing in nature and its laws but what is purposive in the whole.217 
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Judging natural organisms firstly by the concept of internal purposiveness, on the maxim 
which states that: the natural dispositions of each animal are optimally purposive or suitable 
for the goals for which the animal is destined, leads us to infer external purposiveness, and 
finally leads us to the question as to whether nature as a whole might be thought of as a 
system of purposes working towards the realization of some universal end. Kant’s argument 
turns on the question of whether there is something within nature, the existence of which can 
unify a plurality of ends into a system; an end which is ultimate through its relation to other 
ends, and therefore something in which the natural chain of means and ends terminates. Such 
a universal end is what Kant calls the ‘ultimate end of nature as a teleological system’. And, 
in referring to Allen Wood’s commentary, the rational necessity for an ultimate end, in 
relation to the validity of the concept of a system of natural ends in reflective judgement, can 
be understood to be as follows: 
“Without an ultimate end, every aggregate of ends is incomplete. Without an ultimate end, 
there would have to be either a plurality of ends in which the teleology terminates, or else 
every member of the aggregate had a further end somewhere else within the aggregate. In the 
former case, the aggregate would lack unity and not constitute a true system (or realm) of 
ends. In the latter case, the resulting chain of ends would run on endlessly and the whole 
would be without an end. If either nature or morality (or both) is to constitute a system of 
ends, it must have an ultimate end.”218 
Kant then claims that humankind is the only suitable candidate for a type of natural end 
which might qualify for the status of an ultimate end and he justifies this claim on the 
grounds that humankind is the only natural species endowed with the capacity to voluntarily 
set ends for itself. Humankind he writes: “is the only being on earth who can form a concept 
                                                          




of purposes and use his reason to form an aggregate of purposively structured things into a 
system of purposes.”219  
We can summarise the argument above as follows: (a) judging nature in accordance with the 
idea of a system of natural purposes presupposes that there is something, or some species, 
that is an ultimate end of this system. (b) the only being in nature which can qualify for the 
status of the ultimate end is humankind,8 since it is the only species which possesses the 
capacity for setting itself ends (“any ends in general”, not merely those which are morally 
required). (c) This end-setting capacity explains why human beings may be judged to be the 
ultimate end, since this capacity is what distinguishes human beings from mere natural ends 
on the grounds that humankind is the only type of being suitably wired up to be able to grasp 
and deploy the concept of a purpose,220and therefore humankind is the only species within 
nature which is not itself a ‘closed organism’, with an end which is determined for it, since it 
is human beings alone, on the basis of the possession of the capacity so described, have the 
ability to (a) use nature (both internal and external) as a means in determining for itself an 
end, and (b) through the further use of its reason is able to unify an aggregate of ends into a 
system. Thus, if we take these two aspects together we can say that humanity, in distinction 
that is from mere natural ends, is endowed with a specifically rational capacity.221However 
such a conclusion cannot be final since nothing in what we have said so far can tell us why 
such a species of rational beings is to exist at all222 and it is this problem which transfers us 
into morality, since the purpose of human existence can only be one which human beings 
give to themselves, independently of the cooperation of nature, and therefore from their 
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freedom. Thus the extraordinary outcome of Kant’s argument: a purely scientific study of 
nature leads us to morality. The purpose of the ultimate end of nature therefore can only be a 
moral one. We can then say that, although the argument is not operative at this point, the 
ultimate end of a system of nature must be dependent upon a final end of creation, something 
which is unconditioned and outside nature. Therefore, nature has no purpose until we give it 
one by giving ourselves a purpose.223Returning now to the argument in §83. As we have said, 
the thesis regarding humankind as ultimate end of nature leads us to ask a further question, 
for what purpose has nature endowed humankind with the rational capacity to set-ends? In 
order to provide an answer to this question Kant suggests that we now have to look within the 
species itself, “among all his ends in nature” so as to specify, firstly; the general kinds of 
ends which we human beings set and pursue, and secondly; from these ends to assess which 
might qualify as an ultimate end of nature for us. For now we can say that two candidate ends 
emerge, these are: happiness and culture, and we will want to know lwhy Kant supposes there 
are only two such ends.  At this point however, Kant is asking whether the purpose for which 
nature has endowed humankind with the capacity for practical reason224 , lies in the 
attainment of happiness, defined as; “the kind of end that can be satisfied by the beneficence 
of nature itself” and as “the sum of all the ends that are possible through nature outside and 
inside of the human being”.225 Or, on the other hand, whether this ultimate end of nature for 
humankind is purely formal “[t]he production of the aptitude of a rational being for any ends 
in general (thus those of his freedom)” which Kant calls ‘culture’. In order to assess which of 
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the two candidates might qualify for the status of an ultimate end of nature, Kant introduces a 
key conditional argument.  
Half-way through 83 he states that: 
As the sole being on earth who has reason, and thus a capacity to set voluntary ends for 
himself, he is certainly the titular lord of nature, and, if nature is regarded as a teleological 
system, then it is his vocation to be the ultimate end of nature; but always only conditionally, 
that is, subject to the condition that he has the understanding and the will to give to nature 
and to himself a relation to an end that can be sufficient for itself independently of nature, 
which can thus be a final end, which, however, must not be sought in nature at all.226 
And immediately following this he restates the aims of this section of the argument:  
In order . . . to discover where in the human being we are at least to posit that ultimate end of 
nature, we must seek out that which nature is capable of doing in order to prepare him for 
what he must himself do in order to be a final end, and separate this from all those ends the 
possibility of which depends upon conditions which can be expected only from nature.227 
Happiness therefore, as a natural end, by definition, does not meet the condition of being 
“distinguishable from those ends the possibility of which depends upon conditions that are 
given by nature” therefore; happiness cannot serve as a candidate for the ultimate end since it 
cannot provide a unique or coherent final end to the system of nature. Indeed, of happiness, 
Kant writes: 
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earthly happiness . . . that is the matter of all of his ends on earth, which, if he makes them 
into his whole end, make him incapable of setting a final end for his own existence and of 
agreeing with that end. 228 
But equally, as we have already seen, assigning something, or some species the status of an 
ultimate end of a system of nature is dependent on being able to attribute a capacity to that 
species which allows us to distinguish it from the rest of nature. And on the basis that 
possessing such a capacity means that the species under consideration does not have an end 
which is determined for it by nature. Therefore if a natural end such as happiness was to be 
identified as; “the true vocation of practical reason” that is, if the purpose of practical reason 
was to provide the human species with a sophisticated mechanism for the pursuit of its own 
welfare, then the human species would therefore have an end determined for it by nature, 
which would rule out freedom, and humankind would be just another link in the chain of 
means and ends. Thus there would be no ultimate end and therefore no justification for our 
conceiving of nature as a system of ends. Rather, since nature has endowed us with practical 
reason, we are necessarily able to set ends for ourselves, at least in partial independence from 
nature. Moreover it is through our setting ends that, not only do we give ourselves an end, but 
we further develop our capacity for setting ends in general. That is to say; through setting 
ends that we are able to “increase as much as possible the skill for fulfilling ends that have 
been thought up. 229 
Referring once more to the maxim of internal purposiveness, we might put the argument in 
the following way: insofar as the natural dispositions of each organism are optimally 
purposive or suitable for the goals for which the animal is destined, if on the part of the 
human species those natural dispositions or capacities are considered to be the capacities for 
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the use of reason, then the purpose for which the human species is destined (i.e., the purpose 
of its existence), cannot be a natural end since practical reason just is the ability to set ends 
for ourselves. Thus the end for which the human species is destined cannot be found in 
nature. Since it must however have an end for which it is destined, this can only be an end 
which it sets for itself, independently of nature. Therefore we can say that nature has 
endowed us with the natural dispositions for the use of practical reason which are optimally 
suitable for the goal of setting for ourselves a purpose for our own existence, and ‘setting for 
ourselves a purpose’ just is the destiny of the human species. Therefore it is via natural 
teleology that we are able to begin to view human nature as being amenable to the realization 
of its own moral freedom.  
However at this point it is enough to say that by an argument from elimination we arrive at 
culture as the only possible candidate for the ultimate end of nature since culture just is: “the 
formal, subjective condition, namely the aptitude for setting himself ends at all and 
(independent from nature in his determination of ends) using nature as a means appropriate to 
the maxims of his free ends in general, as that which nature can accomplish with a view to 
the final end that lies outside of it and which can therefore be regarded as its ultimate end.”230 
4.3 Two components of the Final End. 
This next section will be split into two parts in order to concentrate on the two conceptions of 
final end of which Kant specifies in section 84 and tries to unify in sections 85-88.  We begin 
by noting that in contrast to the ultimate end of nature, a final end is defined as something 
requiring no other end as the condition of its possibility, containing as it does, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of all other ends. Therefore; the final end cannot be an end that 
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nature would be sufficient to produce in accordance with its idea, because it is unconditioned. 
Without further ado, Kant writes, in the crucial passage from 84: 
Now we have in the world only a single sort of beings whose causality is teleological, i.e., 
aimed at ends and yet at the same time so constituted that the law in accordance with which 
they have to determine ends is represented by themselves as unconditioned and independent 
of natural conditions but yet as necessary in itself. The being of this sort is the human being, 
though considered as noumenon: the only natural being in which we can nevertheless 
cognize, on the basis of its own constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom) and even the 
law of the causality together with the object that it can set for itself as the highest end (the 
highest good in the world). 231 
From this passage we can see that the final end is again considered as something which can 
be attributed to only humankind. Accordingly, two interdependent specifications of the final 
end are given. The first type of final end we learn from the above passage is “the human 
being . . .  considered as noumenon”232, or, equivalently; “the human being (each rational 
being in the world) under moral laws.”233 The second type of final end is defined as the 
“object that [humankind] can set for itself as the highest end.”234 Or; the highest good.  
Now, these two types of final end pertain two categories of an “end” in Kant’s system; the 
final end of creation is an ‘end-in-itself’, whilst the highest good is an ‘end to be promoted’ in 
and through action. Kant is now required then to give us an argument for the unification of 
the two types of final end. Thomas Pogge235 has suggested that the argument for the 
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unification of the two types of final end can be understood in terms of the following: It is 
only through the highest good, as the end of our pure practical reason, that we are able to 
understand the purpose of our acting under the moral law, since the highest good just is the 
point of unification of all moral actions and goals. Through the highest good we are able to 
give ourselves a relation to a final purpose of our existence, from which we can infer the 
purpose of existence in general. Since, without a final purpose of our existence, the world 
itself would have no purpose, therefore the final end of our existence, our supreme goal, must 
itself be the purpose existence in general. Thus the purpose of all existence is one which we 
ascribe to it, by giving ourselves a purpose. However, Pogge’s argument is premised on an 
alternative specification of the two-types of final end, which he takes as a ‘final end of 
humankind’ and a ‘final end of creation.’236Thus he claims that Kant’s argument for 
unification is one that concerns an inference from the final purpose of human existence; i.e., 
the highest good, to the final purpose of all creation. I agree with Pogge that Kant’s argument 
does concern the extension of the highest good as the final end of human existence to 
encompass the purpose of creation as a whole, however I think that Pogge’s argument does 
not offer a way of understanding Kants crucial argument regarding a transition from the 
ultimate end to the final end. Pogge’s argument would be a perfectly good one if we take it as 
pertaining simply to the above stated possibility of the extension of the concept of the highest 
good to the purpose of existence as a whole.  However, I suggest that what Pogge misses in 
his reading is that portion of Kant’s argument which specifies the first type of final end as 
“the human being . . . under moral laws” 237which I take to be the condition on which the 
second type of final end qua the highest good, is premised. Since the highest good, as the 
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total object of the moral law, is established only once we have acknowledge our standing 
under the moral law and what it requires of us. Once this has been established, then I claim 
that it is perfectly valid to read Kant’s text as then moving on to argue for the inference from 
the highest good as the purpose of our existence to the purpose of existence as a whole, 
however, such a reading is only possible once we have given an adequate account of the unity 
between the “human being under moral laws” and the “a priori, a final end, to strive 
after”.238We are only then entitled to apply Pogge’s argument to account for the extension of 
the highest good to encompass the purpose of existence in general. 
In order to see how this can be argued, I refer to Andrews Reath’s239 seminal paper on the 
highest good. Reath’s paper is an important one because in it, he supplies us with an 
argument which will allow us to grasp the unification of our two-types of final end. On 
Reath’s interpretation Kant is maintaining a certain relation between the good and human 
agency, insofar as the good is being defined as the possible object of a moral intention. 
Secondly, in defining an object of practical reason to be “an effect possible through 
freedom”,240 Kant is committed to the view that only states of affairs which could be the 
possible results of intentional human action can be included in what is morally good. Reath, 
takes these two claims together to offer the following argument; since one decides whether an 
object is morally good by asking if one could will an action directed towards it, and since it 
would be irrational to will an action directed towards bringing about some end or state of 
affairs unless that state of affairs could be conceived as being, at least, potentially achievable 
through human agency we should conclude that “the definition of the good indicates that it 
should apply to possible human ends”241  which he then defines as being the ends that could 
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be the result of human reason under ideal conditions. The key moment in Reath’s paper is his 
claim that it follows from the above argument that the Highest Good should be understood as 
an extension of this same principle. Looking to the passage in the Dialectic of the Critique of 
Practical Reason, where Kant refers to the Highest Good as “the unconditioned object of pure 
practical reason”242 or as Reath glosses it “the unconditioned object of the moral law”243, he 
suggests that we should take this to supply the connection between the moral law and the 
highest good. In order to understand this a little better, Reath argues that if the good per se, 
can be taken simply as an object of pure practical reason, referring to an end that is the result 
of the use of moral freedom, then we should view the highest good simply to be the highest 
good that results from our use of moral freedom. We should then be able to show that Kant’s 
reference to the “unconditioned object of pure practical reason” pertains to the totality or 
complete set of ends that is the result of the use of our moral freedom. The concept of the 
Highest Good is derived from the further use of reason “in its characteristic activity of 
introducing systematic unity into a body of a given material”21 i.e., into the ends that are 
contained in collective moral conduct, but crucially; only once the moral law has been shown 
to be established and only once we know which ends it dictates. From this Reath concludes 
that the Highest Good ought to be considered as implicit in the moral law from the beginning. 
“That some notion of the highest good follows simply from the fact that moral conduct is 
directed at ends. If the good refers to possible human ends, the same condition should apply 
to the Highest Good as well. . . .it simply follows from the fact that moral conduct [under the 
moral law] is directed at ends.”244 Reath locates textual evidence for his claim in Kant’s 
remark in Critique of Practical Reason where Kant states that;  
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For, in fact the moral law ideally transfers us into a nature in which reason would bring forth 
the highest good were it accompanied by sufficient capacities; and it determines our will to 
impart to the sensuous world the form of a system of rational beings. 245 
We can read this in conjunction with the claim in the Critique of the Power of Judgment that:  
the final end of creation is that constitution of the world which corresponds only to that which 
we can give as determined in accordance with laws, namely the final end of our pure practical 
reason, insofar as it is to be practical. – Now in virtue of the moral law, which imposes this 
final end upon us, we have a basis for assuming, from a practical point of view, that is, in 
order to apply our powers to realize it, its possibility, its realizability, hence also a nature of 
things corresponding to that end (since without the accession of nature to a condition that 
does not stand within our own power its realization would be impossible). Thus we have a 
moral ground for also conceiving of a final end of creation for a world. 246 
Therefore, in the conclusion of this section, I argue contra Pogge, that it is only once we have 
established the “system of rational beings under the moral law”; as the first type of final end, 
that we know what the moral law is, and moreover which ends it contains. Only then are we 
are able to construct from the acknowledgement of the moral law the concept of the second 
type of final end, as the highest good. And only then are we able to extend the concept of the 
highest good to draw the inference to the final purpose of existence in general. And I suggest 
that the final end as the highest good should then be considered to serve as a point of 
orientation and coordination247 of all our conduct on permissible and obligatory maxims. And 
thus the end to which all our moral action is ultimately directed. One should then be able to 
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think of the final end as the end of the moral conduct of every rational being. This is 
important, since,  as Pogge points out, if the highest good were specified in agent-relative 
terms then this could indeed function merely to render all of our ends mutually coherent, 
however it is only by specifying the highest good in terms of an agent-neutral universality 
that we can fully unite all of our moral endeavours by directing them towards the same state 
of affairs as a common, trans-individual goal; therefore the highest good is not simply a 
consistent point of orientation but a point of coordination.248 
4 .4 On the relation between the ultimate end of nature and final end of creation. 
In order to consider the complex arguments which we encountered in the above, my next 
section will assess some of the literature on the ultimate end/final end distinction and their 
ensuing relation. I shall suggest that the prominent arguments which seek to use the teleology 
in order to establish that human beings possess an absolute value prior to morality do not 
succeed.  As we have mentioned, when Kant talks about a “final end” we can take him to be 
referring, in one instance to an “end-in-itself” and when he talks about an “ultimate end” we 
can take this to be referring to a non-normative or descriptive thesis regarding a capacity; 
namely the rational capacity to set and pursue ends and to systematize them. But how then 
should we understand the relation between the ultimate and final end? I will suggest in this 
section that we may begin looking at this problem by referring to the ‘Formula of Humanity’ 
from the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Although I shall argue that the two 
arguments work in different registers and lead to two totally different conclusions,249 I intend 
to show that the concept of an ultimate end is as purely descriptive one regarding the 
capacities or predispositions which marks human beings out in a system of nature. It is not, or 
not in in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, used to ground a categorical imperative. The 
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question I shall ask in this section is whether it is correct to attribute to Kant the view that he 
simply uses the thesis regarding the ultimate end, which is first and foremost a descriptive, 
theoretical concept, in order infer an absolute value which we assign to this same capacity in 
an evaluative thesis. I argue that, both arguments in the Groundwork and in the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment share common premises regarding the capacity for setting ends and an 
unconditional value assigned to this same human capacity, and the reading of the two texts 
together will actually help in clarifying our question, namely, which feature the possession of 
which something is a final end, or, end-in-itself. Kant’s references, to the rational, non-moral 
capacity to set ends, “any ends in general” as what distinguishes human beings from mere 
natural ends, advocates a reading in conjunction with the argument in The Metaphysics of 
Morals which states that “the capacity to set oneself an end—any end whatsoever—is what 
characterizes humanity (as distinguished from animality)”250 This is broadly the approach 
taken by Paul Guyer251 Allen Wood252 and Christine Korsgaard253 who have each taken the 
argument in §82-83, regarding the relation between ultimate end and final end to refer firstly 
to the description of a rational capacity and the attribution of an absolute or unconditional 
value to that capacity.  That is, the capacity to set ends is what defines Kant’s concept of 
humanity as an end in itself, when it is valued as such.  Guyer, in his reading of 82-83 arrives 
at this suggestion in his claim that the argument Kant must have had in mind is the following:   
In order even to begin to think about an end for nature, we have to think of mankind as its 
end because . . .  [a]s the only sort of being that can form a conception of ends . . . mankind 
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must be the origin of all ends, and therefore the only candidate for the ultimate end in any 
explanatory account of nature. 254 
But how does Guyer conceive of the relation between the ultimate and final end? I suggest 
that he does so as follows:  
Kant can be given credit for clearly recognizing that establishing that mankind is suitable for 
the role of an ultimate end in virtue of his capacity to set ends does not suffice to establish 
that mankind is the final end of nature, and then explicitly maintaining that this second claim 
can be sustained only by introducing the premise that mankind’s capacity to set ends freely is 
itself of unconditional value.255 
However, although Guyer is claiming that it is the capacity for free choice which ought to be 
of unconditional value, rather than the capacity to set ends per se, he seemingly concurs with 
Christine Korsgaard’s reading of these passages where she states:  
It is our capacity to set ends - to freely choose what shall be an end by means of reason, that 
not only makes us ends in ourselves, but which forms the final purpose of nature 
teleologically conceived. It is only this capacity that has its value completely in itself; so that 
this not only forms the basis of a possible categorical imperative, but also the only possible 
basis for a complete teleological view of creation. . . It is we, with our power of valuing 
things that bring to the world such value as it has - and even the redemption of nature is up to 
us. 256 
On the other hand, Allen Wood provides a reading with an emphasis on the capacity of 
humanity as the capacity to set ends, which he believes to be “itself the source of the fact of 
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[other things’] goodness—indeed of the fact that anything at all is objectively good.”257 
Wood vehemently disagrees with Korsgaard’s “value-conference” thesis. Indeed as he writes:  
The idea that any objective value could be simply conferred by human choice is nonsense – it 
contradicts the very concept of objective value”258 And “Still less should we say, as 
Korsgaard also has, that rational beings confer on themselves the value of being ends in 
themselves . . . Rather, the argument is that it is our basic act as rational beings, the act of 
setting ends and regarding them as good, that necessitates our representing ourselves as 
already ends in themselves.259 260 
Wood’s conception of humanity is more expansive than that of either Korsgaard’s or Guyer’s 
insofar as he claims, with reference to Kant Anthropology, that humanity should be 
understood to encompass the “technical predisposition” and the “pragmatic 
predisposition”261where the former pertains to our ability to manipulate things as means to 
arbitrary ends and includes all the skills, arts and the deliberative abilities, while he suggests 
that the “pragmatic predisposition” is a higher-order aspect of ‘humanity’ enabling us to not 
only set ends but to compare the ends we set and organize them into a system.262 Insofar as 
we have noted, in some agreement with Wood, Kant specifies ‘humankind’ as comprising 
these two predispositions both in the ability to set ends and in the ability to systematize ends 
taking both of these together we therefore get the total set of capacities associated with 
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culture as the ultimate end of nature.263 Despite their disagreements as to just which among 
the capacities associated with the predisposition to humanity might be considered to be the 
source of unconditional value; that is, whether it is the capacities involved in the setting of 
ends (Wood and Korsgaard) or, the capacity for freedom of choice (Guyer), all three of the 
above authors ascribe to the thesis which assigns unconditional value to the predisposition to 
humanity itself, in distinction from moral personality. The problem which emerges from 
these readings is that they collapse the distinction between ultimate end and final end, since 
for the above writers, what are for Kant two distinct ends, are essentially the same thing, seen 
from different perspectives. I claim that they are entitled to this reading if they can show that 
humanity and personality are the same thing,35 where personality simply is the result of a 
higher-order ‘reflective endorsement’ of humanity. For instance, as Guyer writes: “the only 
thing that is a viable candidate for being the ultimate end of nature because it explains the 
setting of ends—namely human freedom—is also the only thing that is a candidate for being 
the final end of nature because it is of unconditional value” 264 
But the question which then arises is whether the mere capacity to set ends, or the freedom to 
choose and end, that is, mere practical freedom, which defines the capacities associated with 
the ultimate end of nature, is a sufficient to ground an unconditional value or final end? I 
claim it is not and that the two concepts are distinct. Referring back now to 87 from the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement Kant asks us to imagine the existence of the world in 
which only certain types of beings exist. Beginning with nonrational beings he writes: “if the 
world consisted entirely of lifeless beings or even in part of living but nonrational beings, 
then the existence of such a world would have no value at all, because there would exist in it 
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no being that has the slightest concept of a value.”265He then asks us to imagine a world 
populated by rational beings, end-setters, distinct from and in addition to these nonrational 
beings: 
If, by contrast, there were also rational beings, but ones whose reason was able to place the 
value of the existence of things only in the relation of nature to themselves (to their well-
being), and were not able themselves to create such an original value (in freedom), then there 
would certainly be (relative) ends in the world, but no (absolute) final end, since the existence 
of such rational beings would still always be without an end 266 
In light of the above; I claim that if humanity is indeed just the capacity possessed by merely 
rational beings ‘to value the existence of things only in relation to themselves and their own 
well-being’, then we can say that the capacity to set ends, in the absence of morality, while 
itself necessary for morality, is not itself sufficient to confer any special status or 
unconditional value on humankind in the absence of morality.37 in the Critique of Practical 
Reason Kant states in no uncertain terms: 
In the system of nature man (homo phaenomenon, animal rationale) is a being of slight 
importance and shares with the rest of the animals, as offspring of the earth, an ordinary value 
(pretium vulgare). Although a human being has, in his understanding, something more than 
they and can set himself ends, even this gives him only an extrinsic value for his usefulness 
(pretium usus); that is to say, it gives one man a higher value than another, that is, a price as 
of a commodity in exchange with these animals as things, though he still has a lower value 
than the universal medium of exchange, money, the value of which can therefore be called 
preeminent (pretium eminens). 267 
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In fact the above passages taken together seem to support a reading which suggests that the 
capacity to set ends is of value only as a means. Finally, Kant’s hypothetical discussion 
seems to offer a direct comparison to the predisposition to humanity as distinct from both 
(nonrational) animality and the predisposition to (moral) personality in Religion within the 
Limits of Reason Alone and which has a specific reference to the concept of culture. There 
Kant writes: 
The predispositions to humanity can be brought under the general title of a self-love which is 
physical and yet involves comparison (for which reason is required); that is, only in 
comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy. Out of this self-love 
originates the inclination to gain worth in the opinion of others . . . from this arises gradually 
an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others.  Upon this, namely, upon 
jealousy and rivalry, can be grafted the greatest vices of secret or open hostility to all whom 
we consider alien to us. These vices, however, do not really issue from nature as their root but 
are rather inclinations, in the face of the anxious endeavor of others to attain a hateful 
superiority over us, to procure it for ourselves over them for the sake of security, as 
preventive measure; for nature itself wanted to use the idea of such a competitiveness (which 
in itself does not exclude reciprocal love) as only an incentive to culture. Hence the vices that 
are grafted upon this inclination can also be named vices of culture, and in their extreme 
degree of malignancy (where they are simply the idea of a maximum of evil that surpasses 
humanity) e.g. in envy, ingratitude, joy in other’ misfortunes, etc., they are called diabolical 
vices.268 
As we shall see, humanity, that is, the set of rational capacities identified with culture, is 
identified to be, in agreement with Rousseau, the origin of vice in the species, but also, and as 
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we shall also see Kant paradoxically, conceives of culture as the source of moral and rational 
development: "Only after culture was been perfected (only God knows when this would be) 
would a lasting peace salutary for us, and only through such culture would it become 
possible".269 However the question here will be whether it is the case, noting the ‘diabolical 
vices’ associated with it, that Kant attributes absolute value to the predisposition to humanity 
over that of morality? Wood’s argument is that he must, since an end in itself must be 
ascribed to humanity rather than personality, (that is, rational beings in possession of the 
capacity for morality), because the status of an end in itself cannot be attributed solely to 
virtuous agents. 
I now refer to Henry Allison who, in response to Woods argument, has suggested that Wood 
conflates possession of the capacity for morality with actually being moral. In support of 
Allison’s claim; we will see, in referring back to the Critique of the Power of Judgement, that 
Kant is careful not to make this conflation. Thus in picking up once more the thread of his 
possible worlds scenario he writes 
 The moral laws, however, have the unique property that they prescribe something to reason 
as an end without a condition, thus do exactly what the concept of a final end requires; and 
the existence of such a reason, which in the relation to ends can be the supreme law for itself, 
in other words, the existence of rational beings under moral laws, can alone be conceived of 
as the final end of the existence of a world. If, on the contrary, this is not the case, then there 
is either no end at all for the existence of a world in its cause, or it is grounded in an end 
without a final end.270 
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Kant qualifies the above claim by stating that he is deliberately using the phrase “under moral 
laws”, and not “in accordance with moral laws” since the latter would presume knowledge of 
a being that “always behaves in accordance with moral laws” knowledge which we cannot 
presume to be able to possess. Therefore, the phrase “rational beings under moral laws” 
pertains only to a consciousness of standing under moral laws, not necessarily of obeying 
them. I believe correctly Oliver Sensen is correct when he writes; “to be under the moral law 
does not mean that one follows the moral law or actually is morally good. It merely means 
that one is addressed by the law and accordingly could follow it.”271 
My final suggestion at this point will be that insofar as Kant argues that this final end qua 
‘rational beings under moral laws’ must also mean the “human being . . . considered as 
noumenon” I claim, need not be taken as introducing a thesis about some other-worldly 
nature of human beings but rather it can be taken simply as: “an indication that autonomy and 
imputability are not empirical properties or capacities of rational agents, but qualities that we 
assign to them insofar as we conceive of them as persons or, equivalently as subjects or 
addressees of morally practical reason.” 272 In concluding this section, I suggest that the 
Critique of the Power of Judgement offers strong evidence for the argument that, whilst 
human beings are the only species which can grasp the concept of a purpose in setting ends 
for themselves, and thus are the only species able to confer value on things through their 
capacity of valuing of them and that they must therefore, value this source of value in 
themselves on the basis that this is what distinguishes them from mere natural ends and is a 
necessary condition for morality, it does not follow that any of this is sufficient for attributing 
to human beings the status of an unconditioned value, as a final end. Indeed it seems to be 
Kant’s view that, conversely, this rational capacity can only be a relative value. I suggest then 
in Critique of the Power of Judgement that, at least that the first specification of the final end 
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is to be identified with what Allison and Sensen have called the capacity for morality.273 And 
my final piece of textual support for this reading will be the passage where Kant writes: 
Now if things in the world, as dependent beings as far as their existence is concerned, need a 
supreme cause acting in accordance with ends, then the human being is the final end of 
creation; for without him the chain of ends subordinated to one another would not be 
completely grounded; and only in the human being, although in him only as a subject of 
morality, is unconditional legislation with regard to ends to be found, which therefore makes 
him alone capable of being a final end, to which the whole of nature is teleologically 
subordinated. 274 
4.5 The Analysis of Culture and Moral progress. 
Having completed an analysis of the two key teleological concepts we have now seen that 
Kant establishes culture as the sole candidate for an ultimate end of nature and that this status 
is made conditional on a further, final end of morality. To recap, culture has been specified as 
both the result of our use of practical reason which distinguishes us from mere natural 
organisms, and the vehicle through which we further develop the aptitude for practical reason 
in general. We have also been able to say that Kant defines culture as assisting us, in some 
yet to be specified way, in the realization of the final end of creation which we also now 
know pertains both to the moral subject and the highest good. And we have seen that it is 
only in recognizing ourselves as standing under the moral law that we can know what the 
content of the moral law is, i.e., which ends it contains, and through reason in its 
systematizing function we become aware of the concept of the highest good as the total 
object of the moral law and of our duty to strive towards its realization in the sensible world.  
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In the following section I will provide an answer to the question of how culture and the arts 
function so as to effect a transition between the ultimate end of nature and the final end of 
creation, and to say what such a transition should consist in. This section will consist of a 
reading of perhaps the most significance sentence of section §83, of which has caused the 
most consternation on the current literature on the teleological analysis of culture. This is 
Kant’s claim regarding culture, as:  “that which nature is capable of doing in order to prepare 
[humankind] for what he must himself do in order to be a final end.”275 How to explain what 
Kant means by preparation and in light of a transition from nature to freedom? The question 
which immediately presents itself is whether Kant advocates a gradual transition from the 
capacities associated with culture to those associated with morality and whether this in turn 
requires an empirical, historical dimension. Or, on the other hand, assuming that moral and 
ethical deliberation is fundamentally an individual matter, is this transition to be considered 
as an atemporal ‘noumenal’ process taking place within individuals, and, as such, standing 
outside history as well as nature?   
If we subscribe to the formalist view then, it is not at all obvious how culture, or indeed any 
empirical aid, process, or institution, could possibly be relevant to the question of morality. 
Whilst if we assent to the historical-anthropological view we risk making freedom and the 
moral law dependent on contingent, anthropological features of human nature and society, 
thus requiring us to make significant revisions to the key aspects of both the Groundwork and 
the Critique of Practical Reason regarding the categorical imperative, the duty motive and 
the doctrine of universal moral equality. Therefore, it will be important to try to give the 
correct relation between a priori and empirical standpoints in Kant’s appeal to culture in 
human moral development, and this will amount to specifying what the transition from 
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culture to morality is to consist in. Robert Louden,276one of the key commenters on this issue 
has advanced a thesis regarding culture as a ‘propaedeutic’ to morality. He argues that the 
transition from culture to morality, requires; “some sort of qualitative leap into the realm of 
freedom, one that nevertheless necessarily presupposes the preparatory steps of culture and 
civilization.”277 However in a further passage he alters the strength of this claim, adding that; 
“Culture and education are along with law, politics and religion, [are] all necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for human moralization. There is no guarantee that people who have 
been exposed to these preparatory steps will be morally good, but human beings who lack all 
contact with then cannot possibly be morally good.”278 
In light of the above, as has been pointed out by Patrick Frierson,279Louden conflates 
references to such empirical aids as necessary for ‘morality’ and as necessary for 
‘moralization’ where he should distinguish between the two. In order to make this clearer; I 
shall suggest that the thesis regarding ‘propaedeutics’ could come in either strong or weak 
flavours, each pertaining to a reading of the transition from nature to freedom. In the strong 
thesis, the Ubergang or ‘transition’, might be taken to pertain to a transition from humanity 
(and thus culture) to morality as such. Whilst in the weaker thesis, it could pertain merely to a 
transition from civilization to moralization. Therefore, we might suggest that the strong thesis 
would involve the claim that exposure to such preparatory steps is necessary in order for an 
individual be able to make moral choices at all. Unless we are exposed to such aids we will 
be unable to formulate moral maxims. Therefore, such propaedeutics must be established 
prior to morality as its necessary condition. This cannot be right. In reference to the first of 
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Louden’s claims, the ‘qualitative leap’ he refers to must mean the ‘revolution in Gesinnung’ 
or character, and since he affirms culture as a necessary empirical precondition for this 
fundamental choice of moral disposition, his argument would at best, involve a contradiction 
between culture and transcendental freedom, and at worst, simply rule out the doctrine of 
transcendental freedom as motivational independence from the empirical. As Frierson argues; 
Kant cannot ascribe moral responsibility to any agent that lacks what is necessary to act in 
accord with the moral law. As a result, if Louden is correct that empirical aids . . .  are 
necessary for one to be virtuous, then unless these aids are present, one is not morally 
responsible. Freedom means – if it means anything for Kant –that one can choose to obey the 
moral law regardless of empirical conditions. There are no excuses. So empirical influences 
cannot be necessary preparations for morality unless they are necessary for moral 
responsibility itself, and neither Kant nor Louden claims that all empirical aids are necessary 
in that sense. There is a straightforward contradiction between the claim that an agent is 
morally responsible and thus transcendentally free and the claim that certain empirical aids 
are in addition necessary for that agent to be morally good. 280 
The weaker thesis, which I attribute to the second of Louden’s arguments however, still 
requires exposure to such preparatory steps as necessary for moral choice, but that such steps 
are not sufficient in order for an individual to actually be morally good. Thus in this thesis he 
blocks an inference from the necessity of preparatory steps to the actual moral goodness of 
individuals, since it must be possible for us to choose to be good, without the assistance of 
such empirical factors. Louden’s weaker thesis, in removing the sufficiency claim does not 
therefore strictly preclude the capacity for the freedom to choose good or evil. 
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However, it will be important to note that in both weak and strong version of the argument, 
the various empirical influences such as a just legal system, the development of political 
institutions, artistic progress etc., all of which are connected in some way with culture, are 
taken to be necessary for inner, moral conversion.281 And following this, as I shall show, 
there will be a further distinction to be drawn regarding this thesis. This pertains to the 
distinction between the empirical as manifestations or expressions of inner moral character 
and such empirical factors as necessary preparations for the development of moral character. 
This is important since, as we have seen, Kant consistently refers to a moral action in terms 
of an effect possible through freedom, by which he means that the goodness of a moral 
maxim can only be assessed insofar as it is expressed in our action. However, conceiving of 
politics, law and culture in terms of a preparation for morality means such empirical 
arrangements cannot be at the same time an expression of morality, since they are by 
definition not the product of a moral action.282 
I now turn to Alix Cohen283 who has presented a useful argument in which she suggests that, 
in order to overcome the confusion between the empirical and intelligible, we should 
distinguish between culture as pertaining to the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral 
agency, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for moral improvement or progress, rather 
than to any kind of preparatory aid at all. And she claims, that this will allow us to obtain the 
correct relation between culture and freedom. I think she is correct in her claim that the 
significance of culture pertains strictly to practical freedom and not moral freedom.  
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In her paper, Cohen refers to Emile Fackenheim284 and Mary Gregor’s285 respective 
conceptions of ‘cultural freedom’ and ‘relative freedom’. Gregor’s conception of ‘relative 
freedom’ comprises of two aspects taken from The Metaphysics of Morals. The first stresses:  
man’s ability to rise above the level of instinct and act in pursuit of ends. […] By it man is 
free not only to pervert his instincts that lead to his self-preservation and the preservation of 
the species, but to expand his desires ad infinitum. […] The Anthropology, accordingly, 
stresses the other aspect of freedom involved in civil society, the development of man’s 
tendency to become a well-bred member of society who can live peacefully with his fellow 
men.286 
For Fackenheim, ‘cultural freedom’ is specified as being  
only partly, but by no means wholly independent of natural desires. It may enlarge, transform 
or even pervert them; but it does not emancipate itself from them. Freedom, in this sense, we 
shall term cultural freedom. For it is essentially social in significance. […] Cultural freedom 
produces institutions and forms of government, and it is the source of tradition. Its 
expressions are the substance of history. 287 
In light of the above, Cohen claims that while neither Gregor nor Fackenheim relate their 
respective conceptions of ‘relative’ and ‘cultural’ freedom to practical freedom, both  are  in 
fact referring to one and the same power; conceived from a cultural perspective by 
Fackenheim, and a psychological perspective by Gregor. Cohen then claims that it is this 
thesis regarding practical freedom that concerns Kant’s account of culture in the Critique of 
the Power of Judgment. Therefore, in weakening the argument for the relation of culture to 
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morality, so as to include only a relation to practical freedom, Cohen is able therefore to 
separate her discussion, from those such as Louden who seek a strong relation to morality. 
Therefore for her, culture is only efficacious on worldly practical agency, and therefore it has 
no impact whatsoever on our capacity for full-blown transcendental freedom. Cohen is thus 
able to preserve Kant’s insight in which he claims that the empirical cannot determine the 
intelligible. 
Cohen relates the source of the apparent confusion in the commentary regarding the moral 
significance of culture, to Kant’s own specifications in Critique of the Power of Judgment in 
which, as we have pointed out, he claims that culture encompasses both the conditions of 
moral agency and the conditions of moral progress. This results in a thesis of which is highly 
suggestive of the notion that empirical factors can have an impact on the human being’s 
moral status by generating some form of moral progress.288 However this cannot be Kant’s 
considered view.289 Again in his introduction to that same work, we find there that “freedom 
and moral agency are restricted to the domain of the intelligible, [thus] they cannot be 
influenced by anything empirical.”290 Cohen argues contra Louden that, whilst Kant does run 
them together in §83, ‘in principle’, the conditions of moral agency and those of moral 
progress or improvement should not be conflated. As we have seen, in order to for Louden’s 
thesis regarding ‘necessary preparatory steps’ to go through, he is required to revise or 
renounce Kant’s arguments for the distinction between empirical and intelligible, and 
insodoing to show how culture is able to have a direct influence on moral choice. This, 
however, clearly involves a thesis which, by Kant’s own lights, is metaphysically invalid.  
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What do we make of Cohen’s second claim that the thesis advanced by Louden “[uses] the 
two concepts interchangeably, [and] in fact misrepresents Kant’s argument on both counts. 
Furthermore, his notion of ‘propaedeutic’ or ‘preparatory steps’ to morality is in fact 
detrimental to our understanding of the issues at stake.”291 Cohen’s argument comes down to 
the following; that we should view culture as providing us with certain, minimal pre-
conditions of moral agency, of which she argues, can be thought of as pertaining to “a certain 
form of freedom, a minimal level of rationality and the consciousness of the moral law.” 
Similarly to our arguments above regarding the distinction between humanity and animality, I 
claim that on this understanding we can describe such conditions as minimal precisely in the 
sense that they pertain only to the distinction between being moral and being amoral. Cohen 
then claims that whilst the above can be taken as the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
us to be moral in a broad sense, on the basis that one cannot possibly be morally good 
without these conditions, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for moral progress. She 
argues that a conception of moral progress or improvement would thus “involve something 
extra: they help to be moral in the narrow sense of the word namely, to be morally 
autonomous insofar as one acts from duty.”292 However it does not follow, given the 
establishment of such conditions for minimal moral agency that one will necessarily act 
morally. Since this must be an act of free will on the part of the agent. In conclusion then, the 
conditions of moral improvement are neither necessary nor sufficient for (actual) moral 
improvement; since, it must be possible for one to be morally good without any such 
empirical aids. Therefore, they are merely helpful. 293 
However, due to Cohen’s useful paper, it still remains to be seen how empirical factors such 
as culture can assist us in our moral vocation if they are to have no direct impact on our moral 
                                                          
291 Cohen, 2009, p125 
292 Cohen 2009, Ibid, parenthesis dropped 
293 Cohen 2009, pp127-128 
 109 
 
character. And it is to this question I shall try to provide an answer to in the following 
section. I will suggest that the solution to the above might be as follows, since culture is 
associated with the predisposition to humanity, and with a teleological thesis, traced back to 
the Groundwork which concerns the internal necessity of the development of practical 
reason; what Kant refers to as, “those predispositions whose goal is the use of his reason” and 
what he terms in the Teleology the “aptitude for setting ends in general”, which amounts to 
the same thing, and towards its true vocation which is just moral reason, and therefore to the 
pursuit of the highest good (which is what Kant means by reason developing itself 
‘completely’). Therefore I claim that culture involves, firstly the phenomenal exercise of our 
capacity for practical freedom. Secondly through this exercise of practical freedom itself we 
further develop our reason, up to and including the conditions for moral agency. Indeed, Kant 
is clear in his claim that “reason itself does not operate instinctively, but rather needs 
attempts, practice and instruction in order gradually to progress from one stage of insight to 
another.” 294 Secondly, from the position of the observer; in being able to conceive of this 
development as being possible, through conceiving our culture as progressing, this thought 
provides us with a strengthening of our duty to our moral improvement. However in taking 
Cohen’s thesis into account I argue that, actual moral improvement whilst requiring the 
above pre-conditions for its phenomenal exercise must be something which is decided upon 
independently of anything empirical. 
However, we will now be required to confront the question; if culture is indeed conceived as 
the vehicle through which we develop the conditions for moral agency and therefore that the 
predisposition to humanity as an original predisposition towards the good, then why is it at 
the same time a major source of moral failure? 
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4.6 Culture and progress: Reason and Skill -Vice and Inequality. 
I now assess the arts and culture as a vehicle for the developmental process towards the 
highest good. The purpose of this section will be to ask; if it is our destiny to develop 
completely the predispositions for the use of reason by way of culture and therefore to be led 
towards the realization of our final end, why does culture engender such “diabolical vices”, of 
which are counter-purposive to moral progress? 
The goal will be to give a full explication of Kant’s teleological analysis of culture, and to 
further specify the link between a priori and anthropological components with regards the 
question of a transition from culture to morality. 
In this effort, I will be indebted to Pablo Muchnik’s295  work on the transcendental basis of 
Kant’s theory of human nature and history. Muchnik shows how we can understand the social 
dynamic, which we observe in culture, as concerning “the phenomenal expression of [the a 
priori thesis of] radical evil”296 of which to simplify almost entirely, is a fundamental 
propensity on the part of human beings to subordinate maxims of duty to self-love. Kant sees 
this propensity as pertaining to and being expressed phenomenally in culture, and thus culture 
is itself conceived as both the origin of and solution to the vices of self-interest, social rivalry 
and competitiveness which are themselves counter-purposive to moral progress. 
Here, I place Kant’s thesis of cultural development, and the necessity of its reform, in relation 
to Rousseau’s moral and political critique of the arts.297 Kant’s debt to Rousseau has been 
widely acknowledged in recent years,298 particularly with regards to former’s reworking of 
the concept of amore propre in relation to the ‘predisposition to humanity’, whilst I draw on 
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some of this recent work, my main focus will be specifically directed to a consideration of the 
differences which emerge in Kant and Rousseau’s respective approaches to a consideration of 
the solution to the vices of culture in relation to human progress. In acknowledging the 
problem which he inherits from Rousseau, Kant writes: 
In his writing on the influence of the sciences and on the inequality of human beings, 
[Rousseau] shows quite correctly the unavoidable conflict of culture with the nature of the 
human species as a physical species in which each individual was entirely to reach his 
vocation;  but in his Emile, his Social Contract and other writings, he seeks again to solve the 
harder problem of how culture must proceed in  order properly to develop the predispositions 
of humanity as a moral  species to their vocation, so that the latter no longer conflict with 
humanity as a natural species. From this conflict . . . arise all true ills that oppress human life, 
and all vices that dishonor it, nevertheless, the incitements to the latter, which one blames for 
them, are in themselves good and purposive as natural predispositions, but these  
predispositions, since they were aimed at the merely natural condition, suffer injury from 
progressing culture and injure culture in turn,  until perfect art again becomes nature, which 
the ultimate goal of the  moral vocation of the species. 299 
In light of the above, it is to the question of Kant’s answer to the crucial question of “how 
culture must proceed in order properly to develop the predispositions of humanity as a moral 
species to their vocation” which I turn in this section. Let me firstly consider the arguments 
for culture as pertaining both to the result of the collective use of the set of rational capacities 
associated with ‘the predisposition to humanity” which distinguishes us from mere natural 
organisms (animality), and also as the vehicle through which nature further develops in the 
species “the aptitude for the promotion of ends in general” which may be seen as a corollary 
of what Kant terms in Idea for a Universal History as “the complete development of the 
                                                          




predispositions for the use of reason.” And it is this which I will argue Kant provides us with 
the thought of the possibility of rational improvement or progress.  However, we then  must 
address how the development of the skills and capacities for reason, left as they are, “suffer 
injury from progressing culture and injure culture in turn”300 leading to “diabolical vices”. 
Since such vices are counter-purposive to the teleological thesis regarding our moral 
progress, I suggest that Kant then needs to show, even in this situation, that nature compels us 
to the good, in constraining the self-interest which emerges in cultural development. Turning 
now to Rousseau’s argument for the reform of culture and the arts, I suggest that not only 
does he conceive of the arts and sciences as failing to promote political and moral progress, 
but moreover that the widespread esteem for the arts in society is counter-purposive to virtue 
and is therefore a chief cause of moral and political failure.301 To understand this thesis I 
argue we need to understand what Rousseau means by ‘esteem’ and how this is related to his 
conception of ‘inflamed’ amore propre and this therefore will answer why Rousseau 
conceives of the arts, as they are, to be counter-purposive to the development of a just 
society. As I read it, the First Discourse on The Arts and Sciences concerns Rousseau’s 
argument that, engaging in any cultural goal, whether scientific, literary, or artistic represents 
a choice, “in effect a moral choice being made by people about how they would do well to 
comport themselves and use their life’s time.”302 Rousseau wants to inquirie into the values 
which motivate the individual’s making of such a choice, and which might explain why it is 
that artistic life is celebrated and considered a praiseworthy vocation. Rousseau, cliams that 
we can explain why the choice to dedicate one’s life to the arts is so widespread on the basis 
that certain personal advantages namely; public praise and improved social status, are seen to 
                                                          
300 Kant ‘Conjectural Beginning of Human History’, 2008, p.171 
301 Christopher Kelly Rousseau as Author: Consecrating One's Life to the Truth  University of Chicago Press, 
2003 p.55 and Zev Tracenberg Making Citizens: Rousseau's Political Theory of Culture Taylor & Francis, 1993 
144-150 




be gained from it.303 Therefore, insofar as the arts are ‘esteemed’ in society at all so he 
argues, this is a symptom of wider political and social inequality, since esteem for Rousseau 
is connected to an unequal distribution of talents and so of the inequality amongst human 
beings. It is what he refers to in the crux of his argument regarding the moral failure caused 
by the arts, as:  
“The disastrous inequality introduced among men by the distinction of talents and the 
debasement of virtue.” (First Discourse, CW 2:18, PL. 3:25) And : “A taste for letters . . . and 
the fine arts destroys the love of our primary duties and of true glory. Once talents preempt 
the honors owed to virtue, everyone wants to be an agreeable man, and no one cares to be a 
good man’ (21/II.966).   
Rousseau acknowledges that even insofar as we are able to recognize a shared property which 
makes us morally equal, human beings will continue to desire confirmation in the eyes of 
others of their worth as particular individuals. 68  ‘Esteem’ then, by Rousseau’s lights, is 
distinct from moral respect, just as it is in Kant, since, esteem does not recognize a universal 
right which all individuals enjoy on the shared possession of a capacity which, as we noted 
above, is defined as the capacity of being able to stand under the moral law. Rather, esteem is 
to regard another person as worthy of admiration on the basis that they are distinct, and that 
they stand apart from other human beings in light of their individual excellences. Esteem 
therefore cannot be something which all persons are equally entitled in virtue of their 
common nature. 304 The suggestion is that differential tribute and acclaim would not be given 
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to such effusions unless luxurious indolence and indulgence had become very widespread, 
causing people to look around for diversions and trinkets to exercise their restless favour or 
scorn upon. They desire to be valued, admired, and loved for their distinctive 
accomplishments and even for their natural (and sometimes trivial) endowments and 
properties. 305 
However, just as Kant associates the vices of culture with the predisposition to humanity, and 
insofar as they are connected to this disposition, they are also crucial to human development. 
So, Rousseau claims that esteem, as an expression of amore propre, as a basic psychological 
fact of human being as social animals, is also the source of the good. Rousseau then, does not 
therefore advocate expunging amore propre from society. For him the purpose of the social 
contract will be to redirect the harmful effects of amore propre, in its ‘inflamed’ variety into 
the basis for (moral) respect, since if left as it is, such expressions of ‘inflamed’ amore propre 
can only lead society to both moral and political failure.  On this basis then, Rousseau argues, 
that it will be necessary to design legitimate cultural and political institutions which would 
ideally aim, not to eradicate, but to harness amour propre in ways that are conducive to virtue 
and mutual cooperation, through transforming esteem into respect, and therefore promoting 
political success. 306 
Following ZevTrachtenberg, I now consider Rousseau’s claim that a society which retains a 
system of culture and the arts with the wrong characteristics will inevitably encourage certain 
dispositions in individuals which can make social cooperation dangerously uncertain.71 
Through his specifications of Ideal culture or culture as it ought to be, we can foster the 
development of those dispositions which are best able to promote harmonious, collective 
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action. Rousseau’s recommendations for the reform of culture and the arts amount to the 
specification of a politically supervised culture whose function would be to control and re-
direct amour proper to civic ends. However, as Trachtenberg has himself pointed out, 
Rousseau’s cultural ideal is inconsistent with his theory of political legitimacy.307 The 
cultural institutions which he believes are necessary to sustain society as it could be 
“invalidate his explanation of how individuals can be free while they are obligated by the 
law—and thereby render that society illegitimate.”308 That is to say, Rousseau’s cultural ideal, 
being essentially one of re-direction of amore propre through legislation would encourage a 
“love of the laws” in the people and foster in them the consciousness of the notion that laws 
they make are their own, thus leading to the enforcement of the general will. The problem is 
that the ideal culture does not foster the appropriate cognitive skills which citizens require in 
order to make sound collective judgments regarding the common good. Thus, according to 
Trachtenberg, we have no reason to expect the members of society as it could be, could 
therefore enter into political institutions as competent voters, nor that they would gain 
competence by means of their participation. Rousseau therefore provides no foundation for 
cognitive development.  From this I finally consider how Kant’s specifications turn on the 
same suggestions, that of the necessity for a legally constrained culture, and whilst I suggest 
his thesis has its own problems, I also suggest that due to its emphasis on cognitive 
requirements it can be considered as an advance on Rousseau’s.  
Kant is in agreement with Rousseau regarding the origins and effects of rivalry and inequality 
as an effect of the development of reason through culture. As he writes; “Skill cannot very 
well be developed in the human race except by means of inequality among people”309 and 
moreover he agrees that in order to counter these debilitating effects we require the 
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development of  social institutions. But if it is the purpose of the human species is to be led 
from culture the realization of our final end, why then does culture engender such vice and 
destructiveness? And moreover, from a practical perspective, is it not precisely in the face of 
this sort of hostile and amoral world, which engenders the thought that our moral vocation is 
impossible, and of which is the prime candidate for leading us to moral failure?  In section 83 
of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant re-affirms his view that it is the development 
of practical reason itself which contains the source of human discord. As we have said, the 
culture of skill is defined as being “the aptitude for the promotion of ends in general”, which 
is necessary, but “not sufficient for promoting the will in the determination and choice of its 
ends, which however is essential for an aptitude for ends.”310 
Kant’s thesis regarding culture as the source of discord is surmised by Sharon Anderson-Gold 
that in “releasing man from instinctual direction, practical reason enlarges the scope of 
purposive activity, but also carries with it the danger that some of these purposes will 
conflict. Cultural difference clearly emerges from practical reason’s power of choice and 
ability to set arbitrary purposes.” 311 
However, Kant’s view whilst distinct from and an advancement of Rousseau’s, retains the 
idea of the cultural situation of unsocial sociability. Kant believes that propensities to evil 
explain how human nature can divert from its inherent moral destiny—from “what the human 
being should make of himself.”312 Indeed as Gordon Michalson notes, “the point of Kant’s 
language about the original predisposition to good and the natural propensity to evil is to 
enable him to argue that evil arises from what we  freely do with what we are naturally given, 
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rather than from what we are naturally given taken by itself.”313 Thus the development of 
culture brings with it via ‘unsocial sociability’ an increase in mutual antagonism through its 
fostering of conflicting private interests, which in turn requires the establishment of laws 
regulating external freedom, since cultural antagonism and rivalry is counter-purposive to the 
development of the natural predispositions towards the complete use of reason. Thus, the 
effect of Kantian amore propre or “humanity” is as Pablo Muchnick writes; 
the psychological mindset that results from the development of sociality out of [animality]. 
The principles of freedom and perfectibility slowly replace the dominance of self-
preservation and pity in the natural state. This development has the positive effect of 
expanding all our faculties, but  comes at the price of disrupting their original harmony . . . 
The dominance of amour-propre thus institutes a mediated, competitive, and calculative  form 
of life, in which the agent’s sense of personal worth depends  upon the opinion of others. This 
mode of relation leads to inevitable conflicts: factitious comparisons produce a zero-sum 
game in which one’s sense of superiority is purchased by another’s sense of inferiority. More 
importantly, the game is self-defeating: the assurance we expect to receive about our worth 
never arrives because those who are perceived as inferior cannot validate any self-image 
worth-having. 314 
And it is through this debilitating social dynamic, that human beings are forced into doing 
what they ought to do, just as Rousseau conceives the necessity for the redirection of amore 
propre towards virtue. So Kant writes that  
this splendid misery is bound up with the development of the natural predispositions in the 
human race, and the end of nature itself, even if it is not our end, is hereby attained. The 
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formal condition under which alone nature can attain this its final aim is that constitution in 
the relations of human beings with one another in which the abuse of reciprocally conflicting 
freedom is opposed by lawful power in a whole, which is called civil society; for only in this 
can the greatest development of the natural predispositions occur.315 
Thus, since it is reason itself which is both the source of and the solution to cultural 
difference and conflict, reason itself must develop, through its own internal capacities, the 
critical power to integrate plural and potentially conflicting ends. To take Anderson-Gold’s 
point; “The resolution which results from a developed reason is simultaneously the unfolding 
of genuine or perpetual peace.”316 The internal necessity of reason (as we have seen with 
regards to to the first teleological maxim of the principle of suitability) explains how the 
development of the predispositions to the use of reason is bound up with the institution of just 
cultural institutions and that this presents a basic first step towards morality. However, the 
inhabitants of this state of affairs Kant essentially conceives of as being self-interested, albeit 
constrained in their pursuit of their own happiness by the rule of law, it is still prudential and 
technical reasoning which remain the order of the day rather than moral reason.317 
In conclusion, culture creates the conditions for moral agency and the thought of and thus 
motivation for moral improvement, which is just to say that the ability to conceive of culture 
as progressing towards the good, enables us to strengthen of our moral disposition. However, 
as Muchnick points out above, any further effort to transform these civic-legal conditions, 
which are really themselves pre-conditions318,in the promotion of the ‘ethical community’ 
dictated by the highest good, itself requires of us a fundamental revolution in our mode of 
thought, which by rights must be down to us. Culture does enough just to help provide us 
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with a “way of thinking” that such an effort is not impossible.  Although the legal order (“the 
[stage of] presumed moralization”) that arises out of the tensions of amour-propre, forces the 
individual to take other agents into consideration, it falls short of expanding her judgment 
into a universal law. And Kant belives that only the idea of the moral law and the respect 
inseparable from it can guarantee such expansion. Therefore, Kant believes that, in order to 
realize man’s moral destiny, the mode of deliberation that personality embodies must 
supersede that of humanity. But whereas humanity superseded animality in the development 
of civilization as one form of self-love gave place to another, personality entails a radical 
discontinuity and requires a deliberate decision on our part”  
Conclusion  
Let me now conclude this chapter. I hope to have shown that Kant’s thesis on the highest 
good is one which follows strictly from the moral law, that is, it provides an answer to the 
question regarding what sort of world might be possible if each of us acts as we ought. Kant 
does have a moral teleology. The arts have a moral-practical significance for Kant only in 
terms of their functional role in helping bring about the highest good; which as we have seen 
lies in their capacity to develop the conditions for the complete use of reason and in creating 
the conditions for the thought of the possibility of moral progress. The arts then cannot 
literally make us moral, the reason being as we have seen that this would make morality 
conditional on extrinsic empirical requirements. We have also seen that for Kant and 
Rousseau, the arts are a source of social antagonism, rivalry and inequality, tendencies which 
run counter to the purposive exercise of morality and the promotion of civic virtue. 
Therefore, the necessity of developing cultural institutions from the position of public right, 
which may reform the arts on the basis of the regulation of external freedom. This legally 
enforced culture; what Kant terms civil-society must then be transformed into the ethical 




argue that the arts, whether in terms of practices or of the type of experiences they afford us, 
have an intrinsic value, but rather an extrinsic or relational value, of which they inherit from 
their relation to the final end for Kant and the fostering of the Ideal State for Rousseau. It is to 



















Rousseau: the Case against Culture and the Arts. 
5.1 
In this chapter we will be concerned to trace out some of the ways in which culture and the 
arts may impact on how far a people are motivated to sustain the institutional and civic 
measures required for the enjoyment of equal freedom. The chapter will be divided into two 
parts, the first will consider how a system of culture might fail in this regard, and in the 
second we shall consider how it might succeed. And we will be considering these issues 
through a reading of perhaps the most famous work of cultural critique in the modern 
republican tradition, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. In this 
work Rousseau argues that culture and the arts are a principle agent in the corruption of free 
republics. Indeed culture and the arts are corrupting because they undermine that which all 
democratic republics require in order that they be adequately maintained namely the 
attributes and dispositions associated with civic virtue. Rousseau argues that the historical 
tendency towards a loss of liberty may be explained at least in part, by how far societies have 
cultivated and promoted the fine arts. Whereas, in the case of states which remain unfree, the 
development of the fine arts so he argues, will serve to strengthen despotic power. In order to 
understand these claims, we will need firstly to consider Rousseau’s thesis on degeneration or 
corruption in his cycle of regimes and in order to place the development of culture within the 







5.2. Cycles of Corruption 
Rousseau gives an account of the cycle of regimes in his Second Discourse,319,there he argues 
that the origins of each of the three ‘pure’ forms of government; monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy, are to be taken to depend upon, “the greater of lesser differences between 
individuals at the time of their institution”. Hence it is the degree of inequality, measured in 
terms of the distribution of social goods, particularly wealth, prestige or merit and political 
power that will determine the form of government.320In the case where a single individual has 
come to hold “pre-eminence in power, wealth and prestige”, the state will be a Monarchy. 
Whilst in the case where several have come to surpass all others in the above goods and are 
elected together on that basis, the state will be an Aristocracy. And in the final case where 
social goods are limited and where there is little motivation for competition for superior 
social status; “the people will have retained supreme Administration in common” by which 
he means that the state will be a Democracy. In a break with the ancient theorists321 of regime 
cycles Rousseau does not proceed to give an account of how each of the pure forms 
degenerates into a corrupt form, rather he begins from the premise that, for each of the three 
forms of government their magistracies are at first elective322 and so he argues the source of 
corruption in all cases will flow from the electoral mechanism itself. This is because, for 
Rousseau the system of election is itself dependent upon the competition for an ever greater 
public power and prestige characteristic of amour propre. Which is to say electoral standing 
or political status, is measured in terms of the amount of a social good(s) one possesses 
relative to, or in comparison with others. And where amour propre is the motivational 
element which explains the competition for social goods. Since amour propre, is by 
                                                          
319 See in particular Rousseau, The Discourse on Inequality’, 1997,p.181-188 
320 Rousseau considers the ‘Golden Epoch’ as a period in which the existence of social goods was at a 
minimum, indeed where the only social goods were natural talents. It was with property and wealth that social 
goods so Rousseau argues expanded and became the measure of value Rousseau,1997,p167.   
321 In particular: Polybius, Herodotus, Plato, Aristotle, Xenaphon also Livy.  
322 Rousseau,  The Discourse on Inequality’, 1997, p181 
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definition, insatiable, since it involves competition for ever greater social standing or status 
measured in the relative amount of social goods one possesses, it is a zero sum game which 
for Rousseau can end only in tyranny.  Rousseau explains that when social goods are limited, 
the process of selection between representatives will be based solely on the merit of the 
candidates. He argues that this will confer a “natural ascendency” in favour of age. Since, as 
he observes in reference to the Senate in Rome, the Ephors in Sparta, and the Hebrew Elders, 
age is a primitive indicator of “experience in business and equanimity in deliberations.”323 
But this primitive measure becomes distorted when social goods replace natural talents as the 
commonly endorsed scale of measurement of status and when the deaths of aged 
representatives create perpetual elections. As he writes “[t]he more elections settled on men 
of advanced age, the more frequent they became and the more cumbersome they made 
themselves felt”324 such circumstances then were ripe for exploitation by “the ambition of the 
most Preeminent men”325 who will quickly take advantage of the growing intrigues and 
factions which surround successive deaths and ensuing proliferation of electoral campaigns, 
in order “to perpetuate their offices within their families.”326The people, on the other hand, so 
Rousseau argues, have at this point in the cycle been more or less permanently shut out of 
sharing in government as elite power increases, and are now so “accustomed to dependence, 
repose and the comforts of life, and already past the state where they could break their chains, 
[they] consent […] to let their servitude increase in order to consolidate their tranquillity”.327 
Finally, having now become hereditary, elected representatives are accustomed to viewing 
their power as a hereditary possession, and “to regard[ing] themselves as owners of the state 
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the frequency of deaths in the ranks of an aged senatorial class. 
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326 Rousseau, ‘The Discourse on Inequality’, 1997, ibid 
327 Rousseau, ‘The Discourse on Inequality’, 1997, ibid. I argue below that Rousseau might very well have been 
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of which they were at first only the Officers, to calling their Fellow-Citizens their Slaves, to 
counting them like Cattle among the things that belong to them, and to calling themselves 
equals to the Gods and Kings of Kings.” 328Rousseau now connects this cycle of corruption to 
his broader genealogy of inequality which is understood to drive the cycle of degeneration 
forwards in three phases. In the first phase which establishes law and property, the relations 
of rich and poor are created. The second phase, establishes electoral governments which 
inaugurates the rule of the powerful few for the security and tranquillity of the poor and 
weak. For Rousseau, it is at this state where wealth becomes intimately connected to the 
electoral process itself, insofar as elections begin to favour the ascendance of the wealthy to 
the highest offices where wealth now becomes the indictor of merit. This is because, in the 
first phase, where distinctions in “wealth, nobility or rank, Power and personal merit”329 are 
established, it is wealth to which these goods can be finally reduced wealth can be used to 
purchase all the rest. He indicates that with the proliferation of wealth, any attempt at staging 
elections based solely on natural talents are at best naive and at worse an impossibility.330 
Hence characteristic of the second phase is that the rich in being dependent on votes of the 
people to attain and consolidate power, are able to use their greater material advantage to 
create clients and to purchase votes and loyalty among the less well-off. This practice will 
become widespread given the “universal desire for reputation, honours and preferment”331 or 
otherwise; the “frenzy to achieve distinction”. Such that, Rousseau argues that it is during the 
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330  At least without very real limits on the presence of wealth in elections. See SC ? Rousseau favours electoral 
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believes is required for the implementation of law into the legislative procedure. But according to the Second 
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331 Rousseau, ‘The Discourse on Inequality’, 1997, p183 
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second stage of corruption that “the ambitions of a few powerful and rich men at the pinnacle 
of greatness and fortune”, presumably those with the most clients and influence, finally usurp 
the state and effect its transformation from an electoral into a heredity despotism, in the final 
enslavement of the poor and the weak under the “Mastery” of the powerful and rich. This is 
the “ultimate stage in corruption”, or, the “last degree” of inequality, is then the state to 
which all others finally lead, “until new revolutions either dissolve the government entirely, 
or bring it closer to legitimate institution.” Now, having viewed Rousseau’s rather despairing 
tale of corruption and degradation of political society, our question now will be to ask where 
the arts fit on the above genealogy of corruption. Rousseau identifies the arts as being the 
privilege of those who possess a certain level of education and greater amount of leisure 
time,332than others. So the arts may be understood as themselves made possible, only given 
certain inequalities in class, education and work/leisure. Furthermore he argues that the arts 
are both caused by and further effect, the inflammation of amour proper:333 the desire to gain 
advantage over others. So the arts in being caused by and in giving further effect to amour 
propre, are themselves corrupting, and are themselves indicative of corruption. If we position 
the emergence of the arts midway through the cycle of inequality, Rousseau will argue that, 
based on observations as to the degree in which the arts are widespread and flourishing in a 
society, we may infer how far that society is moving towards the “last degree” of inequality. 
And so, I claim that the Discourse itself, together with his wider thoughts on the arts and 
culture, can be understood both as a warning to his own republic regarding the danger of 
introducing the arts into society to any significant manner,334 and, in the case of monarchical 
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France, Rousseau hopes to assist in “changing the objects of their esteem, and perhaps 
slowing down their decadence.” 335 
5.2 On the Arts and Virtue.  
Rousseau begins the First Discourse with the argument that the arts and sciences are a 
principle, but not the sole cause of corruption of free-states, because the arts both are caused 
by and give effect to what he terms ‘idleness’ [l'oisiveté]. Culture and the arts, he writes, are 
“[b]orn in idleness”, and moreover “they feed it in turn”.336 In order to understand Rousseau’s 
use of ‘idleness’, I suggest that we will need to go back to the classical texts from which he 
draws. It is a mistake to assume that Rousseau means by ‘idleness’ something equivalent to 
‘laziness’,337 rather, as I shall argue, by ‘idleness’ he means something akin to political 
withdrawal. And as we will see, it is the qualities associated with this withdrawal which lead 
to an enervation of certain physiological and psychological attributes and dispositions e.g. 
strength, courage, the commitment to fight against injustice,338 which are required for the 
maintenance and for the defence of a common freedom. Hence, I suggest that Rousseau uses 
‘idleness’ to signify the qualities connected to the life of contemplation. Since the life of 
contemplation, as we will see, by definition is premised upon political withdrawal, it is 
corrupting, but its corruption is understood in terms of an absence of virtue, or, an 
indifference towards injustice339 and not with intentionally choosing vice.340 And if I have 
him right, this corresponds to Rousseau’s belief that the arts are not themselves vicious. 
                                                          
335 Rousseau, ‘Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques’ in Roger Masters and Christopher Kelly (eds) Judith Bush, 
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Indeed, he thinks we would be beginning with mistaken premises if we were to attempt to 
argue that the arts are a bad in themselves. Rather, as he makes clear in the Letter to 
d’Alembert,341 the corruption wrought by the arts can only be understood in relational terms 
and hence by way of the “occupations they interrupt” and the degradation which “they 
serve”. But, as we will see Rousseau wishes to claim that the true object of corruption is not 
merely selfish and lazy artists who fail to cultivate the virtues conducive to the common 
good. Rather he will argue that the corruption associated with the “taste for letters” can 
ultimately be explained as effects of a more distant cause342 namely, the “craving for 
distinction”. Hence the arts are principally a privilege of elites who have the acquired the 
leisure time and independent means to engage in artistic and cultural pursuits, but also as a 
means of competing among themselves in order to further their own advantage. The object of 
the arts is not simply the refining of oneself, but to become ever more refined in comparison 
with others. And as we will see the widespread promotion of this disposition in society has 
the effect of destroying public morals. 
Let us now consider Rousseau’s use of ‘idleness’ against the classical republican writings. In 
these writings ‘idleness’ is signified by the Latin term ‘otium’, which is used (inter alia) to 
denote; ‘security’, ‘peace’, ‘repose’, ‘leisure’ ‘withdrawal’ and ‘ease’. One of the contexts in 
which otium is used by the Roman writers is to denote the characteristics and dispositions of 
the vita contemplativa, or, the contemplative life. We can get a good sense of what the 
contemplative life involves from Aquinas in his ‘The Order of Learning the Sciences’, he 
writes: 
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The ultimate happiness that man can have in this life must consist in the contemplation of the 
first causes; for the little that can be known about them is more loveable and excellent than 
everything that can be known about lesser things...And it is through the completion of this 
knowledge in us after the present life that man is made perfectly happy.343 
Prior to Aquinas, Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, had argued that intellectual 
contemplation is the “complete happiness of a human being, if it receives a complete span of 
life”344 and thus, the life of contemplation must be the best way of life. That is, if the best 
way of life is one lived in accordance with one’s nature, then in consideration of human 
nature, the mind is the divine part. Such that, a life lived in accordance with the activity of the 
mind must be a superior form of activity.345 Moreover, if that which properly belongs to each 
thing by its nature, is not only to be considered what is best for it, but what is also most 
pleasant for it, then if human beings are first and foremost ‘minded’ beings, the most pleasant 
way of life for them must be an intellectual life. Hence, for Aristotle, the intellectual life will 
be one that is superlatively happy. Now, whilst he identifies our ability to engage in reason-
governed activities generally, to be that which separate us from mere beasts, he wishes to 
distinguish further between those properly intellectual activities and all those other activities 
and pursuits that are merely ‘human’. Insodoing he argues that our intellect is capable of 
contemplating much more than merely that of practical or political affairs which concern 
simply the ends of practical reason, our actions and means, indeed, the minded capacity of 
human beings is capable of sophia, or the attainment of intellectual virtue, as contrasted with 
phronesis, the virtue of prudence or practical wisdom. Hence, sophia is closely associated 
with theoria, or, knowledge of the highest objects which Aquinas referred to above as ‘first 
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causes’. Sophia also importantly designates artistic activity, principally, the various technical 
excellences of the artist “well versed in all wisdom”.346As Aristotle notes in his discussion of 
poetry, “we apply the word sophia in the arts to those men who are most precise in respect to 
their technai…we take sophia to mean nothing other than their excellence in techne.”347 And 
the highest form of artistic sophia is considered to be epic-poetry where what is most noble 
and beautiful about great men could be best revered. Such that, for Aristotle wisdom was 
conferred on those artists who had demonstrated technical excellence in their field but itself 
dependent on their display of an all-round wisdom.348In his discussion of the education 
(paedia), of the citizenry for virtue in his Politics, Aristotle writes, in reference to music (by 
which he refers, not simply to instrumentation but to dance, performance, and oral poetry) 
that; “there is a form of education which we must provide for our sons not as being useful or 
essential but as elevated and worthy of free men.” 349 The fine arts then play a part in the 
citizen’s education since they are assist in motivating virtue expressed in the “effect on the 
character and the soul.”350 Secondly, in reference to their elevated and worthy nature, 
Aristotle claims that the arts are only can only be appreciated by free men, that is men of 
rationality, and hence he excludes, women, slaves and labourers who do not qualify as free 
men and hence do not qualify as citizens on the basis of their lacking rationality, from an 
artistic education. In referring back to the discussion of Sophia, Aristotle argues that Sophia 
is what is best in us.351And, a life of contemplation suitably directed towards philosophical 
and artistic pursuits must itself be the highest form of happiness. To be sure, it is a happiness 
distinct from that of a life merely lived “in accord with all the other virtues the activities of 
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which are human.”352 Hence, Aristotle distinguishes between those “virtues and activities of 
which are human”, and not truly characteristic of the perfection of free men, since ultimately 
they are descriptive of those pursuits directed at external or instrumental goods, goods which 
are typically correlated with one’s phronesis, and what he refers to as the ‘divine’, intellectual 
pursuits associated with sophia. Thus the best and thus happiest way of life is identified both 
with a particular form of activity, namely contemplation schole (leisure), and by way of a 
reflection on the proper content of that activity, i.e. the ‘highest objects’. Thus, when 
considering the virtues of theoretical, in distinction from practical, wisdom, he writes that 
“there are things much more divine by nature than man is, of which the most manifest are 
those out of which the cosmos is composed.”353 Intellectual activity is thus good in-itself and 
since the highest objects that it contemplates are also good in-themselves, the contemplative 
life is considered to be a self-sufficient form of happiness. And Aristotle argues that to 
achieve happiness of this order, will require devotion to contemplation for “a complete span 
of life”. If that which interrupts the life of contemplation is practical activity, then the ideal of 
contemplation should, therefore, and as much as is possible, be spent in solitude, away from 
the vicissitudes of human affairs354 of which would disturb its continuum.  
Now, for the Roman Republican writers, the use of the term otium, often appears in the 
context of the description of the qualities associated with the life of contemplation355, or, as it 
is rendered in the Latin, the vita contemplativa. And in this context, otium may be taken to 
refer to a specific kind of inactivity, in a certain sphere, which follows from an individual’s 
withdrawal from public affairs to the world of private leisure. Hence the qualities of the vita 
contemplativa are antonymic, so the Roman writers argued, to those qualities required for the 
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active life or the life of vita activa. Thus otium as the preoccupation with the arts and 
philosophy is indeed used to signify an individual’s dereliction of his duty.  I propose 
therefore to define this initial sense of otium as, a motivational failure on the part of an 
individual, to prioritize public duty over individual happiness. Cicero for example connects 
each of the four cardinal virtues: prudence, justice, magnanimity and temperance, to the 
qualities of the active life, itself understood to be centred on public negotium (or, public 
business) and where each of the virtues is itself connected and interwoven with the supreme 
ethical imperative of seeking the common advantage (utilitas).356Hence virtue is understood 
to be an active and other-regarding concept, exercised through ones bringing about of the 
common good, and therefore it is distinct from the passive and self-regarding concept of 
otium, under the vita contemplativa. For example, when Cicero, writes that prudence, 
(prudentia) is “the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and things to be avoided” 
he is at one with Aristotle. However practical knowledge he argues is not only superior to 
intellectual knowledge, but if it is to be virtuous it must be subordinated to social duty 
(officiium), since it must be rendered serviceable to the whole community for the common 
advantage. Hence, Cicero argues that the learned must “apply their own practical wisdom and 
insight to the service of humanity.”357The desire for knowledge, purely in the service of one’s 
own happiness, since incompatible with the common good, is a pursuit that cannot be 
virtuous or honestum.358  
Otium is further used during the period of civil strife between optimates and populares in the 
late republic. In this context we find the term takes on a more political, indeed contested 
meaning. Once more we can turn to Cicero, who was perhaps the first to use otium in this 
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context359 . Here otium is connected both to his philosophical thought, concerning the best 
regime and of the ideal statesmen and as we will see the wider optimates ideology. Central to 
Cicero’s political thought was the idea of the mixed constitution, which, had at its centre, the 
concordia ordinum,360 or, the harmony of the social orders within the commonwealth. The 
concordia was intimately connected to the principles of the rational ordering of the 
commonwealth for the common advantage, according to certain tenets of Stoicism and 
natural law. Cicero argues that harmony is best secured through limited popular 
representation in government under the leadership of the senate as the key deliberative body 
in the state, and elective higher-magistracies which should be distributed according to merit. 
Scipio notes in De re publica, the achievement of concordia was to depend upon a blending 
of wills where each part in the body politic has its own functional role, measured in 
accordance with perceived differences in competence between classes. Due to these assumed 
differences,361 the mixed constitution was devised so as “to guarantee the political 
domination of [of the people by] the aristocratic landholding minority”362. And, according to 
Cicero, the ideal statesmen, was the one who was devoted to the maintenance and 
preservation of this sense of harmony. Now, Cicero gives otium a political meaning during 
the Catiline debacle, and in the context of the agitation for popular reform. He uses the term 
in reference to public peace, and the tranquillity of the commonwealth, in the absence of civil 
strife, and thus to reaffirm the importance of the concordia. Otium in this context, refers to 
the preservation of the status quo which should not be disturbed by popular agitation.363In his 
argument against Rullus’ agrarian reforms and the public unrest they unleashed, Cicero 
exclaims: “What is so welcome to the people as repose [otium] …especially when 
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accompanied by authority and dignity [imperio ac dignitate]?”364 Here, the dignitas in 
question is that which is owed to the senate by the people for its wise rule. And it is owed 
moreover, for the senate’s preservation of the people’s otium; namely, peace and security, 
delivered through their (political) tranquillity. Hence in asking the people to trade-off their 
demands for popular reform for the greater peace and security of the whole, Cicero wishes to 
preserve otium through a direct attempt to rob the people of the occasion to exercise their 
constituent power.365And when he famously uses the phrase “cum dignitate otium”366 in 
March 56, to surmise the aim of all optimates, he means roughly the same thing; “peace and 
quietude for the masses, political prestige, influence and worthiness for the ‘Best Men.”367As 
such, he lauds, his fellow senatorial gentlemen as the unrelenting enemies of the populares, 
who, through their defence of aristocratic privilege and domination of the political process 
have most faithfully followed the ideal of cum dignitate otium.368.Now, a contrasting sense of 
this sense of otium can be found in Sallust’s369 account of the speech made by Lepidus in 78 
where he urged the people to rally around his attempt to overturn the aristocratic policies first 
put into effect under the Dictatorship of Sulla, and entrenched by the senate after Sulla had 
left office. Sallust’s attribution of otium, to Lepidus, approaches something closer to the use 
of the term in a populares context.370. In his speech Lepidius calls for both the restoration of 
the tribunate of which Sulla had dissolved during his rule, and for greater popular 
representation in the curia of which Sulla had packed with aristocrats. He exclaims that the 
people’s passivity in the face of such tyranny is tantamount to their own enslavement. In 
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Sallust, 'otium' once more denotes repose and security, but one which must now be rejected, 
since it is premised on the total exclusion of the people from government. In a play on 
Cicero’s cum dignitate otium, the mere guarantee of private freedom, offered by the senate in 
exchange for the people’s tranquillity meant nothing according to Lepidus without the 
restoration of tribunate and with it the people’s political liberty. As Valentina Arena writes 
“[u]ntil the tribunate had recovered all its prerogatives, the people [were] deprived of any 
political power, and left in a condition of subjection, at the mercy of elite members, who 
solely fight for their own power”371. Finally, Lepidus argues that security (otium) in the 
absence of Libertas qua popular political authority and power, is no security at all. So, in 
Sallust, Cicero’s otium, becomes; 'otium cum servitio’ '372. Lepidus’s urges that the Roman 
people join him instead in the pursuit of a “dangerous freedom over quiet servitude.”373 And 
insodoing, they must choose between ‘quies et otium’ on the one hand and ‘Libertas’ on the 
other.374 We can locate one further use of otium. Indeed it is this usage which was used to 
justify the idea of a differential political competence between the people and the senatorial 
class based on a certain kind of liberal education, and hence, the claim of right to rule on the 
part of the elite. In the Politics Aristotle had argued that, due to their training in narrow, 
dependent specialisms; artisans, craftsmen and manual labourers should not be granted 
citizenship, of which would confer on them the entitlement to deliberate “about what policy 
is expedient” or “about questions of justice”375. Hence, Aristotle argued that given their lack 
of deliberative competence, it was rational for all those not capable of exercising the virtue of 
prudence, to accede to the rule of the wise, who govern on behalf of the many, for good of the 
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whole. Hence, in his consideration of the best regime, only the ‘gentlemanly’ few may be 
entitled citizenship and hence a role in government. And this is because only these few have 
received, or indeed would be receptive to, a moral education through which to develop their 
prudence. And further only the few enjoy the requisite amount of leisure time required for 
full engagement political affairs. Where prudence is concerned, Cicero inveighs against the 
Epicurean376 philosophers of his time, arguing that their merely intellectual virtue is quite 
distinct from the practical virtue that is required for good government. As he writes; “virtue 
is not some kind of knowledge to be possessed without using it: even if the intellectual 
possession of knowledge can be maintained without use, virtue consists entirely in its 
employment, moreover, its most important employment is the governance of states and the 
accomplishment in deeds rather than words of the things that philosophers talk about in their 
corners.”377 We can observe in the above quotation, that Cicero implies that a certain kind of 
learning cannot be strictly antonymic to the vita activa. And therefore, there is a sense of 
otium which is necessity for virtue. In this context, otium refers both to the practical use of 
one’s leisure time and to one’s humanitas, one’s education in the liberal arts, since this form 
of education is most conducive to the common good by way of its production of prudence 
and wisdom in rulers. Doing good, for Cicero means that one be capable of deliberative 
action, and, as deliberative, one’s actions must be informed by one’s practical wisdom. But 
one’s practical wisdom must be suitably trained though education in oratory and eloquence 
cultivated through a love of the arts, particularly poetry, in the study of ethics and the direct 
observation of those involved in political affairs378. All of which presupposes that one has the 
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independent means required379 to devote one’s free time to the cultivation of the virtuous 
qualities. Hence otium is used to refer to an honourable form of leisure, of which is to the 
common advantage. Otium is here subordinated to vita activa, but need not be opposed to 
it.380 And it is in reference to one’s education, or, peadia that Cicero divides human beings 
into two classes “one uninstructed and uncultivated” on the one hand, and on the other “the 
humane and cultivated”, where he takes it that the former “always prefer utility to moral 
value”, whilst the latter “always places true worth above all other things”.381 Now for Cicero, 
it is one’s prudence combined with ones skill in oratory that is the mark of the greatness of 
the statesman, “Wisdom without eloquence” he writes, “is of little use to the community, but 
eloquence without wisdom mostly does great harm, and never does good.”382 Hence, we 
might make a general claim that those who have not cultivated practical knowledge can have 
no claim to possessing the kind of wisdom required to guide the republic.383 And moreover, 
since the exercise of one’s prudence requires the faculty of language, even if it was the case 
that one did possess the requisite knowledge of politics, absent the proper training in oratory 
and one would not be capable of transmitting that knowledge to the multitude. Thus, given 
deliberative and communicative differences between social orders, it does not follow that 
everyone will be able to participate fully in negotium. Whilst for Cicero the universal 
capacity for reason grants each person a role in the body politic, the body must be ruled by 
the mind, and, since the mind is composed of a worst part, the passions, and a best part 
namely, reason, those who exhibit the dispositions and qualities required for the use of reason 
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ought to rule over the worst for the sake of the whole.384 Thus, whilst the people lack 
communicative and deliberative competence, Cicero does deem them competent enough to 
judge between competing arguments put to them by their political betters. And on this basis 
their role in government should be strictly limited to that of voting up or down laws on the 
basis of judging between best and most persuasive case that they hear, and in choosing 
between members of the political elites for higher magistracies.385  
4.3 Duty, injustice and indifference.  
How might the above discussion of otium in the classical texts allow us to develop our 
understanding of Rousseau’s broad use of ‘idleness’ in the First Discourse? I argue that 
Rousseau does indeed use ‘idleness’ in a way that appears to correlate strongly with of otium 
in the first sense referred to above, that is, a general withdrawal from public duty in the 
pursuit of one’s own (as opposed to the common) advantage. As he writes in a letter to a 
young follower, “The first bit of advice I should like to give you is not to indulge in the taste 
[…] for the contemplative life and which is only an indolence of the spirit reprehensible at 
every age and especially at yours. Man is not made to meditate but to act.”386 Thus for 
Rousseau as for the classical republicans, virtue must be understood as an active quality,387 
indeed in the Discourse itself he writes that “not to do good is a great evil, and every useless 
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citizen is a pernicious man”. Not only will he argue that the development of the arts 
encourages a withdrawal from negotium, and thus to neglect one’s duty to act for the 
common good, but the practice and the consumption of the arts also leads to an enervation of 
the physical and psychological qualities such as strength and courage which must be 
cultivated to remove obstacles to the common good. The study of the arts and cultural 
production more generally, he writes, leads to a “frailty” and a “weakness of the 
temperament” 388in comparison with “strength” and “vigour” gained in common labour. We 
can consider the above passages against those in the Social Contract, where Rousseau argues 
that the security of the republic depends on the people acting so as to ensure that government 
is conducted according to the common interest. In his institutional design, Rousseau favours a 
regime comprising of an inclusive popular assembly, and an elected executive, but 
immediately he notes389 that, since the electoral process will invariably favour the wealthy, 
and since wealth encourages the pursuit of ever greater comparative advantage, elective 
magistracies present a distinct danger to the common interest. This danger was expressed in 
the genealogy of corruption that we considered above. The electoral process not only tends 
towards corruption via the introduction of wealth, but more generally it is distorted when a 
society allows social goods to become the measure of a person’s status or standing. And this 
corruption is expressed in the use of wealth to buy the favour of magistrates, or, where 
wealthy magistrates are able to buy the votes of the poor. To counter this tendency, Rousseau 
requires that the people be disposed to “vigilance and courage”390 in guarding against the 
potential for their own “seduction”, and the ensuring against the manipulation of the popular 
assemblies by wealthy minority or factional interests. Hence courage is required, so Rousseau 
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tells us for the defence of “a perilous freedom.”391And so he reminds us, it would be “great 
folly to hope that those who are masters in fact would prefer some other interest than their 
own”,392 hence, should the people not be suitably disposed towards a defence of their 
common interests by cultivating dispositions which are unconducive to civic vigilance, 
Rousseau writes this would be akin to a “wish to cease being free.”393 Rousseau’s argument 
then concerns the thought that the widespread promotion of the arts not only distracts from 
one’s duty of vigilance but that the arts cultivate among the people attributes which are 
themselves counter-purposive to their capacity to discharge this duty.  Rousseau argues then 
that the arts encourage a “tranquil servitude”, which should remind us of the kind of peace 
and quiet Sallust has Lepidus proscribe, purchased at the expense of a ‘perilous freedom, and 
where this ‘tranquillity’ is identified with the life of contemplation.394  
By correlating virtue to the set of attributes required for the defence of a “perilous freedom”, 
we can now begin to consider a further theme running through the First Discourse. That is, 
Rousseau’s insistent distinction between the martial attributes, associated with both Rome 
and Sparta, and the ‘urbane sentiments’ of politeness and courtesy, associated with the 
cultivation of the arts. Indeed as Rousseau would have been aware, the political liberty of the 
plebeians in Rome was achieved in the institution of the tribunate which had itself evolved 
out of the plebeian composition of the army which enabled the people to use (the threat of) 
force to extract an equal share in government from the patrician classes. Rousseau writes that 
                                                          
391 Rousseau ‘The Social Contract’, 1997b, ibid 
392 Rousseau ‘Political Economy’ 1997b, p.9 
393 Rousseau ‘Ninth Letter’ Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush (trans) Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace (eds) 
Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written from the Mountain, and Related Writing University Press of New England, 
2001, p293 
394 Rousseau writes of this duty in the Letters from the Mountain: “Not being idle as the ancient Peoples were, 
you cannot ceaselessly occupy yourselves with the Government as they did: but by that very fact that you can 
less constantly keep watch over it, it should be instituted in such a way that it might be easier for you to see its 
intrigues and provide for abuses. Every public effort that your interest demands ought to be made all the 
easier for you to fulfil since it is an effort that costs you and that you do not make willingly. For to wish to 
unburden yourselves of them completely is to wish to cease being free. “It is necessary to choose,” says the 
beneficent Philosopher, “and those who cannot bear work have only to seek rest in servitude.” (LWM 293, Pl., 




the republic “finally ended because everything must end from the usurpations of its Great, of 
its Consuls, of its Generals who invaded it: it perished from the excess of its power.”395 Now, 
this decline was effected at an institutional and not an individual level Rousseau argues, in 
part, through the encouragement and promotion of the arts: “[in Rome] military virtue died 
out among them in proportion as they became knowledgeable about Paintings, Etchings, 
Goldsmiths vessels, and to cultivate the fine arts.”396 He extends this analysis in his reference 
to renaissance Florence and, in what must be an explicit reference to Machiavelli, he writes; 
“and as if this famous land had been destined forever to serve as an example to the other 
peoples, the rise of the Medici’s and the restoration of Letters, destroyed once more and 
perhaps forever the martial reputation which, a few centuries ago, Italy seemed to have 
recovered.”397This is a remarkable passage. Firstly, Rousseau is referring here to the 
Florentine Republic, before its fall to the Medici in 1532, as the land “destined to serve as an 
example to the other peoples”. What is more, he attributes greatness, not to the wise and 
noble rulers, but to the citizen-militias of which Machiavelli himself wrote, served to protect 
the people “against the insolence of the great.”398Thus, it was the corruption of the militias by 
those who sort the restoration of Letters and, quite possibly, those who promoted the ‘Golden 
Age’ of the renaissance itself, which was chiefly responsible for causing the collapse of the 
Florentine republic. The effect of the widespread promotion of the arts was that it left the 
people undefended during the ensuing class and factional strife, of which resulted in the 
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oligarchic coups that destroyed the Republic and elevated and then reinstalled the Medici to 
power.399 
We have argued that we should understand Rousseau as inveighing against the vitiating 
effects of the cultivation of arts on the physical and psychological attributes, which he views 
as instrumentally necessary for the defence of a free society. And, we have secondly argued 
that the effect wrought by the cultivation of the arts is a decline in the contestatory and 
reactive spirit of the people. We will now argue that Rousseau considers the fine arts and elite 
culture as promoting a set of social institutions which come to displace the identification with 
republican norms and institutional values. He singles-out one specific social norm introduced 
by the arts for particular criticism, namely, that of what he calls ‘gentleness’. In the Last 
Reply he argues against Montesquieu’s commendation of the idea that the development of the 
arts and letters might go some way to cultivating ‘gentleness’400whilst at the same time he 
acknowledges that gentleness should be considered as “the most amiable of the virtues”, it is 
also he adds a “a weakness of the soul”. 401In reference to Lucius Brutus, he writes that 
“Virtue is not always gentle”, and “when the occasion requires it can arm itself with due 
severity against vice” such that it must be “fired with indignation against crime.”402 Perhaps 
most crucially, and in a barely veiled reference to the philosophe’s, the patrons and the artists 
of the salons among whom he had once lived, he writes that “there are cowardly and 
pusillanimous souls… [whom] are only gentle out of an indifference for good and evil.”403 I 
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concur with Mathew Mendham’s404 analysis here that we should understand these passages as 
an attack not just on the arts but on the inculcation of the arts justified by the broader view, 
attributed to Jean-François Melon, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume and indeed a majority of the 
leading intellectuals of the time, that by increasing commerce, broadly understood as both 
economic exchange and social interaction, that individuals and societies would become more 
doux; that is, more mild, calm, peaceable, soft, and/or sweet.405 We may get a better sense of 
Rousseau’s views on the kind of ‘gentleness’ promoted through the cultivation of commerce 
and the arts by comparing these passages with his criticisms of Christian virtue. Christianity, 
he writes; “far from attaching citizens’ hearts to the state, it detaches them from it as were all 
worldly things. I know nothing more contrary to the social spirit.” 406Rousseau similarly, 
reserves his severest criticisms for Christianity’s call to us to put our trust in God rather than 
our own arms. The militant defence of freedom he writes “is inconsistent with the gentleness 
of a Christian. And after all, what does it matter whether one is free or a serf in this vale of 
tears? The essential thing is to go to heaven, and resignation is but an additional means of 
doing so.” In short the so-called virtue of ‘gentleness’ is not a virtue at all, since indeed it 
may be purchased by nothing more than an ‘indifference’ to corruption, vice and injustice. 
Rousseau indeed seems to be following Machiavelli’s lead in the criticism of those virtues, 
so-called, which encourage submissiveness and compliance towards elites. The so-called 
virtues associated with and promoted by the taste for letters, are not be reproached for their 
barbarousness, or their cruelty, but rather so Rousseau argues, for their ‘sweetness’. If the arts 
promote a widespread physical softness, and, by the same degree, and psychological 
weakness, then it is their moral indifference that makes them contemptible from the 
perspective of republican virtue. We have seen Rousseau arguing that not to do good is an 
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evil and every useless citizen who does not strive to act for the common good, is a pernicious 
man. Such that the moral indifference actively encouraged by the philosophers and the artists 
in their promotion of gentleness is itself barbarous, and its barbarousness lies in encouraging 
a ‘sweet’ or ‘pleasant’ indifference to inequality. Following this thought further, Rousseau 
has told us of the effects of corruption wrought by the cultivation of arts, and he has hinted at 
those he deems responsible, political, philosophical, and cultural elites. I now turn to 
Rousseau’s critique of the leadership of the learned few which he carefully places inside his 
attack on the arts and sciences. As I will argue, this critique can be best viewed by returning 
to the very first passages of the Discourse where Rousseau argues, that these elite groups are 
responsible for manipulating the people into accepting a trade-off between equal freedom and 
the repose of otium.  
In the first passages of the Discourse he refers to a government and its laws which guarantee 
the “safety and well-being of men assembled”. And he argues that the arts are “less despotic” 
but “perhaps more powerful” than formal political power. 407Now, the immediate question is 
why he should view the laws which guarantee safety and well-being as ‘despotic’. And 
secondly, in what sense does he understands the arts as colluding in this despotism. To 
answer the first question, we can consider a passage from the genealogy of political 
inequality as presented in the Second Discourse. An enslaved people, he writes, are those 
who “incessantly boast about of the peace and quiet they enjoy in their chains, and that they 
call the most miserable servitude peace.” 408Rousseau further qualifies this remark in one of 
the fragments from his Corsica. Here he specifically refers to ‘tranquillity’ as an attribute of 
the “servitude” which has been imposed on the Corsican people by their nobility, and as an 
evil distinct from the “ills” imposed on them by the external tyrannies of Pisa and Genoa; 
“From where do the dissentions, quarrels, civil wars come in Corsica that have torn it apart 
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for so many years and finally forced it to have recourse to the Pisans, then to the Genoese? 
Isn’t all that the work of its nobility, isn’t it the nobility who reduced the people to despair 
and forced it to prefer a tranquil slavery to the ills that it was suffering under so many 
tyrants.” 409Not only is Rousseau suggesting that the ‘tranquillity’ promoted by the arts is an 
indicator of servitude, but moreover, that it is principally the nobility and the elites that 
actively encourage its enjoyment.  As we have seen, Rousseau indicts the philosophe’s of the 
doux commerce, the artists who are merely in the service of princes and their courtiers in 
their promoting a rebarbative public morals in order to gain the favour of the rich, and the 
politicians who only speak only of wealth and never of virtue, these groups “spread garlands 
of flowers over iron chains” so as to “throttle in the people the sentiment of original freedom 
for which they seemed born and make them love their slavery”.410 This has the effect of 
encouraging peace and repose in “nurturing in [the people] that pettiness of the soul so suited 
to servitude.”411.Rousseau, is principally attacking the notion that an educated and cultured 
class can be trusted to govern in the interests of the people. In the fragment On Wealth and 
Taste he writes; “Those who guide us are the artists, the grandees, the rich; and what guides 
them is their vanity…They might be the best of men; by that alone they would become the 
most corrupt.” 412 This thought correlates to the remark413 that children should “not brought 
up delicately” and so should not “made into gentlemen”, but rather into “peasants or 
workers”. We have already seen the inflammation of amour propre by excessive wealth 
makes it highly unlikely, so Rousseau believes, that the rich will be able to know the common 
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good, and so he has also argued, that flourishing of social goods such as praise and esteem as 
a measure of social status, means that artists and the philosophers have become dependent on 
the rich, in their pursuit of patronage and for the resources required to provide for the leisure 
time they need in order to compete with one another in the pursuit of social status. Lastly, we 
have seen how the politicians are dependent on currying the favour of the wealthy in order 
that they may be able to buy the votes required in the pursuit of ever greater power, in return 
tailoring policy to their advantage. Underpinning all of this is amour propre, or the desire for 
ever greater social standing measured in terms of wealth and political leverage for the rich, 
the power to command for the politicians, and public praise and esteem for the artists. Now, 
Rousseau traces the inflammation of amour propre to a particular kind of educational design, 
arguing that, it is because of and not despite, their education, their paedia, that these groups 
cannot know better than the people where the common good lies. In the Emile, Rousseau 
breaks totally from the Greek and Roman forms of education we briefly considered above. 
This is because in his view it is precisely the inequality promoted by a liberal arts education 
that leads to a failure to achieve the kind of knowledge conducive to the common good, “An 
exclusive education” he writes, is principally “an education whose only goal is to distinguish 
those who receive it from the people… always gives the preference to the more costly forms 
of training over the more common, and consequently, the more useful ones.”414 Thus liberal 
or ‘exclusive’ education does not produce knowledge at all, but rather, a kind of pseudo-
knowledge premised on the pursuit of social advantage. Hence we can now understand why, 
in the Corsica he should write that it is not the man of learning and culture but rather the 
agricultural worker who acquires for himself the necessary talents for governing through 
ploughing the field.415 Relating this back to the First Discourse, Rousseau agrees with 
Machiavelli’s remark that; “the strength of well-armed spirits cannot be corrupted by a more 
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honourable leisure [ozio] than that of letters, nor can leisure enter into well-instituted cities 
with a greater and more dangerous deceit than this one. This was best understood by Cato 
[the Censor] when the philosophers Diogenes and Carneades, sent by Athens as spokesmen to 
the Senate, came to Rome. When he saw how the Roman youth was beginning to follow them 
about with admiration, and since he recognized the evil that could result to his fatherland 
from this honourable leisure, he saw to it that no philosopher could be accepted into Rome. 
Thus, provinces come by these means to ruin.”416 Following Machiavelli, Rousseau praises 
Cato’s fortitude in “inveigh[ing] against those artful and subtle Greeks who seduced virtue 
and enervated the courage of his fellow-citizens”417. Indeed, Rousseau’s inveighing against a 
kind of deceitful, or as he put is seductive knowledge which propagated by and is the 
privilege of the educated and cultured few, should itself be understood in relief to his support 
for a conception of learning by doing418 hence Rousseau identifies participation in political 
affairs and contestation of unjust laws and policy itself, and not exclusive learning, cultivates 
one’s capacity for political judgement. But precisely as we have seen this is exactly what is 
being denied to the people where the love of the arts distracts from contestation and wealth 
excludes one from participation. The ‘exclusive’ forms of education, with their uncommon 
honours and privileges, serve only to strengthen the unity of the powerful private interests 
against the people, in their pursuit and enjoyment of (un)common distinctions whilst at the 
same time encouraging a competition within that class in the pursuit of ever greater 
distinction.419 Thus Rousseau reverses the Aristotelean-Ciceronian argument that one’s 
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enjoyment of particular kind of education should be the attribute which marks one out for 
rule, instead he claims that education in the liberal arts assists, not in cultivating 
communication, prudence or the attachment to ideas of relational egalitarian justice, but 
rather produce a disposition conducive to “robbing and betraying one another in order to 
gratify their self-indulgence or their ambition”, and to feeding “their idleness with the sweat, 
the blood and toil of a million wretches”.420 Viewed in this light we can begin to appreciate 
just how far Rousseau’s disagreement with the Ciceronian republican tradition goes. For 
Rousseau, contra Cicero, virtue is the science of “simple souls” and not of learned, 
aristocratic gentlemen. To this effect he writes that Rome was first corrupted when it became 
“filed up with Philosophers and Orators”. Moreover he wholeheartedly condemns the 
eloquence that Cicero so prized amongst the senatorial class as “frivolous” indeed, nothing 
more than “the object of study and the delight of futile men”. 421 
4.4 Culture, elites and public opinion. 
Rousseau’s criticism of the elites in their distortion of public opinion can perhaps be best 
viewed in consideration of his mischievous inversion and misquotation of Plato’s Apology422. 
Recall that the Apology, in effect, stages a criticism by an ordinary citizen, Socrates, of the 
Athenian democracy. More precisely, Socrates attempts an aristocratic indictment of the 
democracy premised specifically on his questioning of its key institutional feature; the 
wisdom of the multitude. He interrogates each of his fellow citizen-jurists; Meletus the poet, 
Anytus the artisan-tanner, and Lycon the orator, arguing to the effect that they, just as he, 
each lack the wisdom required for the various specialist tasks of law-making, application and 
enforcement. As Josiah Ober writes, “Socrates asks the jurors to learn by individual 
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investigation that the general opinion of the mass of citizens (hoi polloi) was false.”423 Athens 
depended on the contribution of each citizen’s particular knowledge to the knowledge of the 
whole, in order to enrich the collective judgement on the common good, so that, by asking 
each of his citizen-jurists to reflect on his own individual lack of knowledge, Socrates’ 
contention is that if each of the parts, or the people severally, are equally ignorant, then it 
must follow that the whole, or the people taken collectively, is ignorant. And it is they (the 
democrats) and not he, who should be held responsible for corrupting the youth by promoting 
this form of collective ignorance. Rousseau turns Socrates indictment around to have him (or, 
rather, to have Socrates speak in the voice of the republican citoyen) accuse the elites of 
propagating a pseudo-knowledge, in that they think they know where virtue and the common 
good lies where they, in fact, do not. As Clifford Orwin writes, Rousseau’s use of Socrates is, 
in effect deployed in order to “eulogize ignorance,” in relief to the pseudo-knowledge of 
elites, and insodoing to defend popular opinion “against all pretense to knowledge superior to 
it.”424.  As Orwin continues, “Rousseau's Socrates…blames only the learned and the artists 
[for this pseudo-knowledge] avoiding criticism of the people and those vested with its 
authority.”425 Indeed Rousseau praises Socrates’ for his ‘wise’ and ‘learned’ ignorance just as 
he praises the agricultural worker for learning about government in ploughing his field. He 
thus assimilates Socrates to his own persona in the Discourse: a good citizen who knows 
nothing of what the rich and learned know, and who should not be thought of as better or 
worse for that. Transposed from the context of the ‘enthusiastic amateurs’ of the ancient 
egalitarian democracy, to that of monarchical France in the sway of enlightenment, with its 
specialist learned classes of knowledge producers and taste makers so eloquently defended in 
the works philosophes, Rousseau consistently and fervently condemns the corruption of the 
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‘grandees’, or ‘the great’ (‘les grandes’) whilst at the same time, never condemning the 
people (les peuple). In a later reflection on the composition of the Discourse he surely makes 
plain a sentiment which he takes care to hide in the published work itself:  
I have a violent aversion for the social stations that dominate the others… I hate the great [les 
grands], I hate their status, their harshness, their prejudices, their pettiness, and all their vices, 
and I would hate them even more if I despised them less.426 
Les grandes; the “politicians” the “the philosophes” and “artists”; all those he describes as the 
“heaps of idlers paid by the fat of the people to go six times a week to chatter in an 
academy”427 have corrupted public opinion and public morals on the basis of their own 
‘prejudices’ and ‘vices’, a thought which prefigures the remark in the Social Contract that 
“any man can carve tablets of stone, or bribe an oracle, train a bird to whisper in his ear, or 
discover some vulgar means imposing himself on the people”428and the sham social contract 
in the Second Discourse, where the rich use their greater rhetorical flair to manipulate the 
disunited poor into acceding to their rule. Again he seeks to rubbish the idea that these groups 
have a claim to wisdom which is naturally more conducive to the common good and of which 
could be used to advance their claims to rule. Rousseau argues that “the common good is 
everywhere clearly apparent, and only good sense is needed to perceive it”,429 this “good 
sense,” not only resides in everyone, since “our will is always for our own good,” and where, 
“our own good” is the common good, but no one is naturally better or more capable of 
knowing it than anyone else. Again in the Corsica he writes that “Good sense is enough to 
lead to a well constituted state, and good sense is elaborated as much in the heart as in the 
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head.” 430However we must now note that contra Phillip Pettit’s431 attempts to make 
Rousseau give ringing endorsements of the Hobbesian idea that the people (or the majority of 
the people) are never wrong, Rousseau everywhere admits that “taking men as they are” 
means that the people do err. In arguing that the people can be mistaken, Rousseau also does 
not believe that mere “good sense” invariably leads to a correct judgement on the common 
good. Pettit ignores the implications of Rousseau’s broader institutional design, and the role 
played by ‘experts’, where, when functioning well, and when certain preconditions with 
regards to equality of status, sumptuary laws and limits on wealth have been properly 
implemented so as to keep corruption at a minimum, the people are able to draw on the 
‘wisdom’ of those in the executive on various technical matters, such that the popular 
assembly and the elected executive work in concert to make and apply legislation. Indeed, 
aside from its principle duty to carrying out the instructions of the popular assembly, the 
executive is tasked with reviewing and rectifying legislation to be presented to the people for 
their final approval.432 However, on the other hand, and contra those who would wish to 
recruit the Genevan as an elite democrat,433 the claim that the people can be wrong is not 
evidence of some natural or intrinsic imprudence, or of their various, and perhaps profound, 
epistemic deficits, but rather, and more often than not, because their judgment has been 
distorted. Indeed, further evidence of Rousseau’s basic belief in the basic epistemic 
competence of the people can be found in the second of the Letters from the Mountain. 
Rousseau writes of the Reformation, that its founding principle was “that the meaning of 
Bible was intelligible and clear to all men…each was a competent judge of doctrine and 
could interpret the Bible…all acknowledged each of them [in the protestant congregation] as 
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competent judge for himself. They tolerated and they ought to tolerate all interpretations 
except one, namely that which removes liberty of interpretation…. Each remains the sole 
judge of them for himself, and does not acknowledge any authority in them other than his 
own.”434This is not to claim that Rousseau does not believe that elective aristocracy is a 
necessary evil, he clearly does. Instead as I read him, in the modern republic, the people will 
have to be able to draw on technical knowledge in order to discover the general will, hence 
elites are worth having so as to provide the people with that specialist knowledge. But he 
does believe that elected elites are an evil, since, as we have seen, it is from them that all 
corruption of the republic begins. Hence, the first two Discourse’s pre-empt the fundamental 
claim in the Social Contract that “that people is never corrupted, but it is often deceived, and 
on such occasions only does it seem to will what is bad.” To be sure, Rousseau is despairing 
of the levels of manipulation that the people suffer when asked to put their trust in learned 
and cultured gentlemen, since it is his belief that “Everywhere the rich are the first 
corrupted”. If the people require “adequate information” on political affairs in order to 
discover the general will, then this depends on information not being distorted by opinion 
leaders, and moreover it requires that the people not be excluded from those structures of 
information themselves.435 Indeed if Rousseau writes that popular judgment is sometimes 
imprudent or vicious, then this does not, as elite democrats suppose, give lie to Rousseau’s 
endorsement after all, of the need to impress upon the people the tastes, the artistic 
temperaments or the love of culture by those men of virtue. Rather, the corruption of public 
opinion “never happens,” he writes, “unless the people is seduced by private interests which 
some few skilful men succeed by their reputation and eloquence to substitute for the people’s 
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own interest.”436 It is from his skepticism of the capacity to properly constrain the vaulting 
ambition of rich precisely because the rich hold the tools of forming and shaping public 
opinion, that Rousseau’s pessimism regarding democratic republics flows.   
We have seen from the discussion in this chapter that in order for a free democratic republic 
of equals to flourish, citizens must be disposed to seek-out and to guard against, the influence 
of powerful private interests which distort the process of discovery of the common good or 
general will, in the manipulation of opinion and setting the standard for what ought to be 
esteemed. Citizens must therefore by disposed to practice contestation. Let one not be 
disposed to contest unjust laws and unequal relations of power, so Rousseau’s argues, and 
one will be responsible for that same injustice and one’s own political exclusion. However, as 
we have seen, Rousseau thinks that this is in part a structural problem not simply down to 
laziness or free-riding. Rather it is one which itself has its root in the promotion of the arts in 
society, where the arts are the product of wealth and patronage, of exclusive forms of liberal 
education, and of the broader pursuit of status inequality. Rousseau encourages then us to 
view artists, those who are supposed to guide the people in shaping and forming opinion and 
morals, not as educated, refined and excellent individuals, but rather as seducers and 
manipulators of public taste and information. Finally then, the arts are held responsible for 
communicating distorted public opinion, of which favours the private interests on which the 
arts themselves depend upon for their continued existence, and of promoting a public morals 
unconducive to equal freedom by encouraging us to rank peace and repose higher than equal 
freedom.  In the following chapters we will be asking whether the design of public culture 
and the arts may be construed in such a way that their influence may be re-directed towards 
the success of the democratic polity. 
 
                                                          




Are Their Egalitarian Reasons to Aid Artists? 
6.1 
There are many reasons why we should support the arts, some of which arise from the value 
of the arts themselves, yet others arise from values independent values which the arts play an 
important role in promoting. For example, some writers favour support for the arts because 
the arts help to promote other important non-instrumental goods, in particular, goods 
associated with democratic citizenship.437 One prominent proponet of the latter view is 
Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum argues that promoting the arts and the cultivation of aesthetic 
appreciation assists in the development of a moral disposition438 and a sense of 
justice.439Support for the arts she argues, fosters; 
[T]he ability to think critically; the ability to transcend local loyalties and to approach world 
problems as a “citizen of the world”; and, finally, the ability to imagine sympathetically the 
predicament of another person 440 
Chris Bertram has forcefully challenged claims of this kind,441 arguing that it is stretching 
what can plausibly be claimed on behalf of the arts to suggest that aesthetic appreciation, and 
more broadly the cultivation of good taste, is in any sense a necessary requirement in order 
that one could have moral beliefs, or, that one could be a good citizen. I agree with Bertram 
on this point. I think Kant’s rather more humble claim is broadly correct. As we saw in 
Chapter 4, Kant argues that cultivating one’s aesthetic appreciation and judgement may 
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assist, but is not in any way a requirement for, the development of a moral 
disposition.442Secondly, as Bertram pursuasively argues, from a democratic perspective, there 
is a decidely unattractive implication to Nussbaum’s argument. Indeed, she comes very close 
to implying that those of citizens who lack instruction in the arts  will also lack the moral 
qualities required for them to function as full members of a democratic society. If Nussbaum 
is correct that the vast majority of the population do not enjoy sufficient exposure to the arts, 
and if the arts are a necessary requirement for democratic competance, then along with 
Bertram, I do not see how she could avoid the conclusion that such people are not competent 
democratic citizens.  
Even if we do not accept Nussbaums argument, there are other moral ideals which we might 
appeal to in looking for reasons for why we should help struggling artists and which have 
nothing to do with the value of the arts, or with whether assisting struggling artists would 
help promote other important non-arts goods. For example if some artists are very badly off 
then perhaps there will be prioritarian, or, maximin-type, reasons, which would favour 
assisting artists, but in this case, there will be reasons do so only and because artists are badly 
off, and not because artists themselves deserve any sort of special assistance, or, indeed, 
because the arts ought to be promoted. There are also important procedural reasons against 
support for the arts, which, due to Rawls, draw on the idea of a reasonable rejectiblity 
requirement on state action. Rawls’ ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy’ says (roughly) that a 
policy or a decision to use coercion or force is legitimate (it is permissible to carry it out), 
only if it is one that no reasonable person could reject.443For example it would be 
impermissible, and hence wrong, for the state to force me to join your football team (because 
you need an extra player to make up a regular 11) on grounds that football is an intrinsic good 
which ought to be promoted. Equally, legislators cannot advance arguments that are, for 
                                                          
442 see Chapter 4 above.   
443 John Rawls Political Liberalism Columbia University Press 1993, p124. 
 155 
 
example, premised on the truth of the Anglican doctrine since many citizens do not accept 
and cannot be shown to have reason to accept such arguments.444Since these reasons are not 
reasons that could be shared by all rational agents, we have reasons to reject a policy of 
support for the arts that are based on arguments regarding their inherently greater value or 
importance.445  
Undoubtedly the most powerful reasons in support for the arts will be perfectionist reasons. 
The arts are, to be sure, are an important source of perfectionist value446.  Hence 
perfectionism does not argue that the arts are intrinsically good and for that reason ought to 
be promoted, but rather, that engagement with and pursuit of the arts is an constitutive source 
of human flourishing, and human flourishing ought to be promoted. In the following section I 
give a brief overview of perfectionism.  
6.2. Perfectionism (again) 
According to perfectionism intrinsic goodness consists in the maximum possible 
development (hence; perfection-ism) of the capacities which pick out human beings as the 
kind of thing he or she essentially is447.Perfectionism says that it is the capacity for rational 
thought and action that is distinct to the human species.448 And perfection or excellence 
consists in the development of this capacity to the highest degree possible.449 Thomas Hurka, 
the leading contemporary proponent of perfectionism writes that the ideal concerns what is 
good in a person and should be distinguished from what is good for a person “in the sense 
tied to well-being”, hence, as he continues “perfectionism should never be expressed in terms 
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of well-being.450 Like equality, perfection is a non-welfarist good, but unlike equality it is a 
monadic property of persons so would qualify in terms of the framwork set out in chapter 3, 
as a personal value, in the sense of its being a property of persons. Because perfectionism 
makes assessments about the goodness of or in persons its propert object of concern is not 
either with things which are excellent (e.g. artworks, buildings, mathematical proofs) or with 
the goodness of a life with regards to the contents of that life, in abstraction from the nature 
of the person whose life it is.451 It does not ask what sorts of things are excellent for a life, but 
how is excellence instantiated by a person within his or her life. Perfectionism holds that the 
basic components of value are certain suitably externalized dispositional states of persons, 
namely; justified true beliefs and successfully pursued ends, or; knowledge and 
achievement.452In aquiring justified true beliefs, one exercises, and develops, the essential 
human capacity for theoretical reason, and successfully achieving a goal exercises or 
develops the essentially human capacity for theoretical reason. In sucessfully purusing an 
end, one excercises and develops, the essential human capacity for practical reason. All 
justified true beliefs, and all successfully pursued ends are said to contribute to the value of a 
life, and because all lives contain some amount of beliefs and achievements, all lives have 
some perfectionist value. So what does this doctrine amount to for the value of states of 
affairs? Well, we can say that for each individual, that each person’s level of perfection 
makes an independent contribution to the goodness of a state of affairs. We can then say that 
one life, call it life-A will have a higher contributive value to an outcome than another, call it 
life- B, if A contains a greater number of justified true beliefs and successfully pursued 
achievements than B.  This would imply that the contributive value of each life to the value 
of an outcome, is proportionate to the level of perfection realized or exemplified by that life. 
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One can increase one’s level of perfection by acquiring a greater number of true beliefs and 
successfully achievements. However, perfectionists also argue that some beliefs are better to 
know and some goals better to achieve than others. To refer to Hurka’s example, it is better to 
know the fundamental laws of the universe than it is to know the number of redheads in 
Beiseker, Alberta453. As he explains: 
Merely forming a belief or intention requires rationality, and it can require more or less 
rationality. Humans are distinctively rational, with capacities beyond animals, because they 
can have and use mental states of a sophisticated kind… We can exploit this fact in 
characterizing quality. We can say that humans exercise rationality more, and are therefore 
more rational, when their intentional states are more sophisticated. [W]e can prefer some 
states that meet these conditions because they have more of our favoured formal properties.454 
So we can say that one belief p will be better than another belief q to the extent to which 
knowing p involves a greater degree of rationality than that of knowing q. Thus, it is not 
(only) a question of number of beliefs one has but rather, by how much knowing one truth 
extends one’s cognition compared with knowing another truth. The same holds for 
achievements. So, the basic thought is that beliefs and achievements differ in quality only in 
terms of the magnitude of rationality associated with them, then perfectionism will satisfy 
continuity455. So one life A, has a higher contributive value to an outcome than another life B, 
if and only if A is more rational than B. And this might be so despite the fact that B’s life 
contains a greater amount of beliefs and achievements than A. Suppose that there is a 
continuous scale of excellence along which we can order beliefs and achievements by the 
relation, “at least as rational as” then quality will increase in line with increases in the amount 
of rationality involved in the believing and in the pursuing. That is, beliefs and achievements 
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get better and better from the point of view of perfectionism, as one moves higher and higher 
up a continuous scale of rationality. So, I think it can be claimed that, as quality increases so 
the numbers of lives in which these higher achievements figure gets less and less. This is I 
think, a plausible assumption, given that the higher the excellence, the more difficult and 
complex456 it will be to achieve. And, given differences in talents and abilities, smaller 
numbers of people will reach these highest heights. Hurka compares the example of a higher 
achievement of practical rationality; “some large scale political reform”, to a lower 
achievement of practical rationality; “the tying of a shoelace”.457 If perfections differ only in 
degree and not in kind, then perfectionists must admit that ‘shoelace tying’ has some degree 
of perfectionist value. But, given continuity, there must be some amount of ‘shoelace-tying’s’ 
that would outweigh the value of ‘political reform’. Indeed, if we adopt the total outcome 
view that Hurka recommends as being the most attractive form of perfectionism458, we would 
be committed to the view that we would do most good by developing everyone’s capacities to 
some degree, rather than maximally developing the capacities of a minority at the expense of 
those of the majority. But it then would seem to follow that, ceteris paribus, the best outcome 
would be the one in which we would bring about the lowest acceptable level of excellence for 
the greatest number of human beings. Call the ‘Minimax Implication’.459 For example, 
suppose that one unit of a compartively higher excellence, say a scientific breakthrough, can 
be outweighed by ten units of slightly lower excellence say, a masterpiece of poetry and in 
turn, one unit of poetry can be outweighed by ten units of an even lower excellence, say, pop 
music, then, by transitivity, one unit of science, can be outweighed by one hundred units of 
pop music. If each step down in quality is accompanied by a proportional increase in the 
                                                          
456 See Gwen Bradford Achievement Oxford University Press 2015 ch.3 
457 Hurka, 1996,p.100 andp.128 
458 Hurka, 1996, p.83 
459 This phrase is due to Alan Carter who raises it against Robin Attfield in his ‘Inegalitarian Biocentric 
Consequentialism, the Minimax Implication and Multidimensional Value Theory: A Brief Proposal for a New 
Direction in Environmental Ethics’. Utilitas Vol. 17, No. 1, 2005. This section owe’s much to Carter’s argument. 
 159 
 
number of lives capable of achieving that level of excellence, then the best outcome will be 
the one in which we bring about the lowest level of excellence for the greatest number of 
people. This result follows if all of the following are true: 
(1) Perfectionist value differs in degree not in kind. 
(2) Goods can be aggregated across persons to form better goods. (Aggregation) 
(3). For every good x, there is a good of lesser weight y, enough of which will outweigh the 
value of x. (Continuity) 
(4.) If A is better than B, and B is better than C, then A is better than C. (Transitivity)460 
Due to an argument by Ben Saunders461, perhaps perfectionists could however respond with 
an argument from diminishing marginal value of excellence. Suppose, for instance, we value 
the first unit of X (science) at 5, the first unit of Y (poetry) at 3 and the first unit of Z (pop 
music) at 2, and that each subsequent unit of any excellence is valued half as much as the one 
before. In this case, three units of Z are valued at 3.5 (i.e. 2 + 1 + 0.5), which outweighs one 
unit of Y, while three units of Y are valued at 5.25 (i.e. 3 + 1.5 + 0.75), which outweighs one 
unit of X, but no amount of Z will ever add up to 5, so no amount of Z can ever outweigh one 
unit of X.  
I think there are a number of problems with this response. Firstly it is questionable whether 
excellence itself has diminishing marginal value, rather than say, resources. Many might 
believe that excellence, if anything has, increasing marginal value. Secondly it runs into the 
problem that Michael Otsuka has argued for:  
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there may be a rationale for discounting the value of additional benefits of a given specific 
type…when the same person receives this benefit a repeated number of times, there is no 
rationale for discounting the value of additional benefits of a given specific type to additional 
people. It is not as if a given benefit such as a pleasurable sensation is of less value to a 
person on account of the high number of others who have received this benefit. Hence we 
cannot claim that the same type of small benefit to infinitely many people may sum to a finite 
number because of the diminishing marginal utility of benefits to additional people. Rather, 
these benefits to different people are all of equal utility, and even very small benefits of the 
same positive value to an infinite number of people will sum to infinity. 462 
If this reply is correct then total outcome perfectionism leads to the Minimax implication, and 
perfectionism begins to look implausible. However, as Hurka himself has stated: “Think…of 
Achilles, the loss of his greatest feats could not be made good by any number of successful 
shoelace-tyings.”463 I agree. Whilst Minimax might not get down as far as shoelace tyings, no 
perfectionism can be correct that says individuals ‘flourish’ or are ‘most perfect’ no matter 
how meagre their attainments are. As Hurka’s above statement implies, the correct 
perfectionist response to the Minimax implication, might well be to accept some sort of 
argument for discontinuity in value.464 This would avoid the Minimax implication since it 
would enable the perfectionist to reject the sacrifice of quality for quantity under the total 
outcome view. However, as Hurka elsewhere aruges, accepting discontinuity would entail an 
objectionably elitist465 form of perfectionism where higher achievements enjoy a greater 
weight than lower achievements. Though I cannot argue for it here, I do not see how the 
perfectionist could deny either of (1)-(4) and reject the Minimax assumption, hence I believe 
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the conclusion to be sound. In order to avoid sacrificing smaller amounts of higher quality 
excellences for larger amounts of trivial lower quality excellences, I think perfectionists 
should be prepared to reject continuity in (3). 
Stephen Lecce,466 has however argued that this might be too quick. Suppose that a 
perfectionist continuum of value runs from, say, 1 at the bottom of the scale to 10 at the top: 
even if achievements higher up the scale are clearly better than lower ones, the latter are 
objectively valuable nonetheless, so in lowering the perfectionist bar, and distributing 
resources accordingly, we ensure that more people lead good lives without actually funding 
worthless or undesirable goals and activities. Perhaps, as Lecce suggests, perfectionists might 
just pick a point along the continuum that a large number of people can attain with some help, 
and make such a point the basis of distributive claims. But, unfortunately I have to agree with 
Lecce here that this move would be arbitrary and question-begging.467 Of course its 
judgments must be weighed alongside other values, but we want to know what would be best 
from the perspective of perfection, and not, what would be the least objectionable form of 
perfectionism. Indeed I think that the problem for perfectionism is the one that Thoams Nagel 
was sensitive to, and, in the end, embraced. That is, in order to promote the ‘maximum levels 
of excellence possible’ without loss of quality, Nagel argued, this would require recognizing 
and exploiting natural inequalities between persons. Firstly, because, he argues, people are 
unequal in their capacities for excellence, secondly, because excellence is a function not only 
of natural abilities but also of class, since so much education and culture is transmitted 
informally through the family, and finally, because the motivation which directs individuals 
toward higher pursuits is also due to family influence.468 Thus, perfectionism must 
recommend that those individuals with greater capacities should be permitted, or, indeed 
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might be required, to fare better, than those individuals with lesser capacities.469I should not 
need to point out that this would bring perfectionist claims into conflict with egalitarian 
claims. But the focus for this chapter is not to attempt to try to weight these two values 
together, which would require far more independent argument, and of course a plausible 
weighting scheme. This would take us far from our current topic. However, I hope that the 
above discussion has canvassed some of the reasons for support for the arts, and has 
illuminated a little, the import of perfectionism. Let me now turn to egalitarianism. Many 
people believe that fairness has an important role to play in our thinking about the arts; 
whether with regard to the questions about the distribution of opportunity, of representation 
in terms class, or, race, or, gender, and in particular, with respect to questions about artist’s 
comparative incomes, to funding and to government support.   
6.3. Equality,responsiblity, desert. 
As I have been arguing, egalitarianism is best understood as that part of morality which is 
concerned with how people fare relative to one another.  It is not however the only part. For 
comparative fairness must be added in order to offer a complete view about how people 
ought to fare relative to one another. As we saw in previous chapters, egalitarian’s are 
centrally concerned with a comparative relation between people in terms of how well their 
lives go. If equality concerns comparative fairness and fairness is constitutively connected 
with ideas of responsibility and thus agency, then things which lack a capacity to be held 
responsible for their choices and actions, cannot stand in relations of fairness. The possibility 
of responsibility, and hence the capacity for agency, is thus a necessary and sufficient 
condition in order that the relation of comparative fairness obtains. Egalitarians therefore do 
not think that all inequalities matter, neither do think that inequalities between things that are 
incapable of agency matter. Hence they do not deny that there are inequalities between, say; 
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insects and mammals or between electrons and protons, but they deny that these inequalities 
are normatively significant.470  I begin this section by considering some views about the 
relation between equality and responsibility. This will be directly relevant to our discussion 
about the arts and occupational choice generally. Many studies have pointed out that labour 
markets in the arts, like so many labour markets are characterized in terms of uncertainty, the 
management of risk471and its consequences, and luck.472 Firstly473 we need to consider some 
questions of scope with respect to the kinds of things we can be held responsible for. For 
instance we can distinguish between ‘local’ responsibility which might refer to individual 
choice, to actions and to consequences, or all three. And ‘global’ responsibility for one’s 
character, and which might only derivatively concern choice and actions.  As a desert 
theorist, Kant is one prominent advocate of this latter view. Simply stated Kant argues that 
the proper desert-base i.e., the condition of our being deserving of anythin at all, is virtue,474 
and the proper understanding of virtue concerns character, and not or not immediately 
actions. This is because, for him, virtue is a property of the good will and concerns a general 
ordering of our dispositions, whereas moral praise or commendation concerns actions, on by 
one. Actions are not the correct items to which the term ‘virtue’ can be applied, however 
actions can be morally praised (or condemned), when they are done from a good (bad, or 
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evil) will. And Kant arruges that a will is a good one when and only when it is robustly good, 
When the will is robustly good, he claims, it is virtuous. I think Kant is broadly correct that 
virute is the proper desert base, and I believe that he is also correct in requiring this kind of 
modally robust goodness of the will is a condition of virtue. To give anything like a complete 
argument for any of these ideas would demand at least one monograph. So let me consider a 
few examples which might help us to get some of these ideas a little more clear. Suppose that 
Tim is well off, he earns £200,000 p.a. Frank is not well off, he earns £15,000 p.a. Suppose 
Tim regularly gives a substantial amount of his earnings away in order to help the needy. 
Now suppose that Frank has a disposition to help the needy however, due to his low income 
he earns, he cannot give very much at all away. If we focus only on the choices they actually 
make, then Tim acts rightly and does more good than Frank. If Tim actually acts well and 
Frank does not, then Tim is more virtuous then Frank. Thus Tim ought to fare better than 
Frank. Now suppose, in a nearby possible world in which he is fortunate enough to earn the 
same amount as Tim, Frank would give the same amount away as Tim actually does. And 
suppose, in another nearby possible world where Tim actually earns the same amount as 
Frank, Tim would not give any of his earnings away. Suppose that in the actual world, Tim’s 
disposition to aid only holds because of his particular peer group and workplace, suppose he 
is a Silicon Valley philanthropist. In nearby possible worlds where he is not working in 
Silicon Valley but in a call centre like Frank, Tim would not have the disposition. Frank 
however, despite the fact that, in the actual world he cannot much away, Frank knows what 
poverty feels like, he has a disposition to aid which is robust over nearby possible 
worlds.475Tim has no such disposition. I think therefore, it would be correct to say that Frank 
deserves to fare better than Tim. And this is because, while he does more good in the actual 
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world, Tim in comparison to Frank, is disposed to act well only under favourable 
circumstances.  
This scenario gives us a reason why we should think pace Kant that desert a matter of 
character in a robust sense, rather than action in a localized sense. For Kant the correct desert-
base is virtue, and justice or desert concerns the proportion of virtue to wellbeing.476Virtue is 
a property of one’s character and only derivatively of one’s actions.477Where character refers 
to a general orientation of the will which guides an agent in her deliberation on how she 
ought to act. Kant claims that, in order for an action to have moral worth it cannot be 
sufficient that one does ones duty on some particular occasion(s), or under favourable 
circumstance. Consider Henry Allison’s478 example of a professor who resists a £1000 bribe 
to give a passing grade to a student whose work has been unsatisfactory. Clearly in so 
resisting, the professor has acted rightly. However, we would not, for that reason alone, Kant 
argues, attribute moral worth to his act. It must also be the case that the professor would have 
acted in the same way had the circumstances been different; for example, if the bribe was 
£10,000 rather than £1000. Thus, in order to attribute moral worth to an act, Kant argues, we 
must able to assume that it was non-contingently dutiful. That is, we must be able to 
reasonably conclude that its performance was not simply a function of contingent 
circumstances. Thus Kant argues that virtue consists in being disposed to act from duty not 
just in worlds in which circumstances are favourable to duty, but, (at least) in nearby possible 
worlds in which circumstances are less than favourable to duty. For example, the professor 
were disposed to act from duty in many less favourable nearby possible worlds, i.e. worlds in 
which he is offered greater and greater sums to pass the student, then Kant might suggest, his 
action in the actual world, i.e., turning down the small offer, would be an expression of an 
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underlying good character. But it is only on basis of being able to make such an assumption 
that we can say that the non-contingency claim is satisfied, and his turning down the £1000 
bribe has moral worth. This claim of course raises a host of epistemic issues that we cannot 
hope to resolve here. Now consider the example of the kindly Mafia don.479 
Suppose there is a mafia don who is generally ruthless to his enemies and to the victims of his 
crimes, of which there have been many. However, suppose that he is intensely loyal to his 
family and associates. His loyalty leads him, regularly and often to make great personal 
sacrifices for them. All of his ill-gotten gains are used to pay for his children’s education and 
to ensure they have a good future, better than the one he grew up in. And moreover, he often 
acts from great compassion and charity towards his associates in looking out for their 
interests and he is always first to help in a crisis. Moreover, suppose that one day the police 
approach him with a deal, they have some information on him which they are certain will 
lead to a conviction. Either he can go to prison for ten years, or he can go free if he would 
only inform them of the actions of his associates. Suppose the mafia don, refuses to betray his 
loyalty to his clan and is more than prepared to go to prison. Would we say that the actions of 
the mafia don have moral worth? If we agree with Kant we should not say this. This is 
because the love and loyalty he is regularly disposed to show are an exception to his 
generally vicious behaviour. As Allison writes, it is as if he decides that “I shall be absolutely 
ruthless, except when it concerns my associates and close relations”. This is hardly indicative 
of a morally praiseworthy character.  
Now, return to the professor example. Suppose that he is offered a series of larger and larger 
bribes to give the student the passing grade. And suppose bribe gets high enough that he 
caves in and accepts. Suppose that his poor choice is an exception to his generally good 
moral character. Along with Kant, I do not think we should say that due to this localized 
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choice, he is in any significant sense less virtuous. Kant’s point is that virtue cannot simply 
pertain to ‘local’ choices and actions. Rather it must be global matter, concerning the general 
orientation of the will. Accordingly, he notes that agents utterly lacking in a good will might 
very well perform actions from a sense of duty but these actions are not “from duty” in his 
robust sense, and therefore are not proper candidates for virtue and the assignment of moral 
worth. All this is to point in the direction of the claim that if the proper desert-base is virtue 
then virtue must be concerned with character, or the goodness of a good will, and not with 
actions. 
Equality as comparative fairness is concerned with choice and action in the local sense and, 
as distinct from desert based views, is that it is not concerned with character. Now, the central 
egalitarian claim is as follows ‘it is bad because unfair that one is worse off than others 
through no fault or choice of one’s own’. We shall need to try to unpick the ‘no fault or 
choice of one’s own’ clause before we can move forward. Many have thought that clause 
simply implies a reasonably clean distinction between inequalities that are the result of luck 
and inequalities that are due to or are the result of free and responsible choices. Then it 
should follow that, in the absence of responsibility, all inequalities are unfair and 
objectionable. And conversely, that all inequalities that result from, or are due to, the 
presence of responsibility are not unfair and not objectionable. Matters are however, 
considerably more complex.  
Beginning with an obvious and prima facie straightforward case concerning inequalities 
between those who are justly imprisoned and the law abiding population. If the bank robber 
Edgar is justly imprisoned for his crime and so is worse off than others and this is due to his 
own free and responsible decision to hold up the bank, then egalitarians should not object to 
this sort of inequality. So it would seem that if these judgements are correct then inequalities 




egalitarians will want to claim that inequalities that are result from free and responsible 
choice are unfair and hence are objectionable. Suppose for example as Kant and Ross 
believe; “the great part of duty”, as Ross puts it, “consists in an observance of the rights and a 
furtherance of the interests of others, whatever the cost to ourselves may be” (Ross RG, 16). 
Let us for the sake of argument simply suppose that, at least sometimes, what we are morally 
obliged to do will require a cost to ourselves and this cost may not be compensated for. 
Suppose that A and B are doctors for the NHS. Both have freely and responsibly chosen to 
doctor for the NHS over a choice of an alternative higher salary in the private healthcare 
system. They have made this choice because they believe they can do most good by using 
their talents and abilities to assist the worst off in the public healthcare domain. Now, A and 
B are worse off than others who, after all are permitted to work in the private sector. Is this a 
case of unfairness is the inequality here objectionable? I believe that it is even and despite the 
fact that A and B are worse off due to their own free and responsible choice to decline the 
higher salary.480What is the difference then between the Doctors case and the case of the 
Bank Robber? How can inequality be unfair in some instances involving free and responsible 
choice and not unfair in others? I think the case of the bank robber case is a pretty watertight 
case of unobjectionable inequality, and one would be hard pressed to avoid implausible 
conclusions should one want to argue otherwise. But surely by our reckoning that both the 
bank robber and the doctors are each worse off than others through their own free choice, so 
by these lights neither deserves aid. However the doctors have simply done what duty 
requires, they are surely no less deserving than we are, how could it be fair that they end up 
worse off than others simply for doing what is right at some cost to themselves, and even if 
this is due to their own free choice.  One the other hand, the robber has freely chosen to do 
                                                          
480 Here I concur with Temkin See his 'Justice, Equality, Fairness, Desert, Rights, Free Will Responsibility, and 




what he knows is wrong. He, if anyone is, is not equally deserving and so has no objection to 
being worse off through his just imprisonment. Now suppose that the bank robber Edgar goes 
on the run to Spain, and is never brought to justice. I do not think that egalitarians would 
object if it were the case that Edgar is only worse off due to brute bad luck, for example due 
to a  tornado striking his hideout in the Costa Del Sol.  
Egalitarians argue that we reasons to aid a worse-off individual when and because her 
situation is unfair relative to others. A situation in which there is a single badly off person in 
the universe and no one else, could not be comparatively unfair. The ‘no fault or choice’ 
clause says that whether our reasons to aid someone who is worse off than others are good 
ones will depend on pertinent facts of individual responsibility. Radical egalitarians if there 
are or have ever been such people, claim simply that all inequalities are objectionable, absent 
any facts about agency and responsibility. They would object, for example, to the prisoner 
case. They would also object to the doctor case. But they see no morally significant 
difference between the two cases. This leaves them open to objections from justice and 
desert. They would also however implausibly have to claim that inequalities between 
electrons and protons were in some sense morally significant. 
6.4. Four ‘case studies’ 
 I shall now offer a brief summary of some important findings from the empirical and 
econometric literature on artist’s incomes and earning functions. These findings will provide 
a partial picture of income inequality in the arts, however they should be useful in guiding us 
in our normative assessment of when, and in what respect, equality as comparative fairness 




advanced countries shows a similar picture regarding artists’ incomes. Throsby’s study481 and 
the work of Alper and Wassall482 in which the authors draw on data from seven United States 
Censuses provides a reasonably consistent set of findings. Alper and Wassall show, earnings 
inequality measures for artists has increased over the period 1949–1999. During this period, 
artists had a consistently lower mean and median incomes compared to workers with similar 
levels of professional training and education. Their study shows that in 1990, the average 
income of a full-time artist in the US was 30% lower than that of all other full-time 
managerial and professional employees, ‘a group broadly comparable with artists in term of 
educational attainment’. Further, these data shows that while artists enjoy a comparable level 
of education to that of professional and technical workers, when comparing earnings 
functions for artists and for professional and technical workers for six of the seven census 
years, Alper and Wassall observe that that returns to education are lower for artists than for 
workers in these other sectors. This is consistent with the findings of several authors483 that 
unlike in other sectors, investment in education does not significantly increase artists 
incomes. These data has shown a huge increase in numbers of people pursuing careers in the 
arts since at least the late 1970s. As Menger484 notes, in France, over the period 1982–1999 
the number of artists grew at a rate of 98 percent; in the USA, from 1980 to 2000, the rate of 
increase was 78 percent. Frank and Cook485 explain this increase in terms of perverse 
incentives due to the huge payoffs on offer for the top artists leading to oversupply. Alper and 
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Wassall’s studies confirm Frank and Cook’s thesis that while very few of these people will 
succeed in artistic careers, due to their relatively high educational levels, they are able 
transition into other professional and managerial occupations. They debunk the ‘mythology’ 
that most people leaving the arts fall into service sector occupations. Finally, drawing on data 
from US Department of Labor’s National Longitudinal Survey of Youth which was begun in 
1979, and was designed to follow a sample of young people from high school throughout 
their working careers up to 2010, it has been possible to compare individual’s careers as 
adults in 2010 with their parents' income in 1979. A recent study486 has shown that those who 
ended up in careers in the arts in 2010, tended to come from households earning between 
$65,000-$69,999 though in keeping with Alper and Wassall results, the majority will be 
significantly worse off in comparison with their parents. Similar findings were confirmed in a 
2015 survey487 of 2,539 people working in all core areas of the cultural industries which 
found that 76% of respondents came from families with at least one parent working in a 
managerial or professional job. And finally a CreateEquity488 analysis of the 2008 Survey of 
Public Participation in the Arts via the National Archive of Data on Arts & Culture revealed 
that professionals in “Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations” were 
around 60% more likely than average to have a father who attended at least some college 
(55.9% vs. 34.5%), and 70% more likely to have a mother who attended college (55.9% vs. 
32.6%). As they report, the finding was the most extreme skew of any of 23 occupational 
categories for mother’s education, whereas, for fathers, it’s exceeded only by mathematics 
and computer science occupations. 
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Now, the first point we should make is that it seems to be apparent from the data that artists 
in general tend to come from relatively high income households, secondly that they tend to be 
more advantaged than other workers in terms of levels of education and skills. Their level of 
education allows them a better set of occupational choices than many workers in other 
sectors. And finally they are in general worse off than their comparison class of professional 
and managerial (i.e middle class) workers. 
I shall now present four cases which draws on some the data above. 
Case 1: 
Suppose there are two individuals Alex and Becky, suppose that both are morally decent 
people and suppose that both have equal opportunities, talents, and initial resources. Suppose 
that Alex freely and responsibility chooses to pursue a career in the arts, she knows all the 
risks involved and that she has a tiny chance of success, but despite this she turns down a 
decent job offer in another sector which she would not have hated. Suppose Becky, could 
have chosen to pursue a career in the arts but because of the high risks involved chooses 
instead a more stable occupation. Now suppose that Alex ends up worse off than Becky. 
Indeed, let us assume that she earns 30% less than Becky. How should egalitarians respond to 
this situation? Alex’s career choice does not make her any less morally deserving than Becky, 
but should Becky be required to transfer resources to Alex so as to compensate her for her 
decision to pursue the arts? I do not believe that she should. I think in this case there is no 
egalitarian complaint that Alex ends up worse off than Becky. And Becky should not be 




Now consider Jane. Jane has not had the good luck that Becky and Alex have been fortunate 
to enjoy. She is from a poor household and due to being born in a deprived area with a lack of 
decent schools, she has not had the educational opportunities that Becky and Alex have 
enjoyed.  Thus Jane does not have the same opportunities as the more talented Alex and 
Becky a choice to pursue an arts career is not part of her option set. However, suppose that 
Jane toils for the same merge income as Alex, and from performing precarious temporary 
work. Jane hates her job but has no access to capital and she is saving to go to university. She 
knows that without making the investment in extra skills she will not expand her sphere of 
occupational choice. Alex on the other hand, loves her job and does not wish to change things 
but wishes she was earning more than she actually does. However given her talents and 
abilities, she could choose otherwise. Jane cannot. In this case I believe egalitarian objections 
are readily apparent. Jane clearly fares worse than either Alex or Becky through no fault or 
choice of her own. Becky has a requirement to transfer resources to Jane. But as we have said 
she has no such requirement with respect to Alex. Alex and Jane may be equally badly off in 
terms of income but Alex has freely and responsibly chosen to be worse off than Becky. 
Secondly and despite her low income, Alex’s job is a constant source of personal flourishing 
and satisfaction to her, whereas, Jane’s work is a source of disvalue to her. 
Case 3: 
Jim and Rachel are both struggling artists at college together. After college Jim desires to 
pursue a career in the arts at least in part, because of the increased social status and the vast 
incomes that are available to the top performers, and perhaps for other self-interested 
perfectionist reasons, suppose for instance he believes that his work as an artist is particularly 
important to his flourishing. Rachel however is dedicated to benefiting the worst-off thought 
her art. After graduating from art college she decides to work as a public artist primarily on 




of life of her community. Jim could have chosen this option but declined to. After some years 
struggling, suppose Jim gets his big break, at his first solo exhibition some multi-millionaire 
buys up all of his work. Rachel’s career is spent working for local councils, she is worse off 
than Jim. Rachel could have pursed the same career path as Jim, but declined to. Rachel is 
worse off though her own choice. From the perspective of comparative justice it is unjust that 
the more virtuous Rachel fares worse than the less virtuous Jim. And from the perspective of 
comparative fairness the inequality between Jim and Rachel is bad even though Rachel is 
worse off through her own choice i.e. though declining to pursue fame and fortune. It would 
be better then, if there were equalizing transfers to Rachel. So in this instance our egalitarian 
judgements would recommend aiding Rachel.  
Case 4: 
Now suppose that after a year in sun Jim’s source of income, his millionaire art dealer, gets 
arrested for fraud and Jim left without a patron. Due to no fault or choice of his own Jim is 
now worse off than Rachel. His earnings have dried up, pure bad luck has left him back 
where he started, struggling in his studio. Suppose that Jim had chosen to pursue the more 
virtuous option of working on public projects like Rachel, he would have had a small yet 
steady income. Comparative fairness would judge that in this case, between unequally 
deserving people inequality isn’t bad, because not unfair. It is not unfair that the less 
deserving Jim is worse off than the more deserving Rachel even though Jim is worse off 
through no fault or choice of his own. In this case, there is no egalitarian complaint on the 
part of Jim, and no egalitarian reasons to see him equalized.  
Let us now review these cases, in particular I shall want to return to Cases 1 and 2. In Case 1 
we saw that Alex’s being worse-off than Becky, was something she could have avoided but 
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didn’t489 given her choice set. The prudent Becky on the other hand had the same risky option 
in her choice set but declined to take it. And, we said that there are no egalitarian reasons for 
Becky to transfer her income to Alex to compensate for her poor occupational choices. In 
their path-breaking work, Frank and Cook argue that labour markets in the arts can be 
characterized as what they refer to as “winner-take-all” markets, sometimes referred to as the 
“superstar” effect490. These markets tend to be characterised by an oversupply of competitors, 
socially scarce employment opportunities491, and the name suggests, huge rewards for a small 
few ‘top’ artists and little or nothing for anyone else. As Alper and Wasell observe their data 
goes some way to confirming that the winner-take-all effect is a determinate cause of income 
inequality in the arts. Frank and Cook argue that such markets attract too many contestants in 
part because of a common tendency for people to overestimate their tiny chances of winning. 
And this is due to a generalized uncertainty about our own levels of talent and ability. 
Secondly, as Chung and Cox show492, in terms of the closely related superstar phenomenon, 
the very large incomes of superstars are driven more by sheer option luck and less by the kind 
of luck associated with superior talent. Writing in terms of popular music Chung and Cox 
argue that luck initially increases popularity and triggers a self-reinforcing bandwagon effect. 
Adler also describes493 a situation where the successful artist “the superstar” who emerges 
from among several artists who are all equally talented. In his model the emergence of the 
successful artists arises from a pure chance event: consumers select an artist at random when 
they add a new artist to their consumption basket, and it is simply by pure chance that one of 
these artists ends up with more patrons than the rest. These discussions are relevant for our 
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egalitarian judgments about arts policy. Egalitarians have long distinguished between what 
has often been referred to as option luck on the one hand and brute luck on the other494. 
Option luck inequalities are said to be the result of free and responsible choices to pursue 
risky options which don’t come off, and where the presence of responsible choice is said to 
make these types of inequalities unobjectionable. Brute luck inequalities, on the other hand 
refer to all and only those inequalities that are necessarily unchosen e.g., one’s being born 
with a certain set of native talents or lack thereof, one’s health, genetic variations, 
unavoidable accidents and choices made for you on the part of others that you yourself could 
not possibly have avoided, for example the quality of your upbringing, your place of birth, 
and the class and social status into which you were born. Typically egalitarians have taken 
the view that such brute-luck inequalities as objectionable. There are however two ways of 
specifying risk associated with option luck495. There are more or less, imprudent and more or 
less prudent risks, where risks can be assessed as belonging to one or the other category on 
the basis of the chances of winning or losing, and the value of what may be won or lost.  A 
risk will be prudent if the probability of winning is high and imprudent if the chances of 
winning is low. It may also be imprudent to neglect to take an opportunity when the chances 
of winning are high. But we need also to take into account the value of the goal to be 
achieved, as well as the value of the goal forfeited, and, the costs incurred by not acting.  An 
example of a prudent risk is getting on an aeroplane. Each time one steps onto a plane one 
takes a relatively low risk, but gains in comfort and reduced journey time compared to taking 
other means of transport. The decision to pursue a career in the arts, as Frank and Cook 
suggest, is an imprudent risk, where the probability of success is very small with a large 
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penalty for failure496,but where the value what one might win is extremely high. And in 
comparison with alternative options in an artist’s occupational choice set, the value of an 
artistic career may eclipse the value of more productive employment in other sectors. Now, 
winner-take-all markets are dominated by brute luck involved in differences in arittic talent 
and ability. However as Frank and Cook note497 winthe kind of luck associated with option 
luck such as who you know are also important determinates for success. If this is the case, 
then, surely these are factors beyond one’s control. All this is to say one cannot adequately 
judge the risk associated with artistic careers then one cannot know how well one is likely to 
fare in advance of choosing the artistic career option. If one doesn’t know one’s own talents 
or the talents of one’s competitors, and if one cannot account for uncontrollable factors, such 
as social capital and networking opportunities are required for success. Though I think it is 
still the case that in general one chooses the artistic career option in the knowledge the choice 
is the less prudent among one’s choice set.  
To return to case three of Alex and Becky whilst it need not be bad because not unfair that 
imprudent Alex ends up worse off than prudent Becky due to bad option luck on an freely 
chosen imprudent risk. And while it would be bad because unfair if prudent Becky was to end 
up worse off than Alex through bad option luck on a prudent risk. Suppose we now modify 
case three.  
Case 1*: 
Suppose that Alex and Becky both make the choice to pursue a career in the arts. And 
suppose again they take this imprudent risk freely and responsibly in the knowledge that the 
labour market in the arts is dominated by uncertainty. I think there is an egalitarian complaint 
if it is the case that Alex ends up better off than Becky. I think that it must be unfair if Alex 
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enjoys vastly greater good option luck despite the imprudent risk, if both Alex and Becky 
have made similar choices.498 In the case of winner-take-all markets it seems impossible to 
separate brute from option luck, since, firstly success is highly dependent on the brute good 
luck of having some marginally superior talents than another, and secondly it would seem 
that success is equally dependent on good option luck i.e., favourable external factors that are 
beyond one’s control. This indicates that whilst I think it is not unfair that artists who are 
responsible for having chosen imprudently are worse off than others in their comparison 
group of professional and managerial workers, I do think that artists cannot be responsible for 
their being better or worse off than other artists who, by implication have made similar 
choices. So to sum up I think that inequalities within the arts are bad because they are unfair 
since they are reflective of a mixture of small differences in brute luck, in the form of natural 
talents and vast differences in option luck. But in general we need not have an egalitarian 
reason to compensate worse-off artists over, or instead of worse-off workers in other sectors.   
Case 2 illustrates this point. In the example of the inequality between Jane on the one hand 
and Becky and Alex on the other, egalitarians should have a reasonably clear-eyed view, 
judging that it is bad because it is unfair that Becky is better off than Jane due to good brute 
luck, i.e. Alex and Becky more advantaged family circumstances, and their having greater 
talents and education than she. Alex and Jane are equally badly off, but it would be incorrect 
to judge that the inequality between Alex and Becky is unfair, and this implies that it would 
be incorrect to judge that same inequality as equally unfair as the inequality between Jane and 
Becky. The inequality between Becky and Alex is not unfair since Alex is worse off due to 
her own choice whereas Jane is not. Egalitarians should judge that Jane ought to be assisted 
not that Alex or Alex and Jane ought to be assisted. Let me illustrate further by drawing on 
Sen’s example of the distinction between the starving child and the fasting monk: suppose the 
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monk and the child are both have the same level welfare, they are both, severely 
undernourished, at welfare level 1. We have to distribute some welfare to one of the two. It 
would be implausible to aid monk since he has freely and responsibly chosen to fast whilst 
the child is starving due to no fault or choice of her own. We have egalitarian reasons to 
assist the child. 
In conclusion. We have argued that egalitarian reasons for or against the arts must be 
carefully weighed together with perfectionist reasons, and with non-egalitarian and non-
perfectionist reasons if we are to arrive at an all things considered judgement of what we 
ought to do with regards support. There is little doubt from the empirical literature we have 
canvassed that most artists fare very badly and worse off than others in their comparison class 
and that this is mainly due to luck. I believe that there will be prioritarian reasons to aid the 
worst-off artists though not because of any special concern for the arts but because these 
individuals are among the worst off. I have less faith in their being conclusive egalitarian 
reasons for our so doing. Finally with respect to perfectionism, as I have argued, I do not 
think that this value holds out much hope for aiding the poorest, and, least excellent in the 












The aims of this dissertation, as I set them out in my introductory chapter, are as follows. As I 
state my first objective is to provide an answer to two pressing problems within egalitarian 
moral thought. These problems are the so-called levelling-down objection, and, the problem 
of the value of equality qua comparative relation between people. Answering these problems 
takes up the work of Chapter’s 1-2. The second objective, is to apply some of this thought to 
the question of culture and the arts. More specifically, the aim is to try to answer the question 
of whether there are egalitarian reasons to support the arts. Now, I also argue in my 
introduction, we need to provide an answer to the first two problems, in order to achieve our 
first objective, otherwise equality itself might not matter, and so, by implication, egalitarian 
reasons to favour or disfavour support for the arts would not matter. I next suggest that in 
order to move from my first to my second objective, we require a framework for 
understanding why culture and the arts might matter. Otherwise, if the arts did not matter we 
would run the risk of triviality or vacuity. It would do just as well to ask whether there are 
egalitarian reasons for or against shoelace tying, or, grass counting. I also point out that while 
it is easy to find applied studies in contemporary egalitarian thought (for example, in the 
domains of healthcare and education) egalitarianism has not yet engaged with the question of 
culture. This, I suggest, is due to some of the reasons just mentioned, viz., that it is still a 
seemingly contested claim in contemporary analytic moral philosophy that culture and the 
arts are a matter of moral concern, and therefore, even among those who accept that culture is 
of moral concern, it is contested as to how much concern we ought to give it. The former 
point can be traced back at least to Rawls treatment of culture and the arts in his Theory of 
Justice. Recall that Rawls states that culture and the arts contribute, neither directly nor 
indirectly, to the social conditions that secure the equal liberties nor to the advancement, in an 
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appropriate, of way the long-term interests of the least advantaged.499 But just because culture 
and the arts do not matter for these reasons surely does not mean that they do not matter at 
all. I argue that it is plausible to claim that the arts and culture do matter and they matter 
because they are, in some sense, an important source of perfection, understood in terms of the 
development of the essential human capacities for reason. But, as I next note, just what this 
might consist in has not been made at all clear in the contemporary literature on 
perfectionism. I argue that Kant, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement offers a 
comprehensive discussion of the importance of culture and the arts in terms of the 
development of the rational capacities. And that by returning to Kant, we would be able learn 
a great deal about why the arts and culture should be a matter of moral concern.  My 
introduction then moves on to ask, why should egalitarians be concerned with the question of 
culture and the arts? Well, if we have reasons for believing that culture and the arts matter in 
the first place, we will be one step closer to answering that question. So, to put it in slogan 
form: egalitarians should be concerned about culture and the arts because the arts are an 
important source of rational development. And rational development sometimes comes at the 
cost of increased inequality. Strangely this last point has not been explored by egalitarians. 
However I note that one important forebear of contemporary egalitarianism, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, grasped just this point back in 1751, in his First Discourse on the Arts and 
Sciences.  And as I suggest Rousseau offers crucial assistance in providing the basis of an 
egalitarian framework, one which could significantly aid our thought on the connection 
between inequality and the promotion of cultural and artistic excellence. In my Chapter 5, I 
attempt to pick up on some of these thoughts in the consideration of the question of whether 
there are egalitarian reasons to aid artists.  That was the basic methodological framework of 
this dissertation. Let me now review the results.  
                                                          





In Chapter 1, we stated that egalitarians believe that an outcome is made in better, in one 
respect, if inequality is reduced or eliminated, even if this does not involve making the worse 
off better off, but only involves bringing the better off down to the level of worse off.  
Non-egalitarians argue that, in no respect is an outcome made better by levelling-down some 
and in no respect is an outcome worsened merely by raising-up some.500 If levelling down 
would undeniably decrease inequality, nevertheless it would render no one better off and 
since raising up would undeniably increase inequality it would only make some better off; 
equality then cannot improve an outcome in any respect so egalitarianism must be rejected. 
We then saw that the rejection of egalitarianism rested on the truth of a principle which Larry 
Temkin501 dubbed ‘the Slogan’.   
The Slogan: One situation cannot be worse (or better) than another in any respect if there is 
no one for whom it is worse (or better).502 
The Slogan is obviously strong enough to support the objection to levelling down. To see 
how, suppose there is an outcome where x=(10), y=(20) now suppose that we simply remove 
(10) units from y and throw them away, so x=(10), y=(10); the Slogan says the new outcome 
is not better in any respect. Egalitarians claim that the new outcome is better in one respect 
i.e. that it is better with respect to equality. But the Slogan denies this claim. It says that the 
new outcome is simply worse for some and better for no one, and because it is better for no 
one it cannot be better in any respect. Therefore equality cannot be a value that renders an 
outcome in even one respect better than another, thus, egalitarianism should be rejected.  
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We saw that one major stumbling block to establishing the truth of the Slogan was that it ran 
afoul of the non-identity problem. That is, the Slogan expresses a Narrow Person-Affecting 
view of outcome value, where the goodness of outcomes is dependent solely on how 
particular people - or, particular groups of people - are affected for better or worse in those 
outcomes. The aim is for each person who does exist, or has existed, or will exist, should fare 
as well as possible.  It was objected, due to Broome,503 Parfit,504 and Temkin505, that, as an 
example of a Narrow person-affecting principle, the Slogan has deeply implausible 
implications in cases which involve people whose existence is contingent on our choices.506 
We then showed that the Slogan could be revised to deal with problematic non-identity cases. 
Nils Holtug507 offered a convincing example of how this might be done. Holtug’s Wide 
Person-Affecting restriction is able to avoid the non-identity problem since, in contrast to the 
Slogan, it is not limited to a concern with how particular people fare for better or worse in 
one outcome relative to how those same people might fare in any alternative outcomes. 
Rather it expresses a concern with how people fare for better or worse in different outcome 
and where the aim is to see to it that whichever people will exist, that those people are as well 
off as possible. I pointed out that Holtug’s Revised Slogan (RS), is successful in answering to 
the Non-Identity problem, and so the egalitarian cannot use such cases to undermine its truth. 
As we saw on p27, RS is also strong enough to motivate the objection to levelling down.  On 
pp.28-42 we assessed a moderate egalitarian position. On this view ‘equality’ was not a value 
as such, but a factor which adjusts an intrinsic value up or down. We referred to this view as 
‘comparative’, or, ‘relative’ prioritarianism and, as we saw, the aim here was the same as 
absolute, or non-comparative prioritarianism, that is, to maximize the sum total of priority 
weighted utility, with the welfare of the worst off having the greatest weight. However, as the 
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name suggests, the relative priority view differs from the absolute view in terms of how it 
understands ‘being badly off’. Relative prioritarians believe, until it has been proven 
otherwise, that it does not make much sense to talk about an absolute measure of welfare. 508 
Instead the idea is to assign weights to each person’s welfare in the distribution, where these 
weights are determined by the rank order position when all welfare levels are arranged in a 
descending order. Weights increase as one moves down the order, thus the greatest weight is 
assigned to those who are relatively worst off. As we saw, the relative priority view would 
avoid levelling down and it would favour reducing inequality. Relative prioritarianism would 
favour reducing inequality, however, only in a certain way, and only under certain conditions, 
and not because there is any intrinsic disvalue to inequality. Rather, given a fixed sum of 
welfare, it would recommend a more equal distribution over a less equal one, because the 
more equal distribution would have a higher sum total of weighted utility. Because it is 
unable to register the fact that it is bad that some are better off than others through no fault or 
choice of their own, and that levelling down would undeniably reduce inequality, the relative 
priority view cannot be considered a plausible egalitarian view. Egalitarians should reject this 
view. Egalitarians want to bring to an end relations of comparative unfairness between 
persons, they do not want to simply benefit people, or, by implication, to make the worse off 
as well off as possible. I argue, however, that while the relative priority view is not a 
plausible version of egalitarianism, it is a plausible version of Rawls’s maximin principle. 
Finally I stress that egalitarians should endorse levelling down as an implication of their 
view, but since all egalitarians are committed to the view that equality is not all that matters, 
levelling down is quite capable of being outweighed by other moral concerns and thus we 
need not hold that it would make an outcome all things considered better. Those who are 
committed to RS, on the other hand, are committed to an implausible monistic view about 
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value. RS says that welfare is all that matters. I conclude with an argument that shows this 
view to be implausible. It would mean that all the various non-welfarist goods would have to 
be excluded from the moral universe. But since there are goods whose value does not reduce 
to how they affect sentient creatures, for better or for worse, and, unless one is, in Fred 
Feldman’s words, a fanatic about welfare, one must believe that there is a least one 
impersonal good that has independent non-instrumental normative significance. If we believe 
that is at least one such good, we must give up or restrict the scope of RS. We concluded with 
the following thought: Suppose that there are two separate heavens, in H1 Pol Pot is at 
welfare level (1000) while in H2 Stalin is at (10). Further suppose that because both deserve 
to be at (2), Pol Pot and Stalin are doing better than they deserve. According to proportional 
justice it would make things, in one respect better, if Pol Pot was reduced to (10) since Pol 
Pot would be closer to getting what he deserves, and it would be best if they were both at (2). 
Those wedded to RS would, however, not only claim that H1 is better than H2 but there is no 
respect in which it could be worse. Those who endorse the relative priority view would say 
that if a benefit became available it would make things better all things considered to give it 
to the comparatively worse off person, we should give it to Stalin. Those who endorse the 
absolute priority view would say that if a benefit became available it would make better all 
things if we gave it to the person who is absolutely worse off, again, Stalin.  It would not be 
in any respect good to simply chuck that benefit away. And it would not be in any respect 
good to lower Pol Pot to (10). I believe most people would find their credulity strained by 
these claims. This must be because we believe that something other than welfare or, more 
generally, person-affecting value, has normative significance. And this contradicts RS. We 





In Chapter 2, I began by pointing out that the rejection or restriction of RS did not, of course, 
show that equality had positive value. All we were entitled to conclude from the previous 
Chapter 1, if our arguments went through, was that levelling down was no objection to 
egalitarianism. I then said that the purpose of introducing the levelling down objection was in 
order to show that from it, another problem emerges for egalitarians. That is, I wanted to 
show that while it is true that equality is a non welfarist value, it is clearly not a non-welfarist 
value in the sense that beauty, or truth, or perfection are non-welfarist values. And this is 
because equality is a relation between persons, it is not a property of anything. However, if 
value supervenes on properties, then since equality is a relation and a relation is not a 
property, how then, does (in)equality itself have (dis)value? Thus the problem which 
confronted us in Chapter 2 was to try to explain how a relation might have value over and 
above the value of its relata. This problem, as I argue, is not exclusive to egalitarianism. Take 
for example, freedom. If as many writers believe, freedom is best understood, as three-place 
relation between, an agent, an agent imposed constraint, and, the doing of something X,509 
does the value of freedom reduce at least in part to the value of ‘being able to do X’? I offer a 
way of answering this question by considering some of W.D Ross’s arguments in 
Foundations of Ethics. In Ross’s work, he argues, not only for pluralism about value but for 
pluralism about kinds of value. Ross is committed, on the one had to what he calls personal 
value, or personal goods, and on the other to “situational goods.”510 What then are 
“situational goods”? We saw that when Ross talks about the value of justice he often claims 
that it is “a separate good” or “a different kind of good” from “personal goods”.511 I think the 
same is true for equality as comparative fairness. But what does Ross mean by “different kind 
of good”? In the Right and The Good, Ross maintains that we have reasons of beneficence to 
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promote what he refers to as the “generally recognized personal goods, either in the way of 
good moral or intellectual activities or in the way of pleasure.” And in this work he maintains 
that both the duty of justice and the duty of benefice can be subsumed under the general duty 
to promote as much good as possible.512  However, in Foundations of Ethics, he amends his 
view. He argues in his later work that a duty of justice should not subsumed under the 
category of a general duty to promote the good because a duty of justice is not a duty to 
promote “generally recognized personal goods”513 which the general duty to promote the 
good requires us to promote. He puts this thought in the following passage: 
One of the great puzzles of ethical theory lies in the sense we have of obligations to do certain thinks 
which do not seem likely to bring into being the greatest possible amount of any of the generally 
recognized personal goods…we feel an obligation to do justice as between different people, even 
when we do not think that the sum of goods either moral or intellectual or hedonistic will be increased 
thereby.514 
Some writers, however, believe that only deontic concepts such as reasons and obligations, 
can be relational and thus polyadic, while goodness or value is a simple monadic property of 
things.  Hence if Ross is claiming that goodness is a relation, he collapses this distinction.515 I 
suggested that this response seems arbitrary and question begging, firstly it presupposes the 
truth of the argument attributed to Moore that intrinsic value supervenes exclusively on 
intrinsic properties, which implies that that the only intrinsic properties can contribute to 
overall value. Yet, as I say - due originally to Korsgaard – it is true that something can have 
final value without its having intrinsic value. And if final value can supervene on relational 
properties then, since relational properties are themselves dependent on relations and 
properties, then relations, since more fundamental, can have value. Ross believes that a just 
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state of affairs “is a good”516 nevertheless he does not think that justice is part of a theory of 
the right, and he says that its being good just means that it is a “worthy object of interest”. He 
adds that a just state of affairs is worthy of interest, “over and above the good which consists 
in the meritorious character or its activities, and that which consists in…happiness”.517 So for 
Ross, justice cannot be a personal good, because, as he explains, it is not a good which is 
“resident in individuals”518 by which he means that justice is not a monadic property of 
things. Ross recognizes that justice is instead a value which holds in “relations between 
individuals.”519 He is arguing here that a theory of value must recognize justice as a ‘different 
kind of good’, or “good in different senses”520 which, after Nicoli Hartmann he calls a 
“situational good”, or, “state-of-affairs-value”.521 I then draw a lesson from Ross that, when 
we talk about the value of equality or the disvalue of inequality, or more generally, when we 
talk about how people fare relative to one another we are talking about a state of affairs in 
which certain kinds of relations between people obtain. And so inequality like freedom, 
desert, knowledge, truth, respect and recognition, refers to a relation holding between 
persons. All of these goods are ‘situational’ in Ross’s sense. I then give the following 
argument in order to show that, the equality relation need not reduce to the value of its relata. 
As I say, this should show that - if not that equality relation has positive value -  it does have 
value independent of welfare. I distinguished between properties and relations. When we say 
that A is square, or A is metal, then we are saying that there is a property ‘being square’ or 
‘being made from metal’ that A possesses. Hence if A possesses the property of ‘being made 
out of metal’ intrinsically, then we say that this property is monadic. All intrinsic properties 
are monadic. Monadic properties are one-place properties, they can be possessed by things 
                                                          
516 Ross 1939, 289 
517 Ross 1939, ibid 
518 Ross 
519 Ross 1939, 286 
520 Ross 1939, 288 
521 Ross 1939, 286, n1. 
 189 
 
individually. But not all monadic properties are intrinsic. For example, the property ‘being a 
man’ is essentially monadic, but the property ‘being a father’ seems to be essentially 
relational. A person x is a father, just in case, x is a man, and there is another person y, such 
that y is the progeny of x. One cannot determine whether x is a father just by studying x 
alone; one has to take into account the relations which x has to at least one other person, e.g., 
y.  But even if the property of ‘being a father’ is essentially relational it can be designated by 
a monadic predicate; ‘is a father’.522 However relational properties are not fundamental since 
they are entirely reducible to relations and properties.523 When we say that London is to the 
west of Bristol or that, A is more massive than B, then we are saying that there is a certain 
kind of relation which holds between London and Bristol, and between A and B, i.e. the 
relation ‘being to the east of’ and the relation ‘being more massive than’. Now we need to 
consider the crucial distinction between internal and external relations. According to David 
Armstrong and David Lewis524 an internal relation such as being ‘taller than’, is one which 
supervenes on the intrinsic properties of the relata. That is, if the relata exist then the relation 
holds between them internally, if and only if the relata have the properties they do 
intrinsically. I then consider the comparative ‘taller than’ relation of height. Suppose that 
John is 5’10” and James is 5’11”, consequently it is true that ‘James is taller than John’, and 
that ‘John is shorter than James’.  Some writers argue that each of these facts are made true 
just in case John has the height that he actually has and James has the height he actually has; 
hence it is not possible for James and John to have the heights they actually do and for James 
to fail to be taller than John. I say that it seems natural to say that James’ being taller than 
John is nothing beyond their individual heights. Supposing that things have their heights 
intrinsically, then the taller than relation is internal. Thus, as David Armstrong writes, 
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internal relations are “an ontological free lunch.” 525 They are “not something extra”526 they 
“are not an addition to the world’s furniture”527 they “are not the sort of relations we should 
be focussing on in ontology.”528 Internal relations therefore reduce entirely to the monadic 
properties of the relata.  I then state - originally due to Bertrand Russell -  that not all relations 
are internal. Some relations are ‘external’. Where, as Armstrong writes, external relations, 
unlike internal relations, are an addition to the world’s being. One example of an external 
relation is the spatio-temporal relation ‘being to the west of’. You could know all the 
monadic facts about London and all the monadic facts about Bristol, and all the monadic 
conjunctive facts about London and Bristol without knowing that London is west of Bristol. 
God could create each city, filling each with the requisite number of persons, cafes, etc. until 
every monadic fact concerning London and Bristol was made true, and he would still not 
have brought it about that London is south of Bristol.529 We assert that Bertrand Russell is a 
famous anti-reductionist about relations, and ask if he can could teach us anything about the 
inequality relation. Suppose that Andy stands in a relation of inequality to Betty. Inequality 
like the ‘taller than’ is an asymmetric comparative relation. Suppose that Andy is at (10) and 
Betty is at (20) units of welfare. It would seem that because of the intrinsic nature of the 
numbers ‘10’ and ‘20’, Andy and Betty of necessity, stand in this relation. I say that a relation 
will be internal iff, necessarily, given the relata a and b, then aRb. So because 20 is 
necessarily greater than 10, it seems that there was no way that 20 could fail to be less than 
10, thus Andy and Betty stand in the relation of inequality they do, simply because of Andy’s 
having the amount of welfare he does and Betty’s having that amount of welfare she does. 
Hence it seemed as if we could finally reduce the relational to the non-relational, intrinsic 
properties, of Andy and Betty respectively. Such that, ‘Andy is better off than Betty’ is made 
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true by the intrinsic properties of Andy and Betty, and there is no irreducibly relational state 
of Andy and Betty. Or, what amounts to the same thing, the relation between Andy and Betty 
is nothing real over and above the monadic non-relational properties of Andy and Betty.  We 
then saw that Russell530 argued against the reducibility of asymmetric transitive relations. He 
points out that in order to perform the reduction, we must posit a relation between the 
magnitude of Andy’s welfare and the magnitude of Betty’s welfare.531 And as Russell pointed 
out: “Quantities are not properly greater or less, for the relations of greater and less hold 
between their magnitudes, which are distinct from the quantities.”532 Hence, “better off than” 
can be reduced to the more fundamental ‘greater than’. In our case, the fact that 20 is 10 units 
greater than 10, is a further asymmetric transitive relation.533 Finally, Russell argues that the 
‘greater than’ relation between magnitudes cannot be treated in the same way as the ‘better 
off than’ relation between Andy and Betty, because there are no intrinsic properties of 
magnitudes in virtue of which they stand in the relations they do. Thus we have an external 
relation. I conclude by arguing that the case for inequality as an external relation is further 
strengthened when we consider the other crucial egalitarian relation - apart from ‘greater 
than’, ‘less than’, and ‘equal to’ relation – namely the ‘x units of welfare away from’ relation, 
where all spatio-temporal relations are external. Finally, if these arguments go through, we 
can show that the inequality relation does not reduce to its relata, so we have good grounds to 
believe that a Rossian situational goods framework for thinking of values such as desert, 
equality and freedom, is indeed plausible. 
Chapter 3 
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In Chapter 3, we moved on to our second major aim, that was to show how and why culture 
and the arts matter. Through a close reading of Kant’s arguments in the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment, I show that for Kant, culture and the arts were important to the development of 
rationality. I argue that Kant believes that our natural dispositions for the use of practical 
reason are optimally suited to the goal of giving ourselves, and our existence a purpose. This 
is the basic claim on which his theory regarding the value of culture and the arts rests. I show 
that Kant defines culture as “the formal, subjective condition, namely the aptitude for setting 
himself ends at all” and from this passage I declare that Kant takes culture to be intrinsically 
connected with the use of practical reason. Now, Kant decomposes ‘practical reason’ into the 
“technical” and the “pragmatic”. Where he says that the former use of reason pertains to a 
capacity to manipulate things as means to ends (skill, art, and deliberative ability), the latter 
‘pragmatic’ use of reason is a higher-order capacity, enabling us to compare the ends we set 
and organize them into a system.  Culture, then, according to Kant, is connected to these two 
types of reason. However, as I also demonstrate, Kant argues that it is through culture - that 
is, by engaging in the pursuit of increasingly complex artistic, educational, political and 
scientific achievements - we further develop our use of practical reason. And this last claim is 
crucial to understanding the value of culture and the arts. Yet, Kant, then, wants to argue that 
this rational development is in some further way connected to moral development. In order 
to explain this idea, I reveal that Kant claimed firstly, that the development of culture allows 
human beings to move further away from their non-rational nature, that is from everything 
Kant thinks is less than essential to human being. As he puts it, “the capacity to set oneself an 
end—any end whatsoever—is what characterizes humanity (as distinguished from 
animality).”534 The question I therefore ask was about the status of Kant’s further claim that 
culture is required “in order to prepare [humankind] for what he must himself do in order to 
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be a final end.”535 If by the term ‘final end’, Kant means the achievement of moral 
personhood, how then does Kant conceive of the relation between culture and the arts and 
morality? I look at three arguments from the secondary literature. First, we saw that Robert 
Louden,536one of the key commentators on this issue, offers a thesis in which Kant takes 
culture to be a ‘propaedeutic’ to morality. That is, engaging in culture and the arts is a 
preparatory step which one must take in order that one can be good. I cann this the ‘strong’ 
thesis. In turn I ask whether culture and the arts, might then be plausibly conceived in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for moral development. That is, as Louden stresses, 
despite there being no guarantee that people who have been exposed to these preparatory 
steps will actually be morally good, human beings who lack all contact with culture cannot 
possibly be morally good. I argue that this is the wrong way to establish the importance of 
culture and the arts. It cannot be correct to say of someone who has not been exposed to the 
arts, that she thereby lacks the capacity to be moral. No one could endorse such a view. 
Fortunately we found this could not be Kant’s considered view. I then canvass a weaker 
thesis, which I attribute to another of Louden’s arguments. This thesis, while still requiring 
engagement with culture as a preparatory step towards a moral development does not claim 
that these steps are sufficient in order for an individual to actually be morally good. Thus the 
weaker thesis allows for the possibility for us to be good without being exposed to culture. I 
then show that both the strong and the weaker theses were rejected by Alix Cohen. Cohen 
argues, contra Louden, that Kant conceives of the relation between culture and the arts in 
terms of the development of the preconditions for moral agency, and not, in way, in terms of 
moral progress or improvement.  Cohen’s argument however implies that there is only very 
weak relation between culture and morality, which is established simply in the use of 
practical reason. While I find much to agree with in Cohen’s paper, I argue that the textual 
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evidence suggests that Kant does indeed argue for a direct relation between culture and 
morality. Finally I claim that Kant argues that the arts and culture are important to the 
development of the ‘complete’ use of reason. In order to understand this claim, we need to 
understand Kant as a perfectionist. He is, after all, not simply offering up the argument that 
engagement in and with culture and the arts implies the use of practical reason, but rather that 
though culture we further develop our use of reason, up to and including the conditions for 
moral reason. Kant is clear in his claim that reason itself does not “operate instinctively, but 
rather needs attempts, practice and instruction in order gradually to progress from one stage 
of insight to another.” 537 Thus, I state that Kant establishes two-part claim about the value of 
culture and the arts. First, that engaging with culture creates the conditions for moral agency 
through the use and the development of practical reason, as we saw in the ‘weaker’ thesis, 
since moral reason is itself a species of practical reason. Hence Kant argues that the 
development of the latter must entail the development of the former. Secondly, he argues that 
if we each share in the cultural development of our society, seeing our fellows flourishing, 
gives us the “thought of and thus motivation for moral improvement”, which is to say that the 
ability to conceive of culture as progressing towards the good, enables us to strengthen our 
moral dispositions.  
Chapter 4  
Chapter 4 then takes us to a more pessimistic view about culture. Here we presented some of 
the arguments given by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his First Discourse on the Arts and 
Sciences, concerning the relation between culture and the arts and vice, or, corruption,  where 
corruption is for Rousseau an effect of unjust inequality. I assert that Rousseau holds a view 
on equality, similar to our view. Where we hold a view of equality as comparative fairness, 
Rousseau holds a view about equality as comparative justice or desert. For Rousseau, virtue 
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is the proper base of desert. And he holds a common good conception of virtue. Corruption 
for Rousseau is therefore an effect of comparative injustice. In the First Discourse on the Arts 
and Sciences he rails against: “The disastrous inequality introduced among men by the 
distinction of talents and the debasement of virtue.”538 Rousseau believes that it is 
objectionable that some should fare better than others on the basis of their possessing superior 
talents and abilities, including artistic or cultural abilities. He believes that such abilities are 
the product of luck. As he puts it; “we are born with our talents, only our virtues belong to 
us.”539  Hence he condemns as unjust, a situation where the less virtuous fare better than the 
more virtuous. Reviewing Rousseau’s sometimes hyperbolic, sometimes ingenious, 
arguments was, I argue, important to our understanding of the costs of inequality which must 
be weighed against reasons in favour of the promotion of cultural and artistic excellence. 
Rousseau identifies the arts as being the privilege of those who are fortunate enough to 
possess a certain amount of education, and a comparatively greater amount of leisure time, 
than others. So the arts may be understood as themselves possible, only given certain 
inequalities in class, education and work. Furthermore, he argues that the arts are both caused 
by and further effect, the inflammation of amour proper: the desire to gain advantage over 
others. On his view artists and their patrons compete ceaselessly with one another in pursuit 
of ever greater social esteem and wealth. So the arts in being caused by and in giving further 
effect to amour propre, are themselves corrupting, and are themselves indicative of 
corruption. Rousseau argues that, based on observations as to the degree in which the arts are 
widespread and flourishing in a society, we may infer how far that society is moving towards 
the “last degree” of inequality and so corruption. In our reading of the First Discourse, we 
saw that Rousseau claims that a choice to pursue the arts entails a choice of a life of 
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contemplation, or, perfection, over a life of virtue. We saw how Aristotle had argued that 
Sophia is what is best in us540 and that a life of contemplation suitably directed towards 
philosophical and artistic pursuits is therefore the highest form of happiness. To be sure, 
Aristotle says that a life conducive with Sophia is distinct from that of a life merely lived “in 
accord with all the other virtues the activities of which are human.”541 Rousseau, on the other 
hand views the preoccupation with the arts and philosophy and thereby Sophia as antonymic 
to a life lived according to virtue. This was due to Rousseau’s commitment to the ancient 
Republican idea of the vita activa, the cultivation of the qualities associated with the active as 
opposed to the contemplative life, where the active life was itself understood to be centred on 
public negotium (or, public business) and where each of the virtues is itself connected and 
interwoven with the supreme ethical imperative of seeking the common advantage 
(utilitas).542 In contrast to Aristotle, we saw that Cicero argues that practical knowledge is, 
not only superior to intellectual knowledge, but that if it is to be virtuous, it must be 
subordinated to social duty (officiium), since must be rendered serviceable to the whole 
community for the common advantage. Hence, Cicero argues that the learned must “apply 
their own practical wisdom and insight to the service of humanity.”543 The desire for 
knowledge, purely in the service of one’s own intellectual perfection, since it is incompatible 
with the common good, is a pursuit that cannot be virtuous or honestum.544 Like the Ancient 
Republican writers, Rousseau’s conception of virtue is an active and other-regarding concept, 
it is to be exercised through ones contributions to the common good, and it is therefore 
distinct from the passive and self-regarding concept of the vita contemplative and perfection. 
As he writes in a letter to a young follower, “The first bit of advice I should like to give you 
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is not to indulge in the taste […] for the contemplative life and which is only an indolence of 
the spirit reprehensible at every age and especially at yours. Man is not made to meditate but 
to act.”545 Hence, as I elaborate Rousseau’s central argument is that the arts encourage a 
withdrawal from negotium, and thus encourage one away from the common good. Not only 
does Rousseau claim that the arts conflict with the life of virtue, I also reveal that he 
condemns artists for cultivating an indifferent attitude towards injustice and vice. As I state, 
Rousseau singles out for particular criticism the idea that cultural progress assists in refining 
the human character. He argues that widespread support for culture and the arts can lead us to 
adopt the wrong attitudes and dispositions towards the vicious. Indeed he suggests that 
cultural sensitivity and an aesthetic sensibility implies an indifference to good and evil.546 As 
I also point out, Rousseau was here attacking a view attributed to Jean-François Melon, 
Montesquieu, Voltaire, Hume and indeed a majority of the leading intellectuals of the time, 
that by developing and supporting cultural institutions individuals and societies would 
become more doux; peace-loving, soft, and/or sweet.547 Thus, Rousseau argues that a choice 
to support, or to pursue a cultural life is incompatible with virtue, and that virtue is 
understood in terms of vita activa; the pursuit of the common advantage. He writes in no 
uncertain terms, not to do good is an evil and every useless citizen who does not strive to act 
for the common good, is a pernicious man. And he claims that the moral indifference actively 
encouraged by the philosophers and the artists in their promotion of gentleness is itself 
barbarous, and its barbarousness lies in encouraging a ‘sweet’ or ‘pleasant’ indifference to 
unjust inequality. 
Chapter 5. 
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Finally, in Chapter 5, I take forward some of Rousseau’s arguments along with the lessons 
from Chapters 1-2, to try to answer the question of whether there are egalitarian reasons to 
support artists. I firstly consider some arguments from perfectionism. As I assert 
perfectionists would not favour supporting all artists. I show that perfectionism holds that the 
basic components of value are certain, suitably externalized dispositional states of persons: 
namely, justified true beliefs and successfully pursued ends, or, knowledge and achievement. 
Having justified true beliefs exercises or develops the essential human capacity for theoretical 
reason, and successfully achieving a goal exercises or develops the essential capacity for 
theoretical reason. All justified true beliefs, and all successfully pursued ends contribute to 
the value of a life, and because all lives contain some amount of beliefs and achievements, all 
lives have some perfectionist value. But I also assert that perfectionists hold that some beliefs 
are better to know and some goals better to achieve than others, where one belief p will be 
better than another belief q, if and only if, knowing p entails a greater exercise of rationality 
than knowing q. The same holds for achievements. I argue that on the perfectionist 
continuum of value, as quality increases along with the difficulty and complexity of 
achievements, so the numbers of lives in which these higher achievements figure will get less 
and less. I declare that this is a plausible assumption on grounds that there are differences in 
talents and abilities, and that most people will not reach these highest heights. We then refer 
to Thomas Hurka’s example of a higher achievement of practical perfection, ‘a large scale 
political reform’, and his example of a lower achievement of practical perfection ‘the tying of 
a shoelace’ If perfections differ only in degree and not in kind, then perfectionists must admit 
that shoelace tying has some degree of perfectionist value. But this now creates a problem. 
For, given booth continuity and aggregation, both of which perfectionists accept, there must 
be some amount of ‘shoelace tyings’ that would outweigh the value of ‘a large scale political 
reform’. I suggest that perfectionists would be committed to the view that we would do most 
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good by developing everyone’s capacities, rather than maximally developing the same 
capacities of a minority. But it would seem to follow from this, ceteris paribus, that the best 
outcome would be the one in which we would bring about the lowest acceptable level of 
excellence for the greatest number of people. This is what I referred to as the ‘Minimax 
Implication.’548 For example, suppose that one unit of higher excellence, say a scientific 
breakthrough or great act of political reform,  can be outweighed by ten units of slightly 
lower excellence say, a masterpiece of poetry and in turn one unit of poetry can be 
outweighed by ten units of an even lower excellence say pop music, then, by transitivity, one 
unit of science, can be outweighed by one hundred units of pop music. If gradual each step 
down in quality is accompanied by an increase in the number of lives capable of achieving 
that level, then the best outcome will be the one where we bring about the lowest level of 
excellence for the greatest number of people. I then argue that perfectionist’s should object to 
the Minimax implication, and that they should not endorse a sacrifice quantity for quality.  
But as I demonstrate, alternative views entail aiding the most talented over the less talented.  I 
then consider some empirical data on artists’ incomes and earning functions. I show that 
artists in general tend to come from relatively high income households, secondly that they 
tend to be more advantaged than other workers in terms of levels of education and skills. 
Their level of education allows them a better set of occupational choices than many workers 
in other sectors. And finally they are in general worse off than their comparison class of 
professional and managerial (i.e middle class) workers.  I then construct four ‘case studies’ 
utilizing these findings to ask whether they support egalitarian reasons to aid struggling 
artists. I reveal that in the main there were probably no egalitarian reasons to assist artists. For 
example in case where an individual chooses to pursue a career option in the arts that leaves 
her worse off than others when she could have chosen otherwise, there are no egalitarian 
                                                          




reasons to compensate for her decision to pursue that option. Thus, in such cases I argue, 
there is no egalitarian complaint that an artist ends up worse off than others.  However I say 
that things get more complex when we consider intra-arts inequalities, and drawing on 
empirical data, I show that success in the arts is largely down to luck. I argue that if two 
people make similar choices to pursue a career in the arts and one ends up much better off 
than the other, simply due to good luck, then this is objectionable because unfair. And there 
would be a complaint regarding the inequality involved. 
Let me now finish with the following thoughts. Equality and perfectionism are two contested 
values, they are contested in principle, by those committed to value monism. Thouse who 
maintain that only welfare matters, neither equality nor perfection will be part of the moral 
universe. I hope to at least have cast some doubt on the plausiblity of this sort of view. 
However, while i do believe that perfection matters, as an egalitarian I have deep reservations 
regarding this ideal. I believe the most plausible version of perfectionism would almost 
certainly want to oppose, at least in some instances, trade-off’s between quantity and quality 
as undesirable.  As I put the point above, I think it would strech our intuitions regarding 
‘perfection’ to judge that a world in which there is some amount of shoelace tyings is a better 
world than one whcih contains the achievement’s of Achillies. As Thomas Hurka puts the 
point; however hard it is to accept a sacrifice of quality for quantity with pleasure or desire-
fulfillment, it is even harder to accept with respect to the goods of excellence, such as 
knowledge and achievement.549 As I also said, it is not plausible for a doctrine which 
purports to be concerned with what  is most excellence or perfect, to be understood in terms 
satisficing, or other such views which aim at less than what is most excellent. To paraphrase 
Thomas Hurka’s earlier comment, perfectionism does not say, ‘become reasonably 
excellent’, or, ‘be sufficiently perfect’, rather it says that one ought to pursue the 
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development of his or her talents and abilities to the maximum levels possible.  We saw this 
with the example of T.S Eliot. If Eliot had chosen to go back to America instead of staying on 
in the U.K to write poetry, he would have developed to a satisfactory degree by teaching 
philosophy, but perfectionists would want to say that this choice would have been wrong. The 
choice to go back to America and teach philosophy would have resulted in a waste of Eliot’s 
finest talents. I also said that, it is very difficult to see how the perfectionist can reconcile a 
desire to avoid scenarios like ‘shoelace tying for Achilles’, with her commitment to 
continuity in value. If excellences differ only in degree and not in kind, then the perfectionist 
must accept the idea that should the numbers stack-up, then some amount of very low quality 
achievements must eventually outweigh achievements of the highest quality. This is 
compounded by the idea that perfectionists seek to identify the higher excellences by their 
difficulty and complexity. As we argued, this would almost guarantee that achievements 
higher up the continuum of perfectionist value will be attainable by smaller and smaller 
numbers of people. One way the perfectionist could avoid the above result would be if she 
were to reject continuity. The perfectionist might therefore assign lexical priority to 
developing the capacities of the most talented individuals. On this view we would seek to 
develop the talents and abilities of the most capable, and, when we have reached a point at 
which nothing more can be done for them, we would then seek to develop the abilities of the 
second most excellent up to the point at which nothing more can be done for them, and so on 
all the way down to the least excellent. However, while assigning discontinuously greater 
value to the development of the more excellent would rule out quality-quantity trade-offs, it 
would imply that small gains to the most excellent outweigh any gain for the least excellent, 
and the result would be an elitism which would be unpalatable to many.  Perfectionism as 
Kant, Nagel and Rousseau have taught us, is at fundamental level concerned largely with the 




all eluicidated enirely in terms of the importance of the development of the ‘essential’, or 
natrual capacities. So when Rousseau puts to us the rhetorical question: ‘What did Racine do 
not to be Pradon? What did Boileau do in order not to be Cotin?’’ He thereby expresses the 
view that artists are differentially “esteemed” and “rewarded” for achievements which are 
largely due to factors beyond their control. He believes that it is objectionable that artists 
should fare better than others merely becasue of their posessing greater capacities. As he 
writes “we are born with our talents, only our virtues belong to us.”550  If the achivment of 
the various excellences is, to a great extent detemined by fortunate genetic endowments and 
if the posession of these endowments makes us no more or less deserving than others, how 
can it be fair that the more talented fare so much better than the less talented. Rousseau 
condemns the view which Nagel and Kant begrudgingly endorse. That is, if we want culture 
and the arts to flourish because we think that the world is made better when rationality is 
developed to its maximum limits, then this would almost certainly require inequalies of a 
significant kind. Rousseau not only demonstrates that this such inequalites are ‘disasterous’ 
and bad, becasue they are unfair or unjust, but he wants to further show that inequalities that 
are the result of the distinction in talents themselves are the cause of a futher litany of ills. If a 
nascent egalitarianism is contained in Rousseau’s remarks about the arts, then modern 
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